

NOT TO BE ISSUED

THE

L I F E

OF

MAJOR-GENERAL

SIR THOMAS MUNRO, BART.

AND K.C.B.

LATE GOVERNOR OF MADRAS.

WITH EXTRACTS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE
AND PRIVATE PAPERS.

1840

BY THE REV. G. R. GLEIG,

M.A. M.R.S.L. &c.

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dah.—I am senior to any of the officers now employed in that quarter," continued he: "I have seen as much service as any officer in the Madras army, having, with the exception of Lord Wellington's short campaign in 1803, been in every service with the army since June 1780, when Hyder Ally invaded the Carnatic."

The preceding letter was written in the month of January, 1817, when as yet the occurrence of a war had not been positively ascertained, or, to speak more correctly, when it was still a matter of doubt with whom the war should be waged. It contained sentiments perfectly in accordance with those of the Governor-General; yet the latter, though not unacquainted with the high character of Colonel Munro, declined to supersede officers already in the field. Whence this determination arose, whether from a feeling of delicacy towards the officers in question, or from a mistaken view of the civil duties in the discharge of which Colonel Munro was engaged, I possess no means of determining; but of the fact itself no doubt exists: indeed, it was distinctly stated, that even in the event of hostilities, his Excellency could hold out little hope that Colonel Munro would be employed actively in the field.

Time passed, and every day rendered more and more palpable the extent of the confederacy which had been formed for the overthrow of the British power. Not Scindiah, and Holkar, and Ameer Khan only, but the Peishwah himself became an object of suspicion; if not to other functionaries, at all events to Mr. Elphinstone, whose situation as resident gave him ample opportunities of observing, which his natural acuteness failed not to improve. It will be recollected, that early in 1817, a new treaty of alliance was set on foot with his Highness, which had for its object a more convenient mode of providing for the discharge of engagements already in force. To this, as it implied a considerable cession of territory, the Peishwah exhibited so much reluctance, that June arrived ere the negotiation produced any result; nor was it till the 13th day of that month that the treaty of Poona

of the new provinces ceded to the Company. Their local position gave to them great value in the existing state of affairs; in the event of a rupture with the Peishwah, that value would be increased fourfold; and hence both the Supreme Government and the Government of Madras were exceedingly desirous that no time should be lost in adjusting the transfer. Colonel Munro was strongly urged to accept the office of Commissioner in this arrangement.* It was not the kind of office which he desired to hold at a moment when hostilities were on the eve of commencing; nor did he conceive that the higher powers behaved to him with the consideration to which he was entitled, when they repeatedly pressed it upon him; but Colonel Munro had never accustomed himself to indulge a private feeling, when the public good seemed to be at issue; and, after a slight struggle between inclination and patriotism, he accepted it. He accordingly repaired to the Toombuddra, upon which a force was already assembled, to the command of which Brigadier-General Pritzler had been appointed, and assuming the temporary direction of it, made ready to occupy Darwar, either by persuasion or force.

No great difficulty was experienced in the accomplishment of this service. Major Newal, being pushed forward at the head of a battalion of sepoy, arrived in front of the place several days before Colonel Munro, who, with the remainder of the brigade, was hindered from passing the river by a violent flood; but that intelligent officer conducted matters with so much address, that he prevailed upon the garrison, though in a state of mutiny, to submit. Colonel Munro came up soon after they had evacuated the place, and took quiet possession. He remained here several weeks, transacting business, or rather striving to transact it, with the agents appointed by the Peishwah to meet him; and he addressed, during

* Among others, his friend Sir John Malcolm wrote to him in the following terms. "If you decline the appointment, I shall address you as Aboo Bekar did Omar. The latter said he did not want the Caliphate; I know that, said the expiring sovereign, but the Caliphate wants you."

of Scindiah's, as well as of Holkar's government, has so much declined since that period, that it is scarcely credible that either Scindiah or Meer Khan would venture to oppose by force, any measure for the suppression of the Pindarries. But it is still possible that they might act otherwise; for there is sometimes a kind of infatuation about Indian chiefs who have lost a part of their dominions, which tempts them to risk the rest in a contest which they know to be hopeless.

The situation of the British Government with regard to the Native powers, is entirely changed within the last twenty years. It formerly brought very small armies into the field, with hardly any cavalry; and the issue of any war in which it engaged was extremely uncertain. It now brings armies into the field superior to those of the enemy, not only in infantry, but also in cavalry, both in quality and in number. The superiority is so great, that the event of any struggle in which it may be engaged is no longer doubtful. It has only to bring forward its armies, and dictate what terms it pleases, either without war, or after a short and fruitless resistance. It may however be doubted whether, after the settlement of the Pindarries, it ought to avail itself of its predominant power, in order to extend the system of subsidiary alliances, by stationing a force in Bhopaul or in any other foreign territory. While the military power of Mysore and of the Mahratta chiefs was yet in its vigour, subsidiary alliances were in some degree necessary for its safety, but that time is now past; and when, therefore, the evils which subsidiary force entails upon every country in which it is established are considered, it appears advisable that future security against the Pindarries should be sought by their reduction, and by compelling Scindiah, for his conduct in supporting them, to cede the districts restored to him in 1805-6, rather than by stationing a subsidiary force in Bhopaul. There are many weighty objections to the employment of a subsidiary force. It has a natural tendency to render the government of every country in which it exists, weak and oppressive; to extinguish all honourable spirit among the higher classes of society, and to degrade and impoverish the whole people. The usual remedy of a bad government in India is a quiet revolution in the palace, or a violent one by rebellion, or foreign conquests. But the presence of a British force cuts off every chance of remedy, by supporting the prince on the throne against every foreign and domestic enemy. It renders him indolent, by teaching him to trust to strangers for

again commit a breach of the alliance. The Nizam will do the same; and the same consequences, a farther reduction of their power for our own safety, must again follow. Even if the prince himself were disposed to adhere rigidly to the alliance, there will always be some amongst his principal officers who will urge him to break it. As long as there remains in the country any high-minded independence, which seeks to throw off the control of strangers, such counsellors will be found. I have a better opinion of the natives of India than to think that this spirit will ever be completely extinguished; and I can therefore have no doubt that the subsidiary system must every where run its full course, and destroy every government which it undertakes to protect.

In this progress of things, the evil of a weak and oppressive government, supported by a subsidiary alliance, will at least be removed. But even if all India could be brought under the British dominion, it is very questionable whether such a change, either as it regards the natives or ourselves, ought to be desired. One effect of such a conquest would be, that the Indian army, having no longer any warlike neighbours to combat, would gradually lose its military habits and discipline, and that the Native troops would have leisure to feel their own strength, and, for want of other employment, to turn it against their European masters. But even if we could be secured against every internal convulsion, and could retain the country quietly in subjection, I doubt much if the condition of the people would be better than under their Native princes. The strength of the British Government—enables it to put down every rebellion, to repel every foreign invasion, and to give to its subjects a degree of protection which those of no Native power enjoy. Its laws and institutions also afford them a security from domestic oppression, unknown in those states; but these advantages are dearly bought. They are purchased by the sacrifice of independence—of national character—and of whatever renders a people respectable. The Natives of the British provinces may, without fear, pursue their different occupations, as traders, meerasidars, or husbandmen, and enjoy the fruits of their labour in tranquillity; but none of them can aspire to any thing beyond this mere animal state of thriving in peace—none of them can look forward to any share in the legislation, or civil or military government of their country. It is from men who either hold, or are eligible to public office, that Natives take their character: where no such men exist, there can

be no energy in any other class of the community. The effect of this state of things is observable in all the British provinces, whose inhabitants are certainly the most abject race in India. No elevation of character can be expected among men who, in the military line, cannot attain to any rank above that of subahdar, where they are as much below an ensign as an ensign is below the commander-in-chief, and who, in the civil line, can hope for nothing beyond some petty, judicial, or revenue office, in which they may, by corrupt means, make up for their slender salary.

The consequence, therefore, of the conquest of India by the British arms would be, in place of raising, to debase the whole people. There is perhaps no example of any conquest in which the Natives have been so completely excluded from all share of the government of their country as in British India.

Among all the disorders of the Native states, the field is open for every man to raise himself; and hence among them there is a spirit of emulation, of restless enterprise and independence, far preferable to the servility of our Indian subjects. The existence of independent Native states is also useful in drawing off the turbulent and disaffected among our Native troops. Many of these men belonging to the Madras army, formerly sought service in Mysore.

If the British Government is not favourable to the improvement of the Indian character, that of its control through a subsidiary force is still less so.

Its power is now so great, that it has nothing to fear from any combination; and it is perfectly able to take satisfaction for any insult, without any extension of the subsidiary system being necessary. It will generally be found much more convenient to carry on war where it has not been introduced. This was the case in both the wars with Tippoo Sultan. The conquest was complete, because our operations were not perplexed by any subsidiary alliance with him. The simple and direct mode of conquest from without, is more creditable both to our armies and to our national character, than that of dismemberment from within by the aid of a subsidiary force. However just the motives may be from which such a force acts, yet the situation in which it is placed, renders its acting at all too like the movements of the Prætorian bands. It acts, it is true, only by the orders of its own Government, and only for public objects; but still it is always ready in the neighbourhood of the capital, to dictate

of Soondoor recommended as a measure well calculated to please the Peishwah, but General Smith's division, which had hitherto remained in the vicinity of Poonah, was ordered in advance; and the residency was left, in the midst of an armed population, to the protection of an inconsiderable detachment of a few hundred sepoya.

At the suggestion of Mr. Elphinstone, Colonel Munro received instructions to employ the force with which he held Darwar, in the reduction of Soondoor. Leaving a small garrison to secure the former place, he marched on the 13th of October, and arriving in the valley on the 27th, Soondoor was immediately given up. There was something more than commonly striking in the circumstances which accompanied this surrender. The chieftain, Sheo Rao, had enjoyed his principality in uncontrolled possession for upwards of twenty years, holding his little court in a formidable stone fortress which commanded the valley; and he had been repeatedly heard to declare, that sooner than submit to the tyranny of the Peishwah, he would bury himself in its ruins. Against the strength of the British empire, however, he felt that it were madness to contend, and after a severe struggle, made up his mind to submit. "He came out," says an eye-witness, "with his little court and retinue, and met the detachment in the glen which leads into his valley; and on reaching the fort, he delivered up the keys with a dignified resignation, which affected every individual who witnessed the scene. He declared that no alternative was left to him, but to throw himself on the protection of the Company; and called aloud to Colonel Munro, when he took his leave, so as to be heard by all his followers, 'Think of my situation,—have some consideration for us all.'" The appeal was not made in vain. Colonel Munro, touched by the humiliation of the unfortunate man, at once acceded to every request which he advanced; and left him to the full as much overwhelmed with gratitude at the generosity of his conqueror, as sorrowful on account of the overthrow of his own importance. It is

worthy of remark, that when the Peishwah's Government came to be broken up, Colonel Munro recommended that Sheo Rao should be restored to his principality, and that the British Government, well disposed of itself to act with generosity, readily acceded to the proposition.

Having accomplished this service, Colonel Munro, in obedience to his instructions, gave up the command to Lieutenant-Colonel Newall, with directions to move the brigade to the point where Brigadier-General Pritzler was appointed to join. He himself, in the mean while, took the road to Darwar, with the intention of returning as soon as possible to the Presidency; for of military employment he now despaired; and the duties of Commissioner were not of a nature to detain him longer than need be from his family. But on reaching the former place on the 14th of November, intelligence came in, which gave a new turn to the whole of public affairs, and opened out to him new and more brilliant prospects. The attack upon the resident at Poona left no room to doubt that a Mahratta war was begun; and Colonel Munro instantly repeated his application to be placed in charge of a corps.

This was done on the 26th of November, in a letter descriptive of the state of the southern Mahratta country and of his own views touching the particular field in which his services might be made available. "I hold," he says, "at present the command of the troops in the expected cession in this quarter; but I can bring into the field only three or four companies of the garrison of Darwar, to which I propose to add a few hundred peons, for the purpose of expelling the Mahrattas from the slip of country between Darwar and Soondah. But even this subaltern command I deem more useful at the present moment, than that of any division south of the Toombuddra." On the 28th, however, he wrote again; and his letter contains so many evidences of the singular sagacity and profound calculations of the writer, that I cannot deny to the reader the satisfaction of perusing it at length.

"The hostile conduct of the Peishwah," says he, addressing himself to the Governor-General, "and my present situation in the middle of the southern Mahrattas, where I have an opportunity of seeing a good deal of their civil and military government, will, I hope, in some degree excuse my addressing your Lordship so soon again. No intelligence has yet been received here respecting the determination of Scindiah; but whether he accede to or reject the arrangement proposed to him, it seems desirable that the whole, or at least the greater part, of the Madras troops now in the field, should be brought as soon as possible to act against the Peishwah. The local situation of the Poona territories, and the still remaining influence of the Peishwah, as the nominal head of the Mahratta states, make the overthrow of his government the most important, perhaps, of all the measures that can be adopted for the safety of our own dominions.

"The Mahratta Government, from its foundation, has been one of the most destructive that ever existed in India. It never relinquished the predatory spirit of its founder, Sewajee. That spirit grew with its power; and when its empire extended from the Ganges to the Caverry, this nation was little better than a horde of imperial thieves. All other Hindoo states took a pride in the improvement of the country, and in the construction of pagodas, tanks, canals, and other public works. The Mahrattas have done nothing of this kind; their work has been chiefly desolation. They did not seek their revenue in the improvement of the country, but in the exactions of the established chout from their neighbours, and in predatory incursions to levy more. Though they have now fortunately been obliged to relinquish their claims, the wish to revive them will never cease but with the extinction of their power. A government so hostile in its principles to improvement and tranquillity ought, if possible, to be completely overthrown. It may be a matter of some difficulty to decide what ought to be established in its room, and whether the chief of the government should be taken from among the relations of the Peishwah or the descendants of Sewajee. Before the establishment of the new state, however, it might be expedient to require the cession of the southern Jagheers, and of the provinces south of the Kistna, to the British Government.

"The provinces between the Werdah and the Kistna are not properly Mahratta: though there is a considerable mixture of Mahrattas, the Canarase form the great body of the people. The Mahratta jagheerdars and their principal servants are therefore considered, in some measure, as strangers and conquerors. The

best of the horse are in general Mahrattas, and no doubt attached to their chiefs; but the infantry in the forts and villages are mostly Canarese, and ready to join any power that will pay them. All the trading classes are anxious for the expulsion of the Mahrattas, because they interrupt their trade by arbitrary exactions, and often plunder them of their whole property. The heads of villages, a much more powerful body than the commercial, are likewise very generally desirous of being relieved from the Mahratta dominion. If the Peishwah do not submit unconditionally, or if the greater part of the Madras troops can be soon brought against him, the conquest of his territory will be effected without much difficulty. But in the event of his not submitting, and of its not being practicable to employ speedily such a force against him, the conquest of his southern provinces would be much facilitated by pursuing the course adopted by Hyder Ally in this very country, of garrisoning all the forts and walled villages with peons from Mysore and the Ceded Districts. By this means the regular force is kept entire for field-service, and the civil as well as the military possession of the country is obtained. An army of horse, which is excluded from the principal towns and villages, cannot remain long together; it can receive no regular supplies; its chiefs having no place of security, can have no treasure, except in their camp, which is soon exhausted; the troops are not paid, become dispirited, and gradually disperse; for even the most irregular and predatory troops cannot be kept long together in the field, unless they have a home to which they can retire in security with their plunder."

The preceding letter is in every respect worthy of the high talents and fervent zeal of its writer; but the end which he sought to attain, was, by the unsolicited favour of Lord Hastings, already accomplished. So early as the 20th of October, a Brigadier's commission had been made out for Colonel Munro, and forwarded to the Commander-in-chief of the army of the Deccan, with instructions to transmit it whenever the fitting moment should appear to the latter to have arrived. There could be no doubt as to the sentiments either of Sir Thomas Hislop or of any other officer attached to his army on such an occasion. All earnestly desired to see Colonel Munro associated with themselves in the important operations before them; and the commission was in conse-

with which General Pritzler might assist in following the Peishwah to any point on which he might retire, whilst the remainder, with a few heavy guns, should be sent back to him, for the purpose of being employed in the siege of the forts with which the southern Mahratta country was studded. In the mean while, however, he determined not to trust to contingencies, upon the certain occurrence of which it was impossible to count, but with his five companies of *sepoys* to cross the Toombuddra, and open the campaign in the enemy's country. This was at once a generous and a bold plan—generous as far as the feelings of others were affected, and bold as it referred to his own situation. Yet the reasoning upon which it rested was as sound in theory, as the promptitude with which he carried it into execution was laudable.

General Munro knew perfectly well, that a force so inadequate as his could offer no resistance whatever to a numerous army prepared to pass the frontier of the Madras territory at a variety of points. The division which advanced directly against himself, he might perhaps repulse; but in the mean while other corps would make good their entrance, and the Company's possessions must suffer insult, which it would be impossible for him either to ward off or avenge. On the other hand, he justly calculated, that were he to carry the war into the enemy's country, they would naturally think first of resisting the aggression; and hence, should no other benefit arise out of the movement, it would at all events serve the purpose of securing the British subjects against the evils of a contest at their own doors. But his calculations were too profound and too justly formed, not to extend beyond this. He conceived, that by alarming the feudatory chiefs for the safety of their own possessions, he would shake their fealty to their superior; whilst a few successes in the outset would in all probability deprive them of the power, if not of the inclination, to do serious mischief during the remainder of the struggle. It was well, under such circumstances, that the strong fortress of Soondoor

On the 5th of February General Munro once more took the field, at the head of twelve companies of infantry, four of them being Mysoreans, three troops of horse, four companies of pioneers, four long guns, as many field-pieces, and one howitzer. He directed his march upon Badaumee, a fortress situated on the Malpurba, by a route so intricate, that the pioneers were continually employed in opening a path for the column, whilst both were exposed to repeated annoyance from the enemy's cavalry, which in great numbers hovered round them. On the 9th he reached Belloor, the garrison, consisting of four hundred horse and three hundred foot, escaping over the hills as he approached, and leaving him to take unmolested possession of a place not devoid of importance. Here he halted till the 12th, preparing his feeble means, as he best could, for the siege; and then pushed forward in high spirits and excellent order towards Badaumee.

After carrying by assault a fortified pagoda, which commanded the line of his march, General Munro arrived in presence of the place to be attacked, and immediately took up the best position which his scanty numbers would permit. This was directly in front of the lower range of works, for Badaumee consists of a number of entrenched heights, having a walled town at the foot of them; and before any attempt could be made upon the former, it was necessary to obtain possession of the latter. No time was lost in throwing up and arming batteries, which played upon the wall without intermission, till a breach being effected on the 17th, which appeared to be practicable, preparations were made to storm. The place was carried with little loss, notwithstanding a gallant defence offered by the garrison in the streets, and the assailants pressed on with so much vigour to escalade the fort, that its commandant hung out a signal of surrender. The garrison, marching out with their arms and private baggage, were permitted to depart with a safe conduct; and by ten o'clock at night of the 18th, Badaumee was in full possession of the British force.

With the single exception of Darwar, there was no fortified town south of the Kistna to be compared in point of importance with Badaunee; and even Darwar was so far inferior to its rival, that its works were both less regular and less extensive. As a necessary consequence, the fall of such a place produced a strong sensation wherever intelligence of the event arrived; and as General Munro had been joined during the siege by the long-expected reinforcements, an opinion speedily obtained throughout the South of the Mahratta country, that to offer resistance to his arms was absolutely useless. Bagreecotah, a fort of some strength upon the Gutpurba, scarcely waited to be summoned ere it opened its gates; whilst Hangul submitted to a single company of sepoy, detached under Lieutenant Stott to straiten its garrison. In a word, the whole of the territory on the south of the Gutpurba was subdued; and nothing remained for him to effect, except the consolidation and political arrangement of his conquests.

Partly with a view to effect this end, partly that he might repair, as far as possible, the injury done to his cannon during the late siege, General Munro halted at Bagreecotah from the 22nd to the 26th. This was not however, at least to him, a period of rest or relaxation. On the contrary, but a faint idea will be entertained of the extent of business with which he was oppressed, if the mere detail of his own military movements be considered; indeed it may with truth be asserted that these, rapid and sometimes hazardous as they were, occupied much less of his attention than the many other arrangements to which he was a party; for, during the entire course of his warlike operations, he was compelled to administer all the civil and revenue details of the different provinces which he overran. He kept up at the same time a constant correspondence with Mr. Elphinstone, Sir Thomas Hislop, Sir John Malcolm, and others, by whom he was regularly consulted as to the general plan of the war; and this was the more embarrassing, because on their parts the corre-

spendence was in cipher, to which, though he repeatedly applied for it, the Madras Government neglected to supply a key. It is impossible, in a work like the present, to insert even a few of the many admirable letters written by him at this period; but I have introduced into the Appendix more than one official communication, which will serve as a specimen of the rest, and suffice to prove the truth of the remark just hazarded, as to the multiplicity of affairs which he was called upon to transact.

On the 26th of February, General Munro again pressed forward, directing his steps up the right bank of the Gut-purba, with a view, first, of completing his conquests south of that river, and then carrying his arms into the districts on the north. The breaking down of some of his guns delayed him, so that he did not reach Gohauk till the 7th of March, but here he crossed the stream, and, re-crossing at Gooda-gurry, encamped before Paudshapoor, which immediately submitted. One fortress only, that of Belgam, now remained in the occupation of the Peishwah's troops: it was a place of greater strength than any which he had yet attacked, and was held by a garrison of not less than one thousand six hundred men; it is not therefore wonderful that, with his scanty means, he should have experienced some doubt as to the prudence of attempting it. But his hesitation, if such it deserve to be called, exerted no farther influence over him than to produce a powerful appeal for farther means; and when he found that the exigency of the service would permit no attention to be paid to it, he shrank not from the responsibility of employing those already within his reach. He arrived before the place on the 20th; and such were the skill and energy with which the siege was pushed, that on the 10th of April a capitulation was signed. By this the enemy pledged themselves to evacuate the fortress by the evening of the 14th at the latest; and on the 12th, General Munro was in possession of one of the most formidable fortifications in this quarter of India, the *excelsior* of which, covered by a

broad and deep ditch, measures about a mile and five furlongs.

It is scarcely necessary to observe, that General Munro's official dispatch, giving an account of this operation, speaks warmly in praise of the zeal and intelligence of both officers and men who served under him. Perhaps no man in command ever did greater justice to his inferiors, or took less credit to himself; and hence, whilst we find Lieut.-Colonel Newall, Lieuts. Lewis and Dickenson, Walker and Mackay, mentioned in the terms which their gallantry and devotion deserved, not one syllable of self-commendation is to be discovered in the document. This, however, was only one out of many noble traits in the character of Sir Thomas Munro. Whether wealth or fame were the prize to be gained, there never lived a human being more perfectly free from selfishness; indeed, it appeared as if, on all occasions, he was more anxious that others should reap their merited rewards, than that common justice should be done to his own pre-eminent exertions.*

The loss sustained by the British army during this siege amounted to no more than twenty-three men killed and wounded; that of the enemy was admitted by themselves to exceed seventy. The result of the operation placed at the disposal of the conqueror a strong and commanding fortress, thirty-six pieces of ordnance of large calibre, sixty smaller guns and wall-pieces, besides complete stores of every description. No acquisition could have fallen into General Munro's hands of which the value was more likely to be acknowledged; for his eighteen-pounders were so run at the touchhole, through repeated use, that three fingers might have been easily introduced.

General Munro rested his over-wrought division at Belgam

* General Munro was so deficient in gunners, and indeed in Europeans generally during this siege, that he was obliged to employ the troopers of the 22nd dragoons, both as artillery-men and grenadiers. He speaks of their services in these capacities as being most meritorious.

till the 17th, employing himself all the while in the consolidation of his conquests; after which, being apprised of the march of General Pritzler with the main body of the reserve, for the purpose of joining and acting henceforth under his orders, he put his little column in motion to meet it. He retraced his steps towards the Gutpurba, which for the third time he crossed on the 18th; and on the following day the much-wished-for junction was effected at a place called Nugger Manowlie. Now then at length the subject of this memoir saw himself at the head of a somewhat respectable force; and he who had effected so much with means apparently inadequate to any thing, was not slow in entering, with his enlarged resources, upon operations of still greater importance.

The fall of Belgam having completed the conquest of the Peishwah's dominions south of the Kistna, General Munro determined to grant him no cessation; but to push forward as far as the Beemah, between which and the Gutpurba Cassée Rao's select infantry and guns were known to be encamped. No needless wavering occurred in the execution of this project; for the division, marching on the 26th, compelled the enemy to fall back with precipitation, and arrived on the 9th of May, in front of his position, under the guns of Sholapoor. General Munro, in spite of a heavy fire from the works, closely and accurately reconnoitred it. A native officer was then sent forward with proposals for the surrender of the place; but the Arab governor, regardless of the sanctity of his flag, murdered him at the foot of the rampart. Nothing therefore remained but to commence the siege with as little delay as possible; and to this end, the energies of every man and officer in the British camp were henceforth zealously directed.

"The fort of Sholapoor," says Colonel Blacker, "is an oblong of considerable area, with a wall and *fausse-braye* of substantial masonry, flanked by substantial round-towers. A broad and deep wet ditch surrounds the place, and the

north and east sides are covered by an extensive pettah, surrounded by a good wall, and divided in the same manner into two parts, of which one is immediately contiguous to the fort. To the southward, communicating with the ditch, is a tank, surrounded on three sides by a mound, which in its extent formed a respectable breastwork to the enemy's position under the walls. Their force, thus strongly posted, amounted to eight hundred and fifty horse, five thousand five hundred and fifty foot,* including one thousand two hundred Arabs, and fourteen guns; independent of the garrison, estimated at one thousand. Major de Pinto, a country-born descendant of Europeans, commanded the regular infantry, and the Native chief, named Gunput Rao Phansee, was the hereditary commandant of the Peishwah's artillery."

From the description which has been given of the ground occupied by the enemy's field-force, it will be seen that nothing effective could be attempted against the fort, while the covering army continued unbroken; and that to hazard an attack upon it, without first of all gaining possession of the works on which it leaned, would have been to waste the lives of his own soldiers for no purpose. General Munro accordingly directed his attention chiefly to the reduction of the pettah; and having ascertained that the walls were not so lofty, nor the ditch so deep as to render an escalade impracticable, he resolved to make trial of that species of assault.

* Colonel Blacker, though for the most part remarkable for his accuracy, has in the present instance greatly underrated the amount of the enemy's force. By official returns obtained after the siege, it proved to be—

Of Arabs	2000
Mohillas	1500
Sindees	1000
Goswams	700
Major Pinto's Infantry	1000
Hindostani and Deccan ditto	4000
Total	10,200
Cavalry	1,500
Grand total	11,700

the defeat of the covering army, anticipated the threatened assault, by proposing to capitulate. His offer was not rejected; and the garrison being permitted to march out with arms and private baggage, Shalapoor was taken quiet possession of by the conquerors. There were found in the place, besides wall-pieces, and abundance of military stores and ammunition, thirty-seven guns of different calibres; whilst the total loss sustained during the progress of a service so arduous, amounted to no more than one hundred and two men and officers killed and wounded. But the importance of this capture, and of the victory which preceded it, is not to be estimated by the number of people slain, or the amount of material captured. There cannot be a doubt that intelligence of so heavy a disaster took away from the Peishwah the last glimmering of hope which he might have hitherto encouraged, and tended not a little to bring about the memorable negotiation, which ended soon afterwards in his surrender to Sir John Malcolm.

With the fall of Shalapoor, General Munro's brilliant campaign may be said to have closed, inasmuch as no other place offered the slightest resistance to his arms. Attempts were indeed made by several of the chieftains, more particularly by Appa Dessaye, a jagheerdar of great influence, to overreach in negotiation one whom they ventured not to resist by force; but General Munro's knowledge of the native character was too intimate to lay him open to wiles which he saw through, and defeated with the utmost coolness. The following letter to Mr. Elphinstone will explain how these matters were managed.

2nd June, 1812.

AFTER leaving Sattarah on the morning of the 29th ultimo, I rejoined the reserve the following day about noon. On my arrival, I found that an order from Appa Dessaye to his officers at Manowlia, directing the immediate surrender of that place to the Company, had been received in camp, and dispatched about an hour before. Though the order itself was perfectly clear, I was convinced, both from the character of the Dessaye;

and his recent conduct, that it would not be acted upon, without an attempt being made to gain time to try the effect of negotiation; I therefore determined to prevent all unnecessary delay by marching to Nepawnee. I informed the two dewans of the Dessaye, who were in camp, of my intention. They endeavoured to dissuade me from advancing, by urging all the usual arguments about their master's sincerity and attachment to the British Government. I told them that their master had been long enough at hand to have carried into effect the order which I had sent to them ten or twelve days ago, for the surrender of Manowlie, if he had been disposed to do it;—that the season was too far advanced for me to halt, in order to see whether he was sincere or not;—that I should in consequence march next morning, the 31st May;—that on the 1st June I should encamp before Nepawnee, and that if the receipt for the delivery of Manowlie to the person whom I had sent to receive possession of that place, did not reach me early on the 2nd, I should, on that day, treat the Dessaye as an enemy, and commence the siege of his fort.

On hearing this, the dewan, Nachur Punt, said, that he would himself instantly proceed to Manowlie and deliver it up, which he did accordingly.

When I marched from Erroor on the 31st ultimo, Appa Dessaye had sent no order for giving up the district of Chickoree. His second dewan, Singoo Punt, who accompanied me, proposed to deliver up the circar, and retain the enaum villages. His plan was at once rejected, because it would in fact have enabled the Dessaye to continue to maintain a number of his servants at the expense of the districts. I told the dewan that the order must be for the surrender of the whole district, without any reservation, and that it must be brought to me before my arrival at Nepawnee. He met me on the march yesterday morning with this order; but as it reserved the enaum villages, it was returned to him; and he soon after came back with another order for unconditional surrender. As the time during which he was absent was too short to admit of his having gone to Nepawnee for the second order, it was evident that he had brought *both* with him.

Such is a brief and imperfect outline of the services of Sir Thomas Munro, during the war with the Peishwah and the Mahrattas, in 1817 and 1818. From first to last, they were carried on under disadvantages against which few besides him,

self would have held up; yet their results were such as an ordinary mind, however enthusiastic in its calculations, could not for a moment have anticipated. Of the hindrances thrown in his way, a tolerably correct estimate must have been already formed. He could scarcely be said to be at the head of an army, even when General Pritzler joined him; and till that event occurred, his whole force fell short of the strength of a moderate-sized regiment. The Madras Government, moreover, by what principle actuated I presume not to say, was the reverse of diligent in attending to his requests: nay, there are circumstances connected with their proceedings, which would almost lead the indifferent spectator to conclude that failure on his part would have been more acceptable than the most brilliant success. The extraordinary vacillation likewise displayed by those in power—the shifting of command from General Pritzler to General Munro, and from General Munro to General Pritzler,—might, and in ordinary cases must, have led to the worst consequences. Indeed, it is not going too far to affirm, that nothing but the great temper, and pure and honourable zeal of these officers, hindered such an issue from taking place.

Again, upon General Munro was devolved not merely the conduct of the war, but the civil administration of all the provinces which he obtained by conquest or cession. Every question connected with the settlement of claims, the adjustment of the revenue, and the administration of justice, was referred to him, by which means his tent was not more the head-quarters of an army, than the chief civil court in the Southern Mahratta country. Then his correspondence with other functionaries was voluminous. All unprejudiced men estimated him as he deserved, and were in consequence glad to avail themselves of his advice; whilst he was too sincere a patriot to refuse his counsel, though aware that of the merit of deeds arising out of it he would reap no portion.

But if General Munro's difficulties were of no ordinary nature, and if there were a few quarters where the result of

him at a distance; I had seen him near. Lord Hastings, however, showed on this, as on every other occasion, that he had only one desire—how best to provide for every possible exigency of the public service.

It is not worth while to incumber the pages of a work like this with transcripts from the numerous official documents which lie within the reach of all men; but the two following panegyrics, the one contained in a private letter from Lord Hastings, the other spoken by Mr. Canning on occasion of a vote of thanks being passed to the army in India, are too eloquent to be omitted.

"In a public acknowledgment of your exploits," says the former, "I have striven to express my opinion of their tone and importance. With that attempt, however, I cannot be satisfied; it may be liable to be considered as one of those official recognitions, where the phrases are not supposed to be exactly measured; and when he who offers the compliment may be suspected of exaggeration in the terms, for the sake of proving his own liberality in the estimate of his command of language. Allow me, therefore, to indulge myself in a private declaration of my sentiments, that I may assert the formal tribute paid by me to your merits, to have been strictly what your conduct claimed; assuring you of my sincere regret, that your exertions should have contributed in any way to the injury of your health. Let me say, that I do not speak on your own individual account only: I have a deep sense of the loss which the public interest sustains by your relinquishment of active employment. You too have the consciousness, would you avow it, of this latter feeling in your breast; and you will internally grieve that you cannot continue to advance those great objects which you have so conspicuously promoted. It will be some consolation to you to know, that you must convey with you the applause of all who have witnessed your energy and judgment; while this letter will be my testimony to our honourable employers, that they cannot too highly rate the quality of your efforts in their service."

Mr. Canning's meed of praise, doubly valuable as arising from a man whose eloquence left an impression never to be effaced on the minds of his auditors, was as follows. After

applauding, as they deserved, other armies and other leaders, the speaker went on to say ;—

“ At the southern extremity of this long line of operations, and in a part of the campaign carried on in a district far from public gaze, and without the opportunities of early especial notice, was employed a man whose name I should indeed have been sorry to have passed over in silence. I allude to Colonel Thomas Munro, a gentleman of whose rare qualifications the late House of Commons had opportunities of judging at their bar, on the renewal of the East India Company's charter, and than whom Europe never produced a more accomplished statesman, nor India, so fertile in heroes, a more skilful soldier. This gentleman, whose occupations for some years must have been rather of a civil and administrative than a military nature, was called early in the war to exercise abilities which, though dormant, had not rusted from disuse. He went into the field with not more than five or six hundred men, of whom a very small proportion were Europeans, and marched into the Mahratta territories, to take possession of the country which had been ceded to us by the treaty of Poonah. The population, which he subjugated by arms, he managed with such address, equity, and wisdom, that he established an empire over their hearts and feelings. Nine forts* were surrendered to him, or taken by assault, on his way ; and at the end of a silent and scarcely observed progress, he emerged from a territory heretofore hostile to the British interest, with an accession instead of a diminution of force, leaving every thing secure and tranquil behind him. This result speaks more than could be told by any minute and extended commentary.”

To the above testimonials in favour of the great merits of General Munro, no language of mine could add any thing. All therefore that I feel called upon to observe is, that there was not a point connected with the well-being of an army, to which he paid not the most scrupulous and unremitting attention. By a discipline strict, yet mildly administered, he at once kept officers and men to their duty ; whilst of maraud-

* Mr. Caning was mistaken as to the number of fortresses reduced. Even those subdued under the immediate eye of General Munro himself exceeded the number of nine ; and if others captured under his auspices be counted, they will amount to more than thrice nine.

ing or wanton plunder, scarcely an instance occurred during the entire course of the service.

"He possessed," says an officer now in England, who filled a responsible situation on his staff, "the happiest talent at conciliating every one under his command, whether European or Native, by his open, manly, just, and honourable way of acting on all occasions; but he never sacrificed duty. He never allowed any one to assume an authority that belonged to him by right of his situation; and he was ever most scrupulous not to encroach on the rights and privileges of others, either directly or indirectly. I never met such a considerate man. He never would allow a rude or uncourteous letter to be addressed to any officer, let his rank be what it may, though he never allowed any thing improper to pass unnoticed, and used severity when necessary, but always reluctantly. He never allowed a letter or order to issue under his name, without its being first shown to and approved by him. When displeasure was expressed, and found afterwards not to be deserved, he always acknowledged his error as openly as he had expressed his disapprobation; but these errors seldom happened with him, for he had too much value for the feelings of all under him."

The war being now at an end, General Munro, whose health had suffered severely from fatigue, made ready to rejoin his wife and family, whom he had left at Bangalore. For this purpose he applied for leave to resign all his commissions civil as well as military; and though strongly urged by the Governor-General to assist his friend Mr. Elphinstone in permanently settling the conquered districts, he resolutely refused. No sooner, therefore, was the reluctant consent of the Marquis of Hastings received, than he gave up his command, and took the road to Madras: yet even on this occasion he was not inattentive to the public good. He drew up a paper on the state of the country, whilst prosecuting his journey, which for clearness and energy might serve as a model to all compilers of statistics.

General Munro found his family anxiously waiting his return at Bangalore, with whom he arrived in due time at

they have only a few very small districts, chiefly in the dominions of Scindiah and Holkar. Some of their chiefs were formerly in the service of the Mysore and other Native governments, and are now, from the weakness of their governments, enabled to maintain some kind of independence; and as their possessions are inadequate to the maintenance of their followers, they make up the deficiency by levying contributions both on their Pagan and Christian neighbours. They can make no resistance, and will probably disperse on the advance of our armies, and seek employment under some of the Native states. Scindiah and Holkar's family will, I imagine, accede to any terms we may dictate. Enough of politics,—I am almost tired of them, and often wished, when I read your letter, describing your journey to the Continent, that I had been with you. Few have seen so much in so short a time; and at a time when Buonaparte's operations have rendered most countries on the Continent much more interesting than ever they were before.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp near Tamberhill, 1st November, 1817.

SIR,

My letters of the 27th and 31st October will have informed you of the quiet surrender of Sundoor by its chief Sheo Row. I wrote to him on the 18th October, apprising him of the object of my march, and offering him a jagheer of eight thousand rupees in any part of the Company's territory. I did not consider this sum as being an adequate compensation for the loss of his district, but as I was aware that many demands would be brought forward for relations and dependents, I thought it best to begin upon a low scale.

On the 22nd October, I received his answer, which expressed in a general way, that it was his wish to conform to the desires of the British Government, and stated that he would send two Vakeels to treat with me. The Vakeels arrived in camp on the 24th October, bringing with them a paper containing a long list of Sheo Row's demands, among which were a jagheer of twelve thousand rupees for himself, smaller ones for his brother and sister, and provision for his principal servants. I promised that he should have a jagheer of nine thousand rupees; that the Vakeels should each receive an allowance of fifteen star pagodas monthly, and that the other claims should be taken into consideration on my arrival at Sundoor. The Vakeels objected to the smallness

from the inhabitants of Sundoor and those of the neighbouring districts under the British Government, concerning Sheo Row, his claims to Sundoor seem to be in some respects better founded than they are stated to be in your letter to Mr. Strachey of the 10th December, 1816. Sundoor formed a part of the principality of Mora Row, the Mahratta chief of Gootty, who was deprived of his dominions by Hyder Ally. His adopted son, Sheo Row Bapa, fell in battle, leaving a son, Seddajee, only two years old, under the guardianship of his uncle, Vencata Row. In 1790, Vencata Row and his nephew Seddajee, with a party of their own adherents, assisted by the inhabitants of Sundoor, expelled Tippoo Sultan's Killedar, and got possession of the place, which they were allowed to retain after the peace of 1792, as part of the ancient inheritance of their family. Seddajee died without issue in 1796, on which his uncle, Vencata Row, applied to Dowlet Row, the half-brother of Mora Row, for one of his sons to be adopted by the widow, which was refused. He then made the same request of Eshwunt Row, who also refused, but said that he might have one of the sons of his younger brother, Kundy Row. An application being made to Kundy Row, he consented, and gave his son Sheo Row, the present Chief. None of the descendants of Mora Row ventured to reside in Sundoor during the life of Tippoo, because, being completely surrounded by his dominions, they were afraid of being seized by treachery; but on his death, in 1799, Vencata Row and Sheo Row went to Sundoor. The Peishwah about the same time issued a sunnud, granting Sundoor as a jagheer to Eshwunt Row. No use was made of this sunnud until some years after, when Eshwunt Row sent a copy of it with a letter to Vencata Row, saying that he wished that means might be taken to prevent discussions in their families. Vencata Row, therefore, sent for Narsing Row, the second son of Eshwunt, in 1804, and gave him an allowance of one hundred pagodas monthly; but as Narsing Row attempted to form a party, he was dismissed in 1808.

It would appear as if Eshwunt Row had acknowledged the claim of Sheo Row, from his permitting his son to serve under him. Whatever may be the question of right, there can be none of possession,—Sheo Row has held it during the long period of twenty-one years. He was in fact an independent prince, by the same right that so many other Mahratta chiefs have become so. He was independent before the treaty of Bassein, and can hardly, therefore, be included among the refractory vassals whom the

British Government are bound by that treaty to reduce, any more than many other greater vassals, who had before that time shaken off their allegiance to the Peishwah. It is true that the Peishwah has always regarded him as a rebellious vassal, and has never admitted his right to Sandoor.

I trust, however, that on considering the long possession of Sheo Row, his claims as the descendant of Mora Row to a small corner of the dominions of his ancestors, and his patient and moderate conduct, the most Noble the Governor-General will be disposed to grant him a more liberal compensation for the loss of his little principality, than that which I have thought myself at liberty to promise. I have the honour to be, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MRS. MUNRO.

Dummal, 19th November, 1817.

I LEFT camp yesterday morning, and the sudden transition from constant noise and bustle, to silence and solitude, appears almost like a dream. This is the only time since my last return to India that I have travelled alone by regular stages, except during my journey from Hurribur to Darwar. I was glad that you were not in camp, because it would have been both fatiguing and uncomfortable to me as well as to yourself, and would have been a very inconvenient interruption to the free and constant access which every body in a camp should have to the commanding officer; but, now that I am alone, I am sorry that you are away. It is only when I am alone, however, that I wish for you. I should not like to have you at Darwar, because I might be called away suddenly, and be obliged to leave you alone among strangers, and the distance from Madras would be too great for you to undertake the journey alone. I wished much to have had you with me this morning in my walk. The weather is so cool, that I went out after breakfast, between ten and eleven, and strolled along the bank of a rocky nullah for an hour; often standing still for some minutes, looking at the water tumbling over the stones, and the green sod and bushes looking greener from a bright sun. There is nothing I enjoy so much as the sight and the sound of water gushing and murmuring among rocks and stones. I fancy I could look on the stream for ever—it never tires me. I never see a brawling rivulet in any part of the world, without thinking of the one I first saw in my earliest years, and wishing myself beside it again. There seems to be a kind of sym-

pathy among them all. They have all the same sound, and in India and Scotland they resemble each other more than any other part of the landscape. I had written thus far about one o'clock to-day, when I was interrupted by the killedar of this place wanting a pass to visit a pagoda in the Company's territory, with twenty horsemen; then came complaints from the head man of the village about camp-followers; then my own Bramin and Mahratta letters, which, with half an hour for dinner, occupied me till dark. As the same thing will happen to-morrow, and to-morrow, I am now finishing this letter by candlelight, with the help of a handkerchief tied over the shade. This, I believe, is the first time since we were at Shevagunga that I have had such an apparatus. When I was encamped about three weeks ago on the spot where I am now, every thing looked dismal: it had been raining constantly for many weeks, the ground was swampy, the tents were wet outside and inside, and man and beast were jaded. The ground is now dry and covered with grass, as if not a foot had ever trodden upon it; the change is so great, that it seems to me like a transition from war to peace, and as if a long time had passed since I was here. I shall feel the same thing at every halting-place on my way to Darwar, and I shall be harassed with complaints from every village about my own devastations among the grain-fields, when I was marching down this way.

I have contrived to read the whole four volumes you sent me of the *Tales of my Landlord*. The *Black Dwarf* is an absurd thing with little interest, and some very disgusting characters. I like *Old Mortality* much; but certainly not so well as *Guy Mannering*. Cuddie has got a little of Sambo about him. His testifying mother is just such an auld wife as I have often seen in the West. Colonel Graham is drawn with great spirit; and I feel the more interested in him from knowing that he is the celebrated Lord Dundee. I admire Edith, but I should like her better if she were not so wonderfully wise—she talks too much like an Edinburgh Reviewer. Kind remembrance to Cochrane and his lady.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE, &c.

Camp at Darwar, 18th December, 1817.

SIR,

I HAD the honour to receive last night from Brigadier-General Fritzier a copy of your letter to him of the 3rd instant, and of your letter to me of the 27th Nov. It was probably the

original of this letter that was lost by one of the two peons who brought me your letter of the 1st instant.

I shall treat all the Jagheerdars, except Gocklah, as friends. I have frequent communication with the Dessay of Kittoor, and have little doubt, both from the local situation of his country and other causes, that he is sincere in his propositions. I shall, however, put his sincerity to the proof in a few days, by calling upon him to aid us in expelling a party of the enemy from a small place in this neighbourhood. I have already got possession of a considerable number of places in this district, entirely by the assistance of the inhabitants, of whom nine-tenths at least are in our favour.

In my letter of the 14th instant, I mentioned that Parusghur had set the example, and that all that the inhabitants had requested was, that they should not be transferred to any Jagheerdars. I should have little doubt of gradually getting possession of all the territory south of the Malpurbab, by the help of the armed inhabitants, if the enemy had nothing to oppose to us but their garrisons. But as they are increasing the body of horse near Badaural, under Cassi Row, who may be expected to act immediately; and as we have no moveable force while the reserve is at a distance, it may become difficult to keep what we have got. The two places mentioned in your letter would be of great use in securing our communications, and might be easily taken were the reserve near.

The Commander-in-Chief's instructions to me of the 19th ultimo, direct me to consider the Company's frontier as the first object, Hyderabad as the second, and the Southern Mahrattas as the third. It is evident that there is nothing to hinder the enemy, while the reserve is in advance, from collecting two or three thousand horse to the eastward of this, who, though they will not face our troops, may attempt to pass the frontier and plunder the country.

This might be prevented by having a force, exclusive of the garrison of Darwar, of not less than a complete battalion of sepoys, to move between the Kistna and the Toombuddra on whatever point it might be necessary; you will be able to judge whether the reserve ought to act with General Smith's force, or to return to the Kistna. If it return immediately, we should soon get possession of what was necessary in the Carnatic, which by covering the Company's frontier, would leave that force more at liberty to act at a distance.

by ten or twenty Peons, and they can therefore do no material injury to the country. It was formerly the same in the Ceded Districts, and will be so again whenever the proper precautions are adopted.

I need not mention that breaches in the walls of villages should be repaired as far as may be practicable. I have, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp near Darwar, 25th January, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE this moment received yours of the 15th, and though much of it is in cipher, I can make out the general meaning of it. It will be impossible to discuss the various questions you propose until we meet, or until the war is over; but this is of little consequence, because I think that, during war, harm rather than good would arise from the appointment of civil collectors in districts in which there is any enemy, or which are liable to be overrun.

Military possession is the great object during war, the next is to collect what we can by the help of Native Tishildars. These should collect from the potails, or heads of villages, and the potails from the rayets. There should be no farming; there should be no innovation, at least during the war. The rents should be much lower than usual, or the inhabitants will have no motive to join us. We should rather endeavour to hinder the enemy from getting revenue than to collect such ourselves; our revenue measures at present should all be directed towards the facilitating of our military operations. I find the revenue a heavy task, but it would be much heavier were it not under my immediate charge. If you have any military officer conversant with revenue, it would be convenient to employ him for the present. If you have not, the easiest and simplest way would be to direct the business yourself, through the aid of an experienced revenue servant as secretary.

The person I would recommend for this office is Mr. McDonnell, or should he not be present, Mr. Nisbet.

The police should remain under the Potails of villages and Tishildars of districts; both should have judicial authority in petty matters. The Collector should be judge and magistrate; road and market customs, and all other duties should remain as at present until the conclusion of the war. Districts which may

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp at Newdigood, 20th January, 1816.

SIR,

I wrote you on the 21st, 22nd, and 25th instant. I received yesterday General Pritzer's letter of the 23rd, inclosing yours and General Smith's to him without date, mentioning that General Smith would be at Hattani on the 23rd instant, and that if the Peishwah escaped, the whole of both forces would be formed into two divisions, one for pursuit, and the other for besieging forts and occupying the country. If such a pursuing force can be formed as may be able to force the Peishwah to fight or to take refuge in a fort, it would be better than a continuance of the present plan. But if such a force cannot be formed, it would perhaps be better to persevere in the present plan, as you will harass the Peishwah more and yourselves less by following him with two divisions, than by following him with one only. If you pursue with only one division, the besieging force must be equal to any thing the Peishwah can bring against it, because he may outrun the pursuing force and attack the besieging one, if it is not sufficiently strong.

Before this letter can be received, your plan will probably have been fixed; should I not be able to join in time to take the command of the main body of the reserve, I shall take that of the besieging force. It may require consideration how far it may be advisable to treat the Jagheerdars as friends for some time longer. If they employ their whole force actively against us, this indulgence cannot be necessary. But you have the best means of knowing what their conduct is.

In besieging forts, it would, perhaps be proper to begin with those contiguous to our own territory, and to proceed so as to obtain a connected command of the country as we advanced. In this view it would be necessary to begin with the Peishwah's forts, between the Malpurba and the Kistna, neglecting such of them as are of little importance in securing our communications. But if it be determined to act hostilely towards the Jagheerdars, it may probably be deemed expedient to begin with the attack of such of their forts as might, from the fear of losing them, be most likely to induce them to quit the Peishwah; if, however, there is no great chance of the fall of their forts producing this effect, we ought to begin with those the possession of which will gain us the firmest hold of the country.

I have, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT.

Camp at Morad, 30th January 1818.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to enclose copies of two letters from the Honourable M. Elphinstone to Brigadier-General Pritzer, respecting the movements of the Peishwah's army. As the Peishwah was on the 23rd a few miles to the north-west of General Smith's force, it is probable that he will be able to escape to the northward. His army is much harassed, and, even if not forced to action, must lose a number of horses and camels in its flight. General Pritzer, in his reply to Mr. Elphinstone's letter of the 23rd, states, that he will reach Erroor on the 25th instant, but must halt there to refresh the troops.

In my letters of the 22nd and 23rd, I took the liberty of submitting my opinion as to the effect which the situation in the Ceded Districts of the reinforcements for the reserve would have in putting a stop to all offensive operations in this quarter. I am now obliged, by the smallness of my force, to employ the whole of it in covering a convoy from the Ceded Districts for the reserve.

Major-General Lang has called upon me to send back the three troops of the 5th Regiment Native Cavalry, and has informed me that he means to recommend that the detachment of the 23rd Light Dragoons shall be kept in the Ceded Districts until they shall have returned. As the state of affairs upon the Company's frontier has been entirely changed within the last ten days, by the retreat of the Pindarries and of the Peishwah, I trust that the Right Honourable the Governor in Council will approve of my retaining the three troops of native cavalry until they can be relieved by the dragoons, or until I can receive the orders of Government.

I beg leave to state that, with only a few companies of sepoys, and without cavalry, it will be impossible to carry on supplies to the reserve, and to protect the country of which we have got possession; that I shall not be able to attack the most trifling place, because, while the troops were engaged in the siege, a small body of the enemy's horse might drive off our cattle while grazing, and with them the valuable establishment of draught bullocks belonging to the battering train; and that the vigorous prosecution of offensive operations in the Southern Mahratta States is regarded as the measure which will be most likely to

induce the Jagheerdars, who compose so great a part of the Peishwah's army, to quit his standard. I have, &c,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp near Badauni, February 21st, 1818.

SIR,

I had the honour to receive, on the 12th instant, your letters of the 31st of January and the 1st of February, with a copy of your letter to Mr. Adam, of the 17th of January.

I expect every day a copy of the cipher, which will enable me to understand fully the plans proposed in these letters, of which at present I can only form a very imperfect idea. The plan of operations against the Peishwah should be regulated by the amount of the whole force that is likely to be brought against him, not only by General Smith and the reserve, but by the divisions under the immediate command of General Doveton and of the Commander-in-chief. As I have no information regarding any of the divisions excepting General Smith's and the reserve, it is only upon the employment of these two that I can offer any opinion. I suppose that General Smith, when joined by the cavalry of the reserve, will always be able to keep within one or two marches of the Peishwah, and that he will occasionally be able, in favourable situations, to leave his infantry and push him with cavalry alone to a certain distance. If General Smith, instead of being able to follow the Peishwah closely, should be left five or six marches behind, nothing will be gained by the junction of the reserve cavalry to his force, the Peishwah would be less harassed than at present, and might, during the intervals when he had left the pursuing force at a distance, do much injury both to us and our allies in the southern districts. This might in some degree be prevented, if the reserve were so equipped as to be able, after leaving its heavy train in some fort or post, to move expeditiously to the point of danger. Such a movement might, however, prove extremely inconvenient by being required in the middle of a siege. The most effectual, and, I believe, the only mode of securing and extending our acquisitions in this quarter, is to allot for these objects such a force as might meet the Peishwah's cavalry without danger, or maintain itself against his whole army, by taking up a position protected by a fort or gully. If we leave this country without a force to protect it, an invasion of a few days might produce a very dangerous reaction. The

to renounce the Peishwah's cause, if he be so disposed. The force now with me is hardly adequate to the reduction of the place with the ordinary garrison; but as the garrison has already been, and may be still further augmented, the capture of the place could not be insured without a greater force. I would therefore recommend that either the whole of the heavy division now acting under General Smith, or the infantry and artillery of the reserve, should be ordered to join the force now with me in order to carry on the siege. With such a force the operations could last only a few days, and the troops brought from the North of the Kistna might be immediately sent back. There is no place whose fall would have so great an influence in hastening the termination of the war as that of Nepauni; for it would give us possession of the Carnatic, from the Toombuddra to the Kistna, and of all the resources of the Southern Jagheerdars. The Vakeels of Mudho Row Dajee and of Gopaul Row arrived in camp some time ago. They have, in all their discussions with me, repeated nearly the same language as in their meetings with you. Mudho Row's Vakeel stated the difficulty of withdrawing his master's son and nephew in safety from the Peishwah's camp, as great obstacles in the way of his complying with the terms proposed by you. Gunput Row's Vakeel asked, how his master, after bringing away his troops, was to be protected, if the Peishwah marched towards his Jagheer? I told him that Gunput Row might either shut himself up in a gurry for a few days, retire into the Company's country, or join one of their armies; but both Vakeels maintained, and I believe with truth, that the main objection to acceding to our terms was the disgrace of abandoning the Peishwah. I observed that Purseram Bhow had not been so scrupulous in remaining in the Peishwah's cause. They answered that he had transferred his allegiance to another Peishwah, and that, if another were now set up, they could do the same. I informed them that I had no authority to say in what manner the final arrangement would be made, but that their masters must in the mean time recall their troops to their respective Jagheers. They left me on the 19th instant, after promising that their masters would comply with the terms proposed in your letter, and they would themselves return as soon as possible with their answers.

I received yesterday a letter from the Nepauni chief, brought by Walli Khan, the same Jemadar of horse who brought me his first letter in November last. The letter stated that the Jemadar

was authorised to treat with me. Walli Khan, however, denied that he had such authority; he said that he could treat, but that he could settle nothing without the presence of Appaujei Litchmen, his master's Vakeel. He spoke much of the good advice given by his master to the Peishwah, and of his wish to bring about a peace. I answered that no proposition could be received regarding the Peishwah, unless it came openly from himself, and that our discussions must be confined to the point of the Nepar-nikurs being willing or not to renounce the cause of Bajee Row. In reply, he said a great deal of his master's obligations to the British Government—of his wish to continue under its protection—of his conduct in not acting hostilely towards our armies, but merely accompanying the Peishwah with his contingent, and of the disgrace to which he would be exposed were he to desert him. As he appeared to think that the disgrace consisted, not so much in the act of desertion itself, as in the reproaches which would be cast upon him, I answered that there could be no disgrace in abandoning a cause in which Goklah and Trimbukjee were principals, and that as the other Jagheerdurs would undoubtedly follow his example, it could not be supposed that they would reproach him for what they had themselves done, and that he would have the advantage (as the first to join us) of greater consideration in the final settlement of the Carnatic. He asked what this advantage would be. I answered, in granting some additions to his Jagheer, and making the conditions of his service easier; but that they could only be settled by his master's returning with his troops to his own Jagheer; that I would give him fifteen days to go to camp, and return with the Vakeel; and that if within that period his master did not either actually quit, or agree to quit Bajee Row, the British Government would deem it necessary to respect his master's possessions any longer.

Camp at Bagri-Cottah, 22nd February, 1818.

THE object of Appah Dessay is evidently to gain time, in the hope that his mediation for the Peishwah may be accepted, or that, by some of the other chiefs leaving him, he may be spared the disgrace of having been the first to do so. There can be no doubt but that his attention to his own interest will induce him to take this step, but no dependence can be placed upon any promise he may make of doing it at a particular time. We ought also to consult our own convenience, and act against him when we are ready. I think that a force ought to be assembled for the

siege of Nepauni by the 10th or 15th of March. If we are not prepared to reduce this place, the partial seizure of his lands might serve only to irritate and bind him closer to the Peishwah. I have had no message or Vakeel from Chintamene Row. His Jagheers are more within our reach than those of Nepauni; but I should wish to delay taking advantage of his circumstances as long as it can be done with safety to ourselves. I shall immediately endeavour to raise a few hundred irregular horse in the Carnatic, both with the view of employing them against the enemy, and of showing that they may find service under our Government. I shall not send you any of the Peons or irregular infantry of the country, because their expense far exceeds any service they can render. They will not cross the Kistna for less than seven rupees a month for each private. They would be more than double the expense of regular sepoy. One thousand sepoy, however imperfectly trained, would go farther than five thousand peons in protecting our conquests: I employ Peons only because I cannot get regulars. There are no troops so cheap as regular sepoy, either in subduing or maintaining possession of a country: they should therefore be recruited with increasing exertion as long as the war lasts.

The infantry force in the field in this province has, until within a few days, varied from two to six companies from the garrison of Darwar, with two companies of the second battalion 12th regiment Native Infantry, which joined with the battering train. The reinforcements ordered by the Governor-General joined during the siege of Badami, which place was taken by storm on the morning of the 18th instant. Bagricottah was abandoned by the garrison on the 20th instant, and we took possession of the place this morning. Cassi Row, Goklah, and Mudden Sing, who left this neighbourhood on the 19th, are said to have repassed the Kistna with the remains of their horse.

I trust that I shall as soon as possible receive your answer respecting the proposed operations against Nepauni.

I have, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MR. STRATTON.

Camp near Belgaum, 24th March, 1816.

I CAN be of no use to you while the war lasts. I shall never be able to command six hours' leisure, which you think enough; and even if I had this leisure, I should be thinking of more immediate concerns than laws and regulations. I have

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

(Private.)

Camp near Belgaum, 4th March, 1810.

MY DEAR SIR,

THE questions proposed in your letter of the 2nd, cannot easily be answered in writing, as they embrace subjects too extensive to be discussed in an occasional correspondence.

I shall, however, endeavour in a few words to state generally my opinion respecting them.

I think that the Jagheerdars ought not to be in a worse situation than under the Peishwah's government, and that therefore those of your first class should not be required to keep up more horse than formerly, though the number which they then maintained might not have been a third or a fifth of their Tynant Zabitahs. This number, whatever it was, they might be obliged to muster, and in the event of any deficiency, a proportional part of the Jagheer might be resumed.

In the case of your second class of Jagheerdars, I would not attempt to exchange for money that part of their Jagheers which is assigned for their personal expenses, unless with their own consent. Without it, the measure would give offence, and the land resumed would, in most cases, probably not yield the sum for which it was taken.

I see no objection to the sequestration of the lands of the third class of Jagheerdars who may be very refractory, and giving some pecuniary allowance in the event of devastation.

I am not sure that I understand your remark on the numerous divisions of revenue, of which Jagheers are usually composed, being oppressive in their collection to the Ryats. In the smaller Jagheers, there will, I imagine, be no difficulty in consolidating the different heads; but in the greater Jagheers, where the internal administration must be left to the Jagheerdars themselves, it will not be so easy. Even among the greater Jagheerdars, however, all such revenues as they may derive from Sirkar villages, under various administrations, may be redeemed, either by paying them the amount in money, or by giving them one or more whole villages, yielding a revenue equal to the aggregate of what they collect from many.

Though the people of India have not what we call gentry, they have what they respect as such themselves; it will not therefore, I think, merely with a view to the establishment of this class of

society, be necessary to restore the Desmooks and Dessays who have been removed to make way for the Mahratta revenue servants. Many of these Desmooks, &c. had usurped lands and revenues during times of confusion, and though they have been deprived of them, they still enjoy, in many instances, all that they had any right to originally. Many of them will still be found holding the office of potail, or carnum, of one or of a number of villages, or even of a whole district; and where this is the case, they should be continued. But it would not be advisable to restore them, where they have long been removed, because their offices and emoluments have been subdivided among another set of men, to whom long possession or purchase has rendered them a private property. Where they have been recently removed, and their rights not granted to any other persons, they might be restored. I do not apprehend the smallest danger from their influence; good treatment will reconcile them all to our government, and lead them to employ whatever influence they have in its favour.

All charities and religious expenses, whatever their amount may be, ought, I think, to be continued for the present; considerable portions of them are probably consecrated by time, and could not be touched without a violation of private rights and of religious prejudices; a large portion of them too, will, no doubt, be found to have arisen from unauthorized grants, and other frauds. The whole should be carefully investigated after peace is restored, and the country settled; and such part of the expenditure as is of modern date, and not duly authorized, should be stopped. This course is followed by the native governments at every new succession, and frequently more than once in the same reign.

We should, I think, let every thing connected with the religious establishments, charities, Jagheerdars, Desmooks, and other public servants, remain as at present, until peace affords leisure to investigate them properly.

I wish to do nothing more in the case of the Jagheerdars you have assigned to me. I shall assure the Putwardan, that their situation will not be worse, but better than formerly; but I shall tell them, when they call upon me for the particulars, that it would be impossible, without many months of leisure, to make any arrangement that would satisfy them all. Peace must be restored before any thing can be done in it.

This matter must be left to my successor. Yours sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

willingly at the call of the British Government. They testify at present great aversion to being summoned as its immediate servants, and propose that they should rather give up part of their Jagheers, and hold the rest service free. This objection is possibly exaggerated; but if it can be removed merely by the maintenance of a form and the substitution of a name, it ought perhaps to be done, more particularly as the preservation of this ancient name would probably be likewise acceptable to Scindiah and Holkar, as their ancestors obtained their possessions not from the Rajahs of Satarah, but from the Pandit Purdhan.

I have the honour to be, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE SAME.

Camp, one mile south of Rayhaug,
26th April, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

WE are moving towards the Kistna, looking anxiously for your answer respecting the two iron twelve-pounders, about which General Pritsler wrote you on the 19th. We shall, I hope, soon take Sholapoor, if we can find water to drink within any reasonable distance. The fall of that place will leave the Peishwah no fortress south of Ahmednuggur. The reserve then returns, and if found advisable takes Nepauni. In a few weeks we may expect that Bajee Row will be driven from all his southern and most of his northern possessions. He can have but little treasure, and having no revenue, he cannot long keep any thing like an army together. This war will become a mere Pindarry one. I can have but little share in it, and shall on that ground, as well as for other causes, wish to quit all duties, civil as well as military, in June, when I return to the Deoah.

I returned to this country with great reluctance, and had the Mahratta war not taken place, I would have gone home in January last, but having engaged myself both in the civil and military affairs of the Mahratta provinces, I should gladly, had my health permitted, have continued to act until both had been finally settled. My sight, however, has lately suffered so much, as to render me nearly unfit for business. I first began to feel a visible change in it while I was in Malabar, during the last hot season; but within the last three months the decay has been rapid and alarming. I felt with much concern during the siege of Belgaum, when I was day after day straining my sight to observe the effect

of our artillery, that I could not pronounce positively, as I could have done some months ago, whether the breach was practicable or not. But I am not obliged to look at a breach every day. It is in civil affairs, which require writing every day, that the decline of sight becomes a most serious evil. There are many days when I cannot write at all, in consequence of a painful straining of my eyes. There is no day in which I can write without pain, or for more than a few minutes at a time. In writing a letter I must pause every five or six lines, and shut my eyes to relieve them from the glare. A man who wishes to enter into the details of civil and political arrangements among Jagheerdars and Zemindars, must examine himself, every person who can give him information, take down in writing what each person says, and compare their different reports. This is the course I have always followed, but I cannot continue it now. I should not get through in a month what was formerly the work of a few days. I must not, therefore, disgrace myself by holding employments, the duties of which the decay of my sight will prevent me from discharging with efficiency.

The Carnatic will be exposed to no inconvenience from my quitting the direction of its affairs. I shall leave in it a great body of revenue servants, some of them of the greatest experience, and a population attached to our Government by good treatment, as much as men can be in so short a period. The Jagheerdars will give no opposition that can affect the tranquillity of the country. They will enter into long discussions, and debate upon every trifling point; but they will submit to what we require, if we only act openly and fairly. The Putwardars should, I think, have the possessions they were entitled to by the terms of Punderpore, with some addition, from a tenth to a fifth, according to circumstances. Their principal Vakeels should also have some provision.

The other Jagheerdars who have not yet come in, ought not to have the Punderpore terms, but should be deprived of a smaller or greater part of their Jagheers, as may be found advisable hereafter.

You will not yourself have time to settle all these matters, and I would therefore recommend your securing a man of ability and temper to arrange them. The fittest person in the Madras civil service is undoubtedly Mr. Chaplin, the Collector of Ballari. He has been talking of going home, but the charge of the Carnatic as principal collector, with a liberal salary, might induce him to

accept the situation. The salary ought, I think, to be a thousand pagodas a month, or twelve thousand pagodas per annum. The first settlement of a country is of the utmost importance, for on it depends not only its future revenue, but its tranquillity. Government cannot purchase too dearly the service of a man who can give a proper form at first to the affairs of a newly-acquired province. I hope, therefore, that you will apply for Mr. Chaplin.

If he cannot be spared, or is unwilling to change, I would ask for Mr. Thackeray, formerly chief secretary, and now acting as Collector of Coimbatore.

I hope, when you have time, you will say that this letter has reached you, as I have no copy. Yours sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Camp near Durrar, 10th June, 1818.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I RECEIVED yours of the 19th of May some days ago, and yesterday your letter without date, but probably of the 30th of May. It long since occurred to me that an official document, as stated by your friend Adams, would be necessary, and I therefore addressed the Madras Government in April *in forma pauperis*, and they forwarded my letter to Bengal; but you and Adams seem to have managed the business without waiting for it. I need not say that I feel myself much obliged to you both, not only in a pecuniary view, but on the higher ground of my having the satisfaction of believing that my services are thought to entitle me to the allowances proposed to be granted. You were present at the India Board office when Lord B—— told me that I should have ten thousand pagodas per annum, and all my expenses paid; and you may remember that you proposed that as the allowance differed only a few hundred pagodas from that of a resident, it should be made the same. I never thought of taking a Muchulka from Lord B——, because I certainly never suspected that my expenses would, above two years ago, have been restricted to five hundred pagodas, a sum which hardly pays my servants and camp equipage, or that Mr. E—— would have taken me by the neck and pushed me out of the appointment the very day on which the three years recommended by the Directors expired, though they authorised the term to be prolonged if deemed advisable. I hope that Bajee Row has by

this time shown himself the "man of taste you took him for," and gone to drink the Ganges' river in preference to roaming about like a vagabond. This event will settle the country, at least in all great points. Many petty disputes may remain to be adjusted, but none that can give us any serious trouble. I have been preaching this doctrine, with as much zeal as any new-light man, to Elphinstone for some time past, as I find that he considers the difficulties as much greater than they really are, and that my aid would be useful in clearing the ground; but this is already done. The jungles and the Babool-trees are down, and he has only now to shave or mow the weeds, which are plenty. I observe also that you have been making honourable mention of me to Adams, and have contrived to make him believe that I might be an useful instrument in settling the southern Mahratta states. The thing is very easy. All that is requisite is to do what he himself suggests, to keep them out of the hands of the Madras Government for some time. A provisional administration directed by Mr. Elphinstone, under the Supreme Government, should be established for two or three years, until the mass receive its form. For this task nobody is so well qualified as Elphinstone. He knows all the Jaghéardars and the people better than any body else. He must have deputies and assistants selected by himself, who will act zealously with him; not fellows sent from a presidency, who have been all their lives in a state of lethargy; and a military force ready to move should be kept up in the conquered country. There will, I think, be no cause to employ this force; but the best way to obviate the necessity of doing so, is to show that you are prepared.

With respect to myself, it is impossible that I can undertake the settlement in detail of any part of this country. I am as well with regard to general health as ever I was in my life; but my eyes have suffered so much, that I write with great difficulty at all times, and there are some days when I cannot write at all. Without sight nothing can be done in settling. It is a business that requires a man to write while he speaks, to have the pen constantly in his hand, to take notes of what is said by every person, to compare the information given by different men on the same subject, and to make an abstract from the whole. Since July last I have been obliged to change the number of my spectacles three times; and if you are a spectacle-man, you will understand what a rapid decay of vision this implies. I cannot now do in two days what a few years ago I did in one, and I can

do nothing with ease to myself. I cannot write without a painful sensation in my eyes of straining. The only chance of saving my sight is to quit business entirely for some months, and turn my eyes upon larger objects only, in order to give them relief. At the rate I am now going, in a few months more I shall not be able to tell a Dockan from a Breckan. Before this happens I must go home and paddle in the burn. This is a much nicer way of passing the evening of life, than going about the country here in my military boots and brigadier's enormous hat and feathers, frightening every cow and buffalo, shaking horribly its fearful nature, and making its tail stand on end. I shall willingly, now that all the great operations of war are over, resign this part of it to any one else. I am not like the Archbishop of Granada, for I feel that I am sadly fallen off in my homilies.

Yours ever,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Camp at Hoobli, 19th Jana, 1818.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I HAVE got yours of the 5th, and congratulate you most cordially on your having caught Surmunt by the lugg. But you seem to have followed the practice of Buonaparte, and given him rather a friendly pinch when you offered eight lacs. You are mistaken in thinking that I am *sukhi* (harsh) towards Maharajahs. You form this opinion probably from my having driven all pretenders to principalities out of the Ceded Districts. But these were a set of fellows whose ancestors had been expelled forty or fifty years before. Some of them were serving as common peons, when they were discovered by some adventurer of a Karkern, who borrowed a hundred rupees in the bazaar, rigged out the new Rajah with a turban and moustle as fine as Timour the Tartar, and started him in the field under the title of Soam Shanker Nacy, or some other warlike name. On these fellows I certainly had little compassion, for I stripped them of their trappings in order to pay their creditors. But for fallen monarchs I have a great respect; and had Surmunt had the good luck to have fallen into my hands, or I to have caught him, I should probably have offered him ten in place of eight lacs. His surrender is a most important event; it will tend more than any thing else to restore tranquillity and facilitate the settlement of the country. It deprives all the turbulent and disaffected of their head and support. I would rather

have taken Bajee Row than the Bombay Government. You will, I hope, be the taker of both. In your situation I would wait a little for Bombay. You are still young enough to do so. I am not, and therefore if I had a chance, which I have not, I would not wait. I have passed too much of my life in obscure drudgery to have any wish to continue the same course any longer. You know that I have been long deaf, and that knowledge at one entrance is quite shut out. I am getting blind fast: I must take care and not get blind altogether, and have knowledge shut out at the only remaining entrance. I should then indeed be fallen on evil days, when I should be able to read neither the lucubrations of the Indian Governments nor of the Directors.

Yours sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

FROM SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Camp, 14th July.

MY DEAR MUNRO,

I HAVE received your two last letters; that dated the 19th ultimo came two days ago. You were right in your guess about my reason for thinking you *sackd*; your sentiments upon my settlement with Bajee Row were quite a cordial. I have not been so happy in this case as to anticipate the wishes of the Governor-General; he expected Bajee Row would get no such terms; that his distress would force him to submit on any conditions, and that his enmities deprived him of all right either to princely treatment or princely pension. I think his Lordship will, when he hears all, regret the precipitation with which he formed his judgment. In the first place, he will find, in spite of the report made by every commanding officer who ever touched Bajee Row that he had destroyed him, that the latter was not destroyed, but had about six thousand good horse and four thousand infantry, and the gates of Asseir wide open, all his property sent in there, and half his counsellors praying him to follow it; while Jeswant Row Lur was positively ambitious of being a martyr in the cause of the Mahratta sovereign. Add to this, the impossibility of besieging Asseir till after the rains, the difficulty of even half blockading it, and the agitated state of the country, and then let his Lordship pronounce the article I purchased was worth the price I paid, and he will find it proved I could not get it cheaper. There are, however, other grounds which I can never abandon, that recommend this course on the score of policy: our own

dignity; considerations for the feelings of Bajee Row's adherents, and for the prejudices of the natives of India. We exist on impressions; and on occasions like this, where all are anxious spectators, we must play our part well, or we should be hissed. I have your opinion in my favour; I have Ochterlony, Elphinstone, and Jenkinson, and many minor men, and I think I will yet force an assent from head-quarters; but they foolishly enough committed themselves, knowing, as they stated at the time, their instructions would be too late. They did not think any circumstances could entitle him to have more than two lacs, and he was to be watched, restrained, and I know not what. My system is all opposite: I am either for the main guard, or a confidence that gives you a chance at least of the mind, the only other security except the body. You shall have a *short* narrative of my proceedings.

I grieve for your decay of vision, and none of your arguments will persuade me it is not at this moment a public misfortune; but you should not remain a moment longer than you can help in India, and give up labour; the warning is too serious. I shall stay till August 1819, till I get answers to letters I now write. If not then appointed, I go home. Yours sincerely,

JOHN MALCOLM.

TO KIRKMAN FINLAY, ESQ.

Bangalore, 11th Sept. 1816.

MY DEAR LORD PROVOST,

A FEW weeks ago, before I left camp at Darwar, I saw a slight gude for sair een—two of your letters, dated the 20th Feb. arrived under cover from Mr. Jas. Ritchie, your partner at Bombay. He wrote to me, mentioning that he intended after the monsoon to visit the Mahratta country. I told him that I should probably have left it by that time, but that I would request my successor, Mr. Chaplin, to facilitate his operations in carrying into effect your threats of showing the Rayets how much better customers free merchants were than a Company of monopolists. Mr. Chaplin is one of the ablest men these monopolists have got in their service. I have given him a copy of the paragraph of your letter, which promises to give his rayets more than any one else for their cotton; and if this be not done, I trust that he will let your friend Baillie Graham know of it.

A great deal of fine cotton is grown in the provinces which have fallen into our hands. I was too much engaged in war and

politics to have time to enter into inquiries regarding its fitness for the European market. The inhabitants have been so much impoverished by their late weak and rapacious Government, that it will be a long time before they can be good customers to Glasgow or Manchester. In those districts which I traversed myself, I fear that I left them no richer than I found them; for wherever I went I appointed myself collector, and levied as much revenue as could be got, both to pay my own irregular troops, and to rescue it from the grasp of the enemy.

I shall not trouble you with military operations, as you will get the details in the newspapers. It is fortunate for India that the Peishwah commenced hostilities, and forced us to overthrow his power; for the Mahratta Government, from its foundation, has been one of devastation. It never relinquished the predatory habits of its founder, and even when its empire was most extensive, it was little better than a horde of imperial thieves. It was continually destroying all within its reach, and never repairing. The effect of such a system has been the diminution of the wealth and population of a great portion of the peninsula of India. The breaking down of the Mahratta Government, and the protection which the country will now receive, will gradually increase its resources, and I hope in time restore it to so much prosperity, as to render it worthy the attention of our friends in Glasgow.

Baillie Jarvie is a credit to our town, and I could almost swear that I have seen both him and his father, the Deacon, afore him, in the Salt-market; and I trust, that if I am spared, and get back there again, I shall see some of his worthy descendants walking in his steps. Had the Baillie been here, we could have shown him many greater thieves, but none so respectable as Rob Roy. The difference between the Mahratta and the Highland Robs is, that the one does from choice what the other did from necessity; for a Mahratta would rather get ten pounds by plunder, than a hundred by an honest calling, whether in the Salt-market or the Gallowgate.

I am thinking, as the boys in Scotland say, I am thinking, Provost, that I am wasting my time very idly in this country; and that it would be, or at least would look wiser, to be living quietly and doosly at home. Were I now there, instead of running about the country with camps here, I might at this moment be both pleasantly and profitably employed in gathering black Boyds with you among the braes near the Largs. There is no enjoyment in this country equal to it, and I heartily wish

that I were once more fairly among the bushes with you, even at the risk of being stickt by yon drove of wild knowte that looked so sharply after us. Had they found us asleep in the dyke, they would have made us repent breaking the sabbath; although I thought there was no great harm in doing such a thing in your company.

My wife joins in best wishes to Mrs. Finlay and the family.

Yours very truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

Bangalore, 13th September, 1816.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 28th August. I do not apprehend any insurrection in the south. None of the Jagheerdars are, I believe, disposed to risk the loss of their possessions, and without leaders scattered horsemen will not act, and if they did, they could do nothing. The materials for Pindarries are no doubt, as you say, doubled by the disbanding of the native soldiery, but then we are to consider that our means of suppressing them are increased in a much greater ratio.

The Pindarries were bold before, because they had a safe retreat in Malwa. Without a place of refuge there can be no formidable insurrection.

The individuals who must compose an insurrectionary force, have families, and houses, and property, and many of them a mare and colt or two. They will not hastily put these things to the hazard for the sake of getting a little plunder, which they cannot be sure of keeping. Had they strongholds or places of refuge into which we could not follow them, they might rise; but they have not, and therefore cannot rise. In all the countries south of Poona, at least, our authority pervades every part of the country, and no assemblage could take place without our knowledge. If there is any rising, it will not be as an army or a military body, but as banditti, and I doubt if it will ever go to this extent. If any small parties were to enter the Nizam's territory, his own troops would be sufficient to disperse them; and our seizing their small property in our villages, would discourage any future attempts of the kind. I would not, however, neglect the additional security to be derived from our military force being kept moveable: Rastrah's Jagheer, and the districts on the Kistna, are the most likely places for disbanded horse to

TO MR. CHAPLIN.

Vellore, 23rd September, 1818.

MY DEAR CHAPLIN,

BEFORE I received your last letter, I wrote to you about the reports of insurrections; Mr. Elphinstone had written to me on the subject, and I answered that I had no faith in them. The Outcherry people are all great alarmists; Loekman Rowe in particular is very timid, and a great believer in plots. There are, no doubt, many people out of employment, and many dissatisfied, as must always be the case in every revolution; but where there is a strong government, these discontents gradually subside by the individuals who wish for a change finding that they are too weak, and betaking themselves to some peaceable occupation. Men who are soldiers, and not mere thieves, in order to rise must have a leader, a fixed object, and at least some hope of success. There is no respectable Jagheerdar who would risk his possessions on the chance of overturning our power. Even if he were disposed to make the attempt, he would find very few followers, because almost all the owners of horses are landholders or respectable inhabitants, who will not subject themselves to confiscation of property and banishment for the sake of any leader. They know very well that if the Peishwah, with all the advantages of an unbroken army and military and civil possession of the country, could not oppose us, nothing can be expected from the efforts of a few insurgents but ruin to those concerned. Horsemen who will readily make an incursion into a foreign territory, will not easily be induced to try an insurrection in their own; because, in the one case, they have a safe retreat in their own country, in the other none. Mr. Elphinstone supposes that the insurgents may invade the Nizam's country; but they would still run the same danger of punishment, because your Amildars would know what men had left their villages, or returned to them from such expeditions. Mr. Elphinstone formerly wrote to me about stationing Akbar Nowirs at Minez, Targaom, and other places of the Jagheerdars. I requested him to send his own, and said that the Amildars would do what was necessary in the other districts. For intelligence one Tishildar is worth a dozen of Akbar Nowirs. He has much greater means of procuring information, and is much more interested in getting what is correct. Nana Row, and men like him, who have served with horsemen, are more likely to ascertain what is going on than mere Maamlet men.

The Tishildar of Sholapoor was put in, because there was at the time no choice; but there had been too short a trial to know whether he was or was not as fit as others.

The Cusbah Bijapoor man was selected on account of his connections in the district, by whose means it was thought that he would be more likely to get possession of it than the best revenue man who had not been accustomed to such service. It was a duty on which very few wished at this time, the end of February, to go. I imagine he knows little of accounts and firms; but I believe he will become, if looked after, a very useful agent.

When the weather settles, the reserve ought to move about the country.

There are two men at Misrickottah who ought to be kept in irons at labour. One is the late Killedar. After taking cowle, and being permitted to remain in the country, they engaged in a plot to seize the place. I ordered them to be confined, meaning, on my return, to have tried them by a military committee. Before we returned from the Kistna, they were reported dangerously ill with bowel complaints. I wrote to the Cutchery to have them taken out of irons until they got better, and never afterwards till now thought of them.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

I came here to-day, and start to-morrow for Madras.

TO HIS BROTHER.

Madras, 30th September, 1818.

MY DEAR ALEXANDER,

THERE are two causes for my writing so little to you: one is, that I have more official writing than I can easily get through; and the other, and a much stronger one, is, that my sight has been so much injured by uncessing labour, by the climate, and perhaps by age, that I cannot write long without pain at any time, and some days my eyes smart so much, and become so weak, that I can hardly write at all. I have resigned the command of the reserve division of the army, which I had long anxiously coveted, and also my situation of Political Resident and Collector in the Southern Mahratta States. It was always my intention to have resigned when the war was finished, and to have gone home immediately. There was no chance when I resigned last month of getting home before January, but the state of my eyes made me resolve to give up my appointments, and to go and visit Bengal in the intermediate time. I do not care

Brigadier-General Doveton was the immediate cause of the final breaking-up of his army; he was not allowed time to rest or to feed his horses. He made his escape to the neighbourhood of Assurghur, with a rabble of a few thousand horse and foot; some of them his own troops originally, and the rest fugitives from Nagpoor and Holkar. He pushed forward a Vakeel to Malcolm, who agreed, on condition of his disbanding his troops, and residing where the Governor-General might think proper, to secure him in the enjoyment of his personal liberty, and an annual allowance of eight lacs of rupees. The amount of the pension, and I believe also the principle of granting him any terms whatever, have been disapproved of. I certainly think differently; I think that great allowance should be made for a native Sovereign, reduced to a state of degradation by a foreign power, from which he can have no hope of rescue but by treachery. If we were to grant terms at all, I do not think the allowance of eight lacs was too much. It is idle to say that he may make a dangerous use of such a sum; because it may easily be expended on his account, without passing through his hands. He would no doubt have been compelled in another month or two to have surrendered at discretion; but the speedy termination of the war, and settlement of the country, was well worth the sacrifice. He had before made overtures at different times to Mr. Elphinstone, who rejected them, as he had been instructed to receive none but those of unconditional surrender. No instructions regarding him had been sent to Malcolm, as it never had been supposed that he would have left his own country, and taken refuge at Assurghur. It is a general opinion in the Madras army, that the Governor-General might have said a great deal less of the Bengal troops, and somewhat more of those of Madras. I shall, on my return to England, be as unsettled and as undetermined as to the place of my future residence as when I last went home.

Yours affectionately,

THOMAS MUNRO.

The following, which was written to Lord Hastings during his stay at Madras, will not, it is presumed, be read without interest.

Madras, 12th November, 1810.

My temporary detention here, in consequence of the Castlereagh's having been driven out of the Roads by the hurricane of the 24th ultimo, has permitted me, before leaving this

country, to have the honour of receiving and answering your Lordship's letter of the 22nd September.

I believe that there is no stronger incentive to the zealous discharge of public duty, than the hope of gaining the approbation of those whose characters we have been accustomed to respect, because they are respected by the public: it cannot therefore but be a source of the highest gratification to me, to find that my endeavours to execute properly the share of the late campaign assigned to me, have been deemed worthy of a private testimonial, as well as official record, by your Lordship. Had I not been conscious that I ought, on account of my health, to leave India for a time, I would not so soon have given up my situation in the Mahratta country, as I thereby sacrificed every future prospect of again earning praise where I most valued it.

On my return to Madras, Mr. Elliot expressed his desire that I should remain in India till January, in order to finish what he thought was still incomplete in the business of the late Commission; and he mentioned at the same time, that it was his intention to re-establish the Commission until my departure. I was sorry the proposal was made, because my not assenting to it might be construed into disrespect: but I declined it on the ground, that having relinquished a military command merely on account of the state of my eyes, it was impossible that I could accept of a civil situation which, from the very nature of its duties, must prove much more injurious to them. Had they not suffered so much from long residence in this country, as to render an entire relief from business necessary for a time, I should, with pleasure, have resumed the pursuits of the labours of the Commission; for I was anxious to give what assistance I could in carrying into effect the orders of the Court of Directors, for employing the natives more extensively in the internal administration of the country. Their exclusion from offices of trust and emolument has become a part of our system of government, and has been productive of no good. Whenever, from this cause, the public business falls into arrear, it is said to be owing to the want of a sufficient number of Europeans; and more European agency is recommended as a cure for every evil. Such agency is too expensive; and even if it was not, it ought rather to be abridged than enlarged, because it is, in many cases, much less efficient than that of the natives. For the discharge of all subordinate duties, but especially in the judicial line, the natives are infinitely better qualified than Europeans. I have never seen

dominion; and nothing can more certainly produce this effect than our avowing our want of confidence in them, and, on that account, excluding them as much as possible from every office of importance.

It is with great reluctance that I have declined acting again in a Commission, the main object of which was, to give to the natives a greater share in the internal administration of the country; and the remarks which I have ventured to make have been drawn from me chiefly by my anxiety to satisfy your Lordship that my refusal to engage in a civil occupation has proceeded altogether from the same cause which compelled me to resign my military command.

unfit to undertake the homeward voyage, till after she should have undergone a thorough repair. The consequence was, that General Munro was compelled to lay aside his intention of quitting India that season. He removed to his own house in Madras; and the weather being exceedingly delightful, and no important business pressing, he passed some months there very agreeably.

On the 24th of January, 1819, General and Mrs. Munro took their passage on board the *Warren Hastings*. The voyage was, upon the whole, a pleasant one, for the ship touched both at Ceylon and St. Helena; and some delay taking place at the latter island, General Munro was enabled to gratify a wish which he had long entertained. He traversed the rock from end to end, visiting every spot to which the presence of Napoleon had given an interest; and he left it more than ever impressed with mingled admiration and pity for that great, misguided, and ill-fated man. This, however, was not the only occurrence which rendered his present homeward passage memorable. On the 30th of May, the ship being then in the latitude of the Azores, Mrs. Munro was delivered of a boy, who received the name, and has since, too soon, succeeded to the title of his father.

Towards the end of June, the *Warren Hastings* came to an anchor in the Downs, and General and Mrs. Munro landing at Deal, proceeded without delay to London. Their sojourn here was not, however, protracted; indeed they appear to have made no pause beyond what was absolutely necessary for refreshment; but pushing directly for Scotland, Mrs. Munro took up her abode with her father, whilst the General amused himself for a brief space, in travelling through the Highlands. But General Munro's merits were too justly appreciated to encourage any expectation that he would be permitted long to enjoy the calm of private life. He had scarcely reached the shores of Kent, ere intelligence was communicated that there was a design in agitation of again employing him in a high station in India; and he was recalled from the North

opinions respecting the sources from which power is derived. Some suppose it to arise with the people themselves, while others entertain a different view ; all however are agreed, that it should be exercised *for* the people. If ever an appointment took place to which *this* might be ascribed as the distinguishing motive, it was *that* which we have now come together to celebrate ; and I have no doubt that the meritorious officer who has been appointed to the Government of Madras, will, in the execution of his duty, ever keep in view those measures which will best conduce to the happiness of twelve millions of people."

Lord William Bentinck again, to whom the appointment had first been offered, but whom circumstances induced to decline it, no sooner heard of Sir Thomas's elevation, than he addressed him in the following terms :—

" Mr. Canning has communicated to me your appointment to the Government at Madras, and I have answered, that this nomination did *him* great honour, and gives *me* infinite satisfaction ; and that whatever feeling of regret, upon public grounds, I may have felt on refusing to return to India, was now completely removed, by my conviction, that a much better substitute had been found. All this is my real true opinion ; and I will only add, that it gives me great pleasure, that your great and noble services have at last toiled through to their just distinction."

In like manner, the Right Honourable John Sullivan, who was for many years an efficient member of the Board of Control, said—

" I am so much alive to the sincere and warm feeling of joy upon your nomination to the Government of Madras, that I cannot mix any thing with my congratulations. I write to offer my humble tribute to Mr. Canning upon a selection that does him so much honour."

Whilst Mr. McCulloch, not the least qualified of all Sir Thomas's friends to judge of his fitness for office, expressed himself thus strongly on the occasion :—

" I shall take an early opportunity of calling upon you to express my unfeigned joy in the prospect of an event which appears to me more calculated than any that has occurred for years, to

—of peace, and war, and of all the interesting struggles among statesmen for political power, and among radicals for the same object. It is near France and Italy, and all the countries of the Continent, which I have earnestly wished to visit ever since I first read about them. The only objection I feel to going again to India is my age. I might now, perhaps, find employment in this country, and I have health enough to travel over Europe, and visit whatever is remarkable for having been the scene of great actions in ancient times; but when I return from India, it will be too late to attempt to enter upon a new career in this country; and my eyes will probably be too old, if I am not so, in other respects, to permit me to derive any pleasure from visiting the countries of the Continent. I may deceive myself, and fancy, like many other old Indians, that I am still fit for what may be far beyond my power. There is no help for it now: I must make the experiment of the effects of another visit to India upon my constitution and mind.

I hope you will visit Craigie sometimes, and see that my son is not spoiled, but brought up hardily as we were in Glasgow.

In the beginning of May 1820, Sir Thomas and Lady Munro arrived at Bombay, where they were hospitably received, and magnificently entertained by the Governor, Mr. Elphinstone. After spending about a fortnight here, they again took shipping, and on the 8th of June reached Madras. Sir Thomas was received with all the state due to his high station; and being conducted to the Government House, entered without delay upon the execution of his arduous duties. Into these, as they occurred in detail, it is not my intention to enter much at length, because the best record which could be given of the manner in which they were performed, is to be found both in the archives of the East India Company, and in the sentiments of the people. But of the principles which guided him in all his public proceedings, as well as of the manner in which his time was spent, it is necessary that the reader should be made generally acquainted.

With respect to the grand leading principle of Sir Thomas Munro's public conduct, enough has been said already to

place it distinctly before the eye of an ordinarily attentive observer. A just, but not a prejudiced, judge of the Indian character, he ever felt and taught, that no point was to be gained of benefit either to the ruler or the subject, except by functionaries capable of speaking and understanding the vernacular languages of the country. He considered, too, that it was the indispensable duty of every European, holding a situation of trust, to be thoroughly acquainted with the customs, habits, prejudices, and feelings of the people; and he invariably laid the blame of such petty disturbances as broke out from time to time in the provinces, on the absence of due knowledge, or becoming attention in the resident British authorities. His own career indeed had fully established the soundness of this theory; for to no man were more turbulent districts committed; yet he not only reduced them to order, in the ordinary sense of that term; but rendered the inhabitants at once willing subjects of the Company, and personally attached to himself. His great object therefore was, to impress those in authority with the policy and absolute necessity of studying both the dialects and feelings of the people; and he applied that principle to all classes, to the military not less than to the civil servants.

With this statesman-like and philanthropic notion uppermost in his mind, one of his first public acts was to be present at an examination of the students,* in the College of Fort St. George, to whom he addressed, in a very impressive manner, the following characteristic speech:—

“The junior civil servants of the Company have a noble field before them. No men in the world have more powerful motives for studying with diligence, for there are none who have a prospect of a greater reward, and whose success depends so entirely upon themselves. The object of all your studies here is one of the most important that can be imagined. It is that you may

* The reader is doubtless aware, that at Madras a sort of college or public school exists, through which every candidate for employment in the civil service must pass, ere he be admitted to fill the office of assistant either to a judge and magistrate, or to a collector.

become qualified to execute, with benefit to the state, the part which may hereafter fall to your lot in the administration of the affairs of the country:—language is but the means, the good government of the people is the great end; and in promoting the attainment of this end, every civil servant has a share more or less considerable; for there is no office, however subordinate, in which the conduct of the person holding it has not some influence on the comfort of the people, and the reputation of the Government.

“The advantage of knowing the country languages is not merely that it will enable you to carry on the public business with greater facility, but that by rendering you more intimately acquainted with the people, it will dispose you to think more favourably of them, to relinquish some of those prejudices which we are all at first too apt to entertain against them, to take a deeper interest in their welfare, and thus to render yourselves more respected among them. The more you feel an anxious concern in their prosperity, the more likely you will be to discharge your duty towards them with zeal and efficiency, and the more likely they will be to return the benefit with gratitude and attachment.

“In every situation it is best to think well of the people placed under our authority. There is no danger that this feeling will be carried too far; and even if it should, error on this side is safer than on the other. It is a strong argument in favour of the general good qualities of the natives, that those who have lived longest among them, have usually thought the most highly of them. I trust that you will all hereafter see the justice of this opinion, and the propriety of acting upon it; for in almost every country, but more particularly in this, the good-will of the people is the strongest support of the Government.”

The following fragment of a memorandum found among Sir Thomas's papers, seems too valuable to be omitted.

MEMORANDUM.

THE importance of public officers being free from debt. No excuses for being encumbered with it. The causes of it—dissipation, thoughtlessness, or want of firmness.

2. It is a great drawback on every man in office. Some men may do their duty with it; but never so well as without it.

3. There are few qualities in a public servant more really valu-

able than order and economy in his private affairs. They make him independent, and enable him to devote, without disturbance, his whole time to his public duty.

4. It is very essential, both to your own future advancement, as well as to the good of the service, that you should leave the College fully prepared, by your knowledge of the native languages, to enter upon its duties with advantage to the people, and that they should not have cause to lament that they are placed under the authority of men, who, not being qualified to execute the duties of their situation, are incapable of protecting them.

5. Many have left the College perfectly qualified for commencing their public career. Some have left it with a very imperfect knowledge of the languages, who have afterwards, by persevering study, completely retrieved their lost time. It is much safer, however, to leave the College already provided with the necessary qualifications for public business, than to trust to the chances of acquiring it in the provinces; for though some may acquire it in this manner, others will fail, and never become useful or distinguished members of the service.

Referring, in some degree, to the same subject, is the following admirable Minute, which I insert, because it will explain more perfectly than could be done by any language of mine, as well the view which Sir Thomas Munro took of the character of the people of India, as his notions of the system of political instruction which ought to be pursued, after candidates for office quitted College.

MINUTE.

5th of August, 1820.

THE Court of Directors has, in its letter of the 1st of March 1820, proposed certain rules for our guidance in the selection of persons to fill the offices of provincial and *illah* judges, and of secretaries to Government and the Board of Revenue, and of members of that Board, and of register and members of the *Sudder Adawlut*. The Court has desired us to take this subject into our particular consideration, and to furnish it with our sentiments thereupon.

The reasons which render it desirable that the offices in question should, as far as may be practicable, be filled with men pos-

slightest reflection will satisfy us, that it is much more probable that he will become an useful public servant by beginning in the revenue than in the judicial departments.

There are some men who overcome all difficulties, and become valuable public officers in whatever line they are placed, and whatever may have been that in which they were first employed: but in making rules, we must look to men such as they generally are.

When a young man is transferred from college to the office of a zillah register, he finds himself all at once invested with judicial functions. He learns forms before he learns things. He becomes full of the respect due to the Court, but knows nothing of the people. He is placed too high above them to have any general intercourse with them. He has little opportunity of seeing them except in court. He sees only the worst part of them, and under the worst shapes—he sees them as plaintiff and defendant, exasperated against each other, or as criminals; and the unfavourable opinion with which he too often, at first, enters among them, in place of being removed by experience, is every day strengthened and increased. He acquires, it is true, habits of cautious examination, and of precision and regularity; but they are limited to a particular object, and are frequently attended with dilatoriness, too little regard for the value of time, and an inaptitude for general affairs, which require a man to pass readily from one subject to another.

In the revenue line he has an almost boundless field, from whence he may draw at pleasure his knowledge of the people. As he has it in his power, at some time or other, to show kindness to them all, in settling their differences, in occasional indulgence in their rents, in facilitating the performance of their ceremonies, and many other ways; and as he sees them without official form or restraint, they come to him freely, not only on the public, but often on their private concerns. His communications with them are not limited to one subject, but extend to every thing connected with the welfare of the country. He sees them engaged in the pursuits of trade and agriculture, and promoting by their labours the increase of its resources, the object to which his own are directed. He sees that among them there is, as in other nations, a mixture of good and bad; that though many are selfish, many likewise, especially among the agricultural class, are liberal and friendly to their poorer neighbours and tenants; and he gradually learns to take an in-

been previously trained in the revenue line, so is that of a collector by his having served in the judicial; but not in the same degree, because he may become tolerably well acquainted with judicial proceedings in the practice of his own duties in the settlement of boundary and other disputes respecting the occupation of land. In framing, therefore, the few rules for giving effect to the instructions from the Court of Directors, which I now submit to the Board, I have not thought it necessary to require that a collector should previously have been employed in the judicial line. It might, at first sight, seem to be desirable that a collector should before have served as a register, and that the civil servants, in rising in the judicial and revenue lines indiscriminately, and in passing from one to the other, should proceed regularly through every gradation in each; but this would be extremely embarrassing and injurious to the service, and would, in fact, be discovered on trial to be nearly impracticable. The conveniency of the service does not always enable us to make interchanges when servants are ready to be transferred from one branch to the other; but we can always secure a few years of revenue instruction, by sending all servants to that line at first. We have then the advantage of the early and first impression; and two years are of more value then, than double the number would be at any after period. After serving two years as an assistant collector, he may either be transferred to the judicial or any other line, or remain in the revenue, and the matter might be determined either by his own option or the exigency of the service. In rising afterwards to the highest offices, it will not be necessary that he should pass regularly through every subordinate one, or that he should serve longer in any of them than such a time as may enable him, with tolerable application, to acquire a practical knowledge of its duties. It may be thought that two years are too short a time for any person to learn much of revenue; but as he may remain in that line as much longer as he pleases, though he cannot be less than two years, there can be little doubt but that a large portion of the junior servants will remain in it; that many of those who leave it, on the expiration of the two years, will have imbibed a partiality for it, and seek to return to it, and that we shall thus always have a sufficient number of servants possessing such a knowledge of revenue as to qualify them to fill efficiently any office whatever.

The rule of sending all young men directly from the college to the provinces, will in future prevent them from thinking of

establishing themselves at the Presidency, and will prove beneficial both to them and the public; but as it might be attended with inconvenience to those who have been fixed here since 1816, were they to be removed, and more particularly as some of them owed their detention to their superior merits having fitted them to fill situations of greater emolument than they could have obtained in the provinces, I would therefore recommend that, in order to prevent their suffering by the operation of a new arrangement, they should be permitted to have the option of remaining at the Presidency, or going into the provinces.*

Another fundamental doctrine, if I may so express myself, in the political code of Sir Thomas Munro, was, that the pay of every public servant, especially in India, ought to be ample, an adequate remuneration furnishing the best preventative against those mean and dishonest dealings of which too many, whether justly or otherwise, have been accused. From the fragment given a few pages ago, it will be seen, that for the practice of incurring debts he made no excuse, because he regarded it as injurious not merely to the personal respectability, but to the national character of Englishmen: yet his abhorrence of the practice was tempered by a benevolence and kindness of heart which never, under any circumstances, seem to have forsaken him. It may be necessary to state, that when a public servant, on this or any other account, suffered suspension, it was the practice to deprive him of all his salaries, and to leave him to make his way home, not unfrequently by means of charitable contributions raised among the inhabitants of the Presidency. Sir Thomas Munro at once interfered to obtain a modification of this somewhat harsh, as well as injudicious regulation. He conceived that greater injury was done by thus degrading the national character in the eyes of the natives, than the

* The reader will find in the APPENDIX a valuable Minute, in which the principle of paying due attention to the native languages is shown to be as essential among military as among civil officers; and the question as to the adequacy of certain measures to act as inducements to their study is ably discussed.

benefits arising from example were likely to compensate ; and he obtained a regulation to be passed, by which such unfortunate or imprudent individuals were supplied with funds adequate to cover the expenses of their passage, provided they departed within a specified period.*

While he was thus attentive to the comforts and respectability of European servants, it is not to be supposed that he forgot for a moment what was due to the natives. From what has been said in many of his letters, particularly in those written during the existence of the judicial Commission, it will be discovered, that to the necessity of behaving with liberality to the people of India he was peculiarly alive, and the whole tenor of his government shows that he never lost sight of that commendable object. He early directed his attention to the re-establishment of native schools wherever they had fallen into decay, and to the erection of new seminaries in places where none before existed ; and he embodied a Committee of Public Instruction at Fort St. George, for the exclusive purpose of training up Hindoos and Moham-medans to offices of greater or less importance under the Government. For the support of this useful institution and the maintenance of native schoolmasters, he allotted fifty thousand rupees annually, a sum certainly the reverse of inordinate when the benefits to be derived from its expenditure are considered.

But it was not for the instruction of the natives only that Sir Thomas Munro was a strenuous and persevering advocate; he was anxious to see them rewarded for their services in such a manner as would induce them to give up the energies both of their minds and bodies to the advancement of the public welfare: and, above all, he was desirous that an adequate provision against old age should be made for such as particularly distinguished themselves by their usefulness.

* There is a most judicious Minute to this effect inserted by him 1st December, 1820, among the Judicial Consultations of Fort St. George, which nothing but the want of space here, deters me from transcribing.

gency gives in no other quarter of the globe; and this, the ill-paid, and generally ill-conditioned servants of our public courts were too much in the habit of turning to the worst purposes. Sir Thomas Munro had all along seen the evil of the system, and repeatedly, in his correspondence with the higher powers, argued against it. He now took the matter up with the earnestness which it deserved, and caused a regulation to be passed, positively prohibiting all revenue officers from holding or possessing land in the several districts within which the compass of their duties lay.

But his anxiety to increase the happiness, and add to the respectability of the natives, was far from ending here. It is probably needless to observe, that under the British Government in India a variety of monopolies exist, all of them more or less hurtful to the interests of the people, though some perhaps, under the existing state of affairs, indispensable. To these Sir Thomas Munro was so far hostile, that he adopted every rational expedient, if not to diminish their number, at all events to hinder their growth: indeed, he looked upon an absolute freedom of cultivation to be the natural right of the rayet; and against every enactment which had the smallest tendency to counteract it, he decidedly set his face. I have inserted in the APPENDIX a long and able Minute on this subject, called forth in consequence of a proposition to secure to the Government a monopoly in the valuable timber which grows in the forests of Malabar.

Again, there was no point which Sir Thomas Munro was more anxious to press upon the attention of the collectors and zillah magistrates, than the impolicy of interfering, unless in very gross cases, with the disputes of the natives originating in questions of caste. It happened that on the 29th of May, 1820, the usual squabble between the right and left-hand castes occurred at Masulipatam. The collector, more zealous perhaps than prudent, interposed to quell the disturbance, employing for this purpose a party of sepoys; and the consequence was, that not only were several lives lost, but a good

in our administration of affairs here. The first is, that our sovereignty should be prolonged to the remotest possible period. The second is, that whenever we are obliged to resign it, we should leave the natives so far improved from their connection with us, as to be capable of maintaining a free, or at least a regular government amongst themselves. If these objects can ever be accomplished, it can only be by a restricted press. A free one, so far from facilitating, would render their attainment utterly impracticable; for, by attempting to *precipitate* improvement, it would frustrate all the benefit which might have been derived from more cautious and temperate proceedings.

6. In the present state of India, the good to be expected from a free press is trifling and uncertain, but the mischief is incalculable; and as to the proprietors of newspapers, as mischief is the more profitable of the two, it will generally have the preference. There is no public in India to be guided and instructed by a free press; the whole of the European society is composed of civil and military officers, belonging to the King's and Honourable Company's services, with a small proportion of merchants and shopkeepers; there are but few among them who have not access to the newspapers and periodical publications of Europe, or who require the aid of political information from an Indian newspaper.

7. The restraint on the press is very limited; it extends only to attacks on the character of Government and its officers, and on the religion of the natives; on all other points it is free. The removal of these restrictions could be of advantage to none but the proprietors of newspapers; it is their business to sell their papers, and they must fill them with such articles as are most likely to answer this purpose; nothing in a newspaper excites so much interest as strictures on the conduct of Government, or its officers; but this is more peculiarly the case in India, where, from the smallness of the European society, almost all the individuals composing it are known to each other, and almost every European may be said to be a public officer. The newspaper which censures most freely public men and measures, and which is most personal in its attacks, will have the greatest sale.

8. The laws, it may be supposed, would be able to correct any violent abuse of the liberty of the press; but this would not be the case. The petty jury are shopkeepers and mechanics, a class not holding in this country the same station as in England,—a

will render it easy for them to consult together regarding their plans; they will have no great difficulty in finding leaders qualified to direct them; their patience, their habits of discipline, and their experience in war, will hold out the fairest prospect of success; they will be stimulated by the love of power and independence, and by ambition and avarice, to carry their designs into execution. The attempt, no doubt, would be dangerous; but when the contest was for so rich a stake, they would not be deterred from the danger. They might fail in their first attempts, but even their failure would not, as under a national government, confirm our power, but shake it to its very foundation. The military insubordination which is occasioned by some partial or temporary cause, may be removed, but that which arises from a change in the character of the troops, urging them to a systematic opposition, cannot be subdued; we should never again recover our present ascendancy; all confidence in them would be destroyed; they would persevere in their designs until they were finally successful; and after a sanguinary civil war, or rather passing through a series of insurrections and massacres, we should be compelled to abandon the country.

12. We might endeavour to secure ourselves by augmenting our European establishment. This might, at a great additional expense, avert the evil for a time, but no increase of Europeans could long protract the existence of our dominion. In such a contest we are not to expect any aid from the people: the native army would be joined by all that numerous and active class of men, formerly belonging to the revenue and police departments, who are now unemployed, and by many now in office, who look for higher situations; and by means of these men they would easily render themselves masters of the open country, and of its revenue: the great mass of the people would remain quiet. The merchants and shopkeepers, from having found facilities given to trade which they never before experienced, might wish us success, but they would do no more. The heads of villages, who have at their disposal the most warlike part of the inhabitants, would be more likely to join their countrymen than to support our cause. They have, it is true, when under their native rulers, often shown a strong desire to be transferred to our dominion; but this feeling arose from temporary causes,—the immediate pressure of a weak and rapacious government, and the hope of bettering themselves by a change. But they have now tried our Government, and found, that though they are protected in their

persons and their property, they have lost many of the emoluments which they derived from a lax revenue system under their native chiefs, and have also lost much of their former authority and consideration among the inhabitants, by the establishment of our judicial courts and European magistrates and collectors. The hopes of recovering their former rank and influence would therefore render a great part of them well disposed to favour any plan for our overthrow. We delude ourselves if we believe that gratitude for the protection they have received, or attachment to our mild Government, would induce any considerable body of the people to side with us in a struggle with the native army.

13. I do not apprehend any immediate danger from the press ; it would require many years before it could produce much effect on our native army ; but though the danger be distant, it is not the less certain, and will ultimately overtake us if the press become free. The liberty of the press and a foreign yoke are, as already stated, quite incompatible. We cannot leave it free with any regard to our own safety ; we cannot restrain it by trial by a jury ; because, from the nature of juries in this country, public officers can never be tried by their peers. No jury will ever give a verdict against the publisher of a libel upon them, however gross it may be. The press must be restrained either by a censor or by the power of sending home at once the publisher of any libellous or inflammatory paper, at the responsibility of Government, without the Supreme Court having the authority, on any plea whatever, to detain him for a single day.

14. Such restrictions as those proposed will not hinder the progress of knowledge among the natives, but rather insure it by leaving it to follow its natural course, and protecting it against military violence and anarchy. Its natural course is not the circulation of newspapers and pamphlets among the natives immediately connected with Europeans, but education gradually spreading among the body of the people, and diffusing moral and religious instruction through every part of the community. The desire of independence and of governing themselves, which in every country follows the progress of knowledge, ought to spring up and become general among the people before it reaches the army ; and there can be no doubt that it will become general in India, if we do not prevent it by ill-judged precipitation, in seeking to effect, in a few years, changes which must be the work of generations. By mild and equitable government ; by promoting the dissemination of useful books among the natives, without

attacking their religion; by protecting their own numerous schools; by encouraging, by honorary or pecuniary marks of distinction, those where the best system of education prevails; by occasional allowances from the public revenue to such as stand in need of this aid; and, above all, by making it worth the while of the natives to cultivate their minds, by giving them a greater share in the civil administration of the country, and holding out the prospect of filling places of rank and emolument, as inducements to the attainment of knowledge, we shall, by degrees, banish superstition, and introduce among the natives of India all the enlightened opinions and doctrines which prevail in our own country.

15. If we take a contrary course; if we, for the sole benefit of a few European editors of newspapers, permit a licentious press to undermine among the natives all respect for the European character and authority, we shall scatter the seeds of discontent among our native troops, and never be secure from insurrection. It is not necessary for this purpose that they should be more intelligent than they are at present, or should have acquired any knowledge of the rights of men or nations; all that is necessary is, that they should have lost all their present high respect for their officers and the European character; and whenever this happens, they will rise against us, not for the sake of asserting the liberty of their country, but of obtaining power and plunder.

16. We are trying an experiment never yet tried in the world; maintaining a foreign dominion by means of a native army, and teaching that army, through a free press, that they ought to expel us, and deliver their country. As far as Europeans only, whether in or out of the service, are concerned, the freedom or restriction of the press could do little good or harm, and would hardly deserve any serious attention. It is only as regards the natives, that the press can be viewed with apprehension; and it is only when it comes to agitate our native army, that its terrible effects will be felt. Many people, both in this country and England, will probably go on admiring the efforts of the Indian press, and fondly anticipating the rapid extension of knowledge among the natives, while a tremendous revolution, originating in this very press, is preparing, which will, by the premature and violent overthrow of our power, disappoint all those hopes, and throw India back into a state more hopeless of improvement than when we first found her.

17. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has brought to

the notice of the Board an anonymous letter, in the Hindostanee language, thrown into the lines of the cavalry cantonment at Arcot, on the night of the ———, urging the troops to murder their European officers, and promising them double pay. This letter was brought in the morning by the Soubadar Major of the regiment of native cavalry, to Lieutenant-Colonel Fowles, the senior officer present in the cantonment. I received a Hindostanee letter by the post some weeks ago, addressed to myself, complaining of the condition of the native army, their depressed situation and low allowances, and exhorting me to do something for their relief. Such letters have been occasionally circulated since our first conquests from Mysore in 1792. I do not notice them now from any belief that they are likely at present to shake the fidelity of our sepoys, but in order to show the motives by which they will probably be instigated to sedition, whenever their characters shall be changed. But though I consider that the danger is still very distant, I think that we cannot be too early in taking measures to avoid it; and I trust that the Honourable the Court of Directors will view the question of the press in India as one of the most important that ever came before them, and the establishment of such an engine, unless under the most absolute control of their Government, as dangerous in the highest degree to the existence of the British power in this country.

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

The same motive which guided me to insert in the body of the work the preceding paper, induces me to give, equally at length, the following on the subject of conversion. It will be read by all parties with the deepest interest; and I am greatly mistaken if, to the minds of the moderate, it carry not absolute conviction. It is to be observed, that to the work of conversion, however zealously carried on, Sir Thomas Munro was no enemy; to the interference of official persons he alone objected, for reasons which he has himself stated at too much length to render any observations on my part necessary.

NINUTE.

15th November, 1822.

HAD I been at the Presidency when the correspondence between the collector and sub-collector of Bellary, regarding the conversion of the natives, was received, I should have lost no time

tracts. No person could have done this but a civil servant, and in Harpenhilly and Bellary, none could have done it but him; yet he cannot in this discover official interference. He did not, it is true, use any direct compulsion; that would most probably have caused an explosion, which would instantly have roused him from his delusion. But he did, and will continue to use, unknown to himself, something very like compulsion,—open interference, official agency, the hope of favours, the fear of displeasure. The people, he says, “could have no difficulty in distinguishing between a matter of authority and of option.” There can be no real freedom of choice, where official authority is interested deeply and exerted openly. A very few of the people might possibly have distinguished between authority and option; but the great body of them would have been more likely to believe that he acted by authority, and that what he was then doing was only preparatory to some general measure of conversion.

Mr. — promises to be guided by the orders of Government, in his conduct to the natives; but I fear that he is too much under the dominion of his own fancies to be controlled by any legitimate authority. He has already shown, by his declining compliance with the directions of his immediate superior, Mr. Campbell, how little he regards subordination, when opposed to what he believes to be his higher duties. He appeals to Government; and while he professes his readiness to conform to their decision, he desires that his opinions regarding the natives may stand or fall, “according as they are supported or contradicted by the Word of God,” as contained in certain passages of Scripture forming the Appendix to his letter. This is an extraordinary kind of appeal. He employs his official authority for missionary purposes; and when he is told by his superior that he is wrong, he justifies his acts by quotations from Scripture, and by election, a doctrine which has occasioned so much controversy; and he leaves it to be inferred, that Government must either adopt his views, or act contrary to divine authority. A person who can, as a sub-collector and magistrate, bring forward such matters for discussion, and seriously desire that they may be placed on record, and examined by Government, is not in a frame of mind to be restrained within the proper limits of his duty, by any official rules.

It was never intended to employ collectors and magistrates as teachers of morality and religion; and of course no rules have been framed for their guidance in such pursuits. Every man who

too just and too sagacious not to perceive, that the troops in the different Presidencies should, as far as practicable, be placed on the same footing; he therefore gave his sanction to the proposed increase; but against every attempt to extend the benefit of the practice to native women and half-caste children, he resolutely opposed himself. This he did on the fair and legitimate ground, that such a regulation would entail an incalculable expense upon the Company, whilst it acted as an encouragement to the increase of a race already too numerous. Towards the half-castes themselves he was by no means disposed to behave with harshness; on the contrary, he considered them entitled to such treatment as their peculiar circumstances called for; but he esteemed it both an unwise and an extravagant notion, that they ought to be taken in any manner under the protection of the State.*

Such is a summary, if I may so speak, of the grand leading principles of Sir Thomas Munro's government; by which, whilst he strove zealously to advance the interests of those for whom he acted, he laboured with no less earnestness to promote the happiness and increase the prosperity of all classes of their subjects. With respect to the system of internal administration carried on in the provinces, it corresponded, as nearly as circumstances would permit, with the plan drawn up at the suggestion of the Commission of which he had formerly been at the head. Whatever his own wishes might have been, he did not consider himself authorized to depart, in the slightest degree, from the rules there laid down; and hence he continued both the revenue and judicial systems of his predecessors, modified as these were by the sanction of the Court of Directors. His conduct, moreover, was on every occasion marked by the very extreme of good feeling and correct judgment. Firm and inflexible in the pursuit of what he felt to be right, he nevertheless contrived, by the suavity of his manner and the conciliatory tone of his language, to gratify even those whose sentiments differed from his own;

* There is given in the APPENDIX an extract from one of his Minutes on these subjects.

and is altogether incredible. The account given by Mr. Ellis is not more satisfactory. He supposes that the Carnatic was chiefly a forest until Adawla Chuckraweti, sovereign of Canara, whose capital was Banawassi, settled three hundred thousand colonists, of whom one fifth were Vellallers, in Tondamundalum. This is evidently fabulous. No prince ever planted such a colony: no country could have supplied the drain. The number of deaths from casualties in such an undertaking would have been as great as that of the surviving colonists. New settlers brought from Canara and Banawassi would die very fast in the Carnatic, even now, when it is cleared. We are not told how three hundred thousand colonists were to maintain themselves among jungles to be cleared away; when we know that, even at this day, such a population could not be maintained without the aid of numerous tanks and water-courses for the cultivation of the lands, which would be otherwise very unproductive.

It is much more likely that the Meerassee tenure with all its incidents, as described by Mr. Ellis, was the gradual growth of a country long peopled and cultivated, than that it was created at once by a grant to a particular tribe of Hindoo cultivators, Vellallers, on their first settling in Arcot, and that province was then an uncultivated forest. It probably originated in local circumstances, and perhaps more in the great number of tanks and water-courses constructed at the public expense, than in any other. As the Circar could be reimbursed for the expenditure upon these works only by the regular cultivation of the lands for which he had provided water, he might have thought it advisable to grant the occupants certain privileges, to enable them to keep up the cultivation as high as possible. A moderate rent, and a hereditary right in the soil, were two of the most obvious means of effecting this object. The joint or Somadayem tenure, by which all the Meerasadars hold all the lands of the village in common, interchangeable at stated periods, probably arose out of the same view of keeping up the cultivation; for, as in unfavourable seasons a portion of the lands could not be fully watered, it is evident that the Meerasadars who held this land, unless there were a periodical interchange, would be worse off and less able than the others to pay their rent regularly.

The great distinction between the wet lands of Malabar and Arcot is, that in Malabar the cultivation of them depends entirely on the falling rains; while in Arcot it depends chiefly on tanks, and other artificial sources of irrigation, constructed at

the expense of Government. In Malabar, the cultivator of wet lands is not at all dependent on the aid of Government: in Arcot, he can do nothing without it. In Malabar, therefore, the cultivator trusts to the seasons and to his own industry for success; and he can with confidence venture to employ all his savings in the improvement of his land. As Government furnishes him with no water, and bears no share of the expense of the improvements, it has no fair claim to any additional rent on account of it; and has, in fact, not made it to any great extent; and hence he has been enabled to render his land a valuable private property, saleable at all times, and transferable at will. In Arcot, the nature of Meerassee hereditary landed property is very different, and is much less perfect; because being dependent on the Government for its supply of water, and being, in fact, held in partnership with the Government, it does not hold out the same inducement to undertake improvement: and hence the land in general is but indifferently cultivated, and though it is nominally saleable, it will seldom fetch any price in the market. In Malabar, where the falling rain during five or six months supplies all the water of cultivation, the proprietor can lay out his money with safety on his land; for he knows that he cannot be disappointed while the order of the seasons continues as it is. But in Arcot the proprietor has no such certainty: he is not even sure that he can keep his lands in their present condition; for, unless Government keep the tanks in repair, this cannot be done. It may often happen that he cannot improve without a larger supply of water, and that this cannot be obtained without enlarging the tank or water-course, which Government may think too expensive; and it may sometimes happen that the bursting of the tank may render his land for ever unfit for cultivation, because the tank may be allowed to go to decay, from its being found that the revenue of all the land watered by it would not defray the expense of repairing it. There are tanks in the country whose lands would not yield five or even four per cent. of the necessary repairs.

The Native Chiefs were fond of building tanks, as good works, or as the means of transmitting their names to posterity; and as they frequently erected them at an expense far beyond what the land could yield any adequate return for, when they were broken down by floods, their successors did not always think it advisable to repair them; and hence the land formerly watered by them was necessarily either left waste or cultivated with dry grain, not

yielding more than from one-fifth to one-tenth of the rice crop. In many parts of Arcot the soil is so poor and sandy, that it will not pay the expense of cultivation unless it be watered. It is evident, therefore, that when Government provides the water, which is the principal part of the expense of cultivation, it becomes a partner with the owner, and has a claim upon him for a fair return for this expense, and that he can never have the same share of the produce as the owner of rice land in Malabar, who bears himself the whole expense of cultivation. From these causes it happens, that in Arcot, and still more in districts where the soil is richer, the most substantial Rayets are found engaged, not in the cultivation of the wet land, where Government supplies the water, but in that of the dry, where they can improve without the aid of Government, and derive the exclusive benefit of every improvement.

It has been maintained by some, that in Arcot and other Tamil countries, the Meerassadar of wet land is bound to pay rent only for what he does cultivate: that if he leave it all uncultivated, Government have no demand on him for rent; and that if Government send another person to cultivate this land, the Meerassadar has a right to exact from this person the landlord's share or rent. If such a right existed anywhere, we might have expected to find it in Malabar and Canara, where private landed property is more perfect than in Arcot, and where Government bears no part of the expense of cultivation. But in those provinces there is no such right, and the landlord is liable for the whole fixed rent of his land, whether he cultivate it or not; and if he fail to pay the rent, his property is liable to distraint and his land to be sold. There does not seem to be any proof of the existence of such a right in Arcot. The belief of it appears to have arisen from confounding the tenant of the Meerassadar with that of the Government. The Meerassadar may undoubtedly make such terms as he pleases with his own tenant; but when he can neither cultivate the land himself nor find a tenant, and Government provides one, he has no claim for rent upon this tenant of Government.

It may at first sight appear to be hard that he should not be entitled to rent for his own land: but it is to be recollected that he has failed to pay the public assessment, and that in such cases the land of the proprietor is, in other countries as well as in this, liable to sale, and that the Meerassadar has still the privilege for a long, though not clearly defined, term of years, of recovering

his land from the Government tenant, on consenting to pay the rent.

The right of the Meerassadar to derive a rent from land for which he neither pays the public revenue nor finds a tenant, is certainly not acknowledged now, and probably never was so at any former time. Government, by the construction of tanks and water-courses in Arcot, supply the water, which is the chief article in the expense of wet cultivation, and has a right to see that the lands, on account of which it has incurred so heavy a charge, are not without necessity left uncultivated, or exempted from their share of the public burdens.

In many parts of Arcot, as has already been remarked, the soil is so poor that, previously to its being watered and converted into rice land, it would not have defrayed the expense of cultivation, and must have lain waste.

In general, the produce of wet is to that of dry land as five to one at least; if, therefore, we suppose that certain Meerassadars possessed a piece of land which under dry cultivation yielded two thousand rupees of annual revenue to Government, it would, after being converted into wet or rice land, yield ten thousand rupees: but the tank which would be required in order to supply the water, would probably cost Government a lac of rupees. The additional revenue, therefore, which Government would derive from this work would be eight thousand rupees per annum, which, making allowance for occasional repairs, would not be more than five or six per cent. for its money: and it would be much less, if we suppose that the Meerassadars, when they did not choose to cultivate, were not liable for the revenue. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Government, where it sunk so large a capital, would expect an adequate return; and as this could only be obtained by the regular payment of the revenue, it would not grant to the Meerassadars a privilege which would defeat this object, but would follow the custom which we find at present established, of transferring the land to other tenants when they failed to pay the rent.

If the Meerassadars, without cultivating themselves or finding tenants to cultivate, had been allowed to levy from the Government tenants a *swamy bhogium*, or landlord's share, of ten to fifteen per cent. they would, without any liability for the public revenue, and without any expense, have derived, by means of a tank constructed at the sole charge of Government, an income from the land four or five times greater than before. No private per-

duce, or whatever its share may be, from the Rayet, whether the crop be scanty or abundant, and because the Rayet is also sure of not being called on for rent when the crop has entirely failed, and he is, perhaps, unable to pay. Such a system is better calculated to save the Rayet from being oppressed by demands which he cannot pay, than to enable him to become wealthy.

This protection to the Rayet from the payment of revenue in a season of calamity, is the only advantage which appears to belong to the system; but it is an advantage which could be necessary only under a rigid system, and would not be wanted under a more liberal one of assessment. The very existence of such a system in Arcot and other districts, where it is most prevalent, is a proof that, however light Indian revenue may be in the theories of Indian writers, in practice it has always been heavy. Had the public assessment, as pretended, ever been, as in the books of their sages, only a sixth or a fifth, or even only a fourth of the gross produce, the payment of a fixed share in kind, and all the expensive machinery requisite for its supervision, never could have been wanted. The simple plan of a money assessment might have been at once resorted to, in the full confidence that the revenue would every year, in good or bad seasons, be easily and punctually paid. No person who knows any thing of India revenue can believe that the Rayet, if his fixed assessment were only a fifth or a fourth of the gross produce, would not every year, whether the season were good or bad, pay it without difficulty; and not only do this, but prosper under it beyond what he has ever done at any former period. Had such a moderate assessment ever been established, it would undoubtedly have been paid in money, because there would have been no reason for continuing the expensive process of making collections in kind. It was because the assessment was not moderate, that assessments in kind were introduced or continued; for a money rent equivalent to the amount could not have been realized one year with another. The Hindoo Governments seem to have often wished that land should be both an hereditary and a saleable property; but they could not bring themselves to adopt the only practicable mode of effecting it, a low assessment. It is however supposed by the Board of Revenue, that it was low. The simple fact of its having been paid in kind is sufficient, were there nothing else to disprove this opinion. The Board say that the Mahomedan exactions converted the Hindoo tax into a land rent, reduced the landlord to a land occupant, who ceased to employ

tenants, and restricted himself to such land as he could cultivate with his own servants, and then Government transferred the vacant land to strangers temporarily, and more often permanently. But there is no proof whatever of this former state of light assessment, of the time when it existed, or when the change began, or when it reached its present standard. It is somewhat singular, that the Board of Revenue, though they consider a light assessment, and the payment in kind of a fixed share of the crop, as fundamental parts of the old Indian revenue system, yet in their conjectures as to the origin of the custom of the revenue, of wet land being demandable in kind, they never once think of ascribing it to any cause tending to favour the Rayet, but only to those causes which tend to secure a high revenue. They say, the fluctuation in the produce, in the value of the produce, the desire to obtain the utmost possible revenue in times of high price, a knowledge of the fluctuation in the value of the precious metals, the impossibility of otherwise obtaining so large a proportion of the gross produce as fifty per cent. may all, or in part, have perpetuated the custom of receiving in kind the revenue demandable from rice lands. I never could discover the least foundation for the assumption, that the Hindoo assessment had been raised by the Mahomedan conquest, or for believing that the assessment which we now find did not exist before that period. We find the assessment as high in the territories of Hindoo as of Mahomedan chiefs. This cannot have been owing to the progress of the Mahomedan arms, because over many of the petty states they never established more than a nominal dominion, nor ever assumed the management of their revenues. Among the chieftains of the Northern Circars descended from the ancient sovereigns of Orissa, and who have for ages been in a great measure independent, as well as among many of the Rajahs of the upper and lower Carnatic, descended from the sovereigns of Vijeanaggur or their deputies, and who also since the fall of that empire have in a great degree been independent, we find the same rate of assessment, amounting usually to about one half, and fluctuating according to the soil from two fifths to three fifths of the gross produce, with little variation except that in some places it is paid in kind, and in others in money. It cannot be maintained that the demands of the Mahomedan conquerors may have compelled these chiefs to introduce a new and higher rate of assessment, because the peshcush imposed upon them by the Mahomedans was trifling, was often

withheld, and was generally less than they had paid to their own princes. The few imperfect records which have reached us of the revenues of Vijeanuggur, the last of the great Hindoo powers, do not show that the assessment was lighter under that Government than under its Mahomedan successors. If, then, there ever did in any age prevail throughout India a moderate land-tax, its loss must be attributed to some other cause than that of Mahomedan invasion. After the time of the first fanatical conquerors, many of the Mahomedan princes seem to have been more enlightened, and as much disposed to be moderate as the former Hindoo rulers. Among these were the Emperor Akbar Mullk Aubar, and other princes, by whom great and systematic reforms were introduced. There is, however, no ground, either from tradition or from record, or from the present state of the country, for believing that a moderate land-tax was ever at any time throughout India the general principle of its revenue system. It is much more likely that a variety of systems have always prevailed in different provinces at the same time, some more, some less favourable to the people, some admitting of private landed property, some rejecting it; that in the same province different systems have predominated at different times; and that the system of all land being the property of the Circar has sometimes succeeded that of private landed property, and sometimes given way to it. At Vijeanuggur, the seat of the last great Hindoo government, and in the countries immediately around it, where, according to the theory of private landed property having been the ancient Hindoo system until destroyed by foreign invasion, we might naturally hope to see it in its greatest perfection, we find no trace or record of its having ever existed. In the countries in the Peninsula it is most perfect in Canara, which was long, and in Malabar, which was a considerable time, under a Mahomedan government.

Next to these provinces it is most complete in Travancore, which never was subdued by that power. In Arcot and Tanjore it is less valuable than in Travancore, and in Madura and Tinnevelly still less so than in Arcot. In a narrow stripe of country along the eastern side of the Western Ghauts, from the south of Mysore to Sattarah, it is found nearly in the same state as in the adjoining districts below the Ghauts. With the exception of this narrow slip, it is unknown in Mysore, in the Southern Mahrattah country, in the Ceded Districts, and in the Northern Circars. It is unknown in Bijapoor; it is found farther north at Sholapoor,

poor to appeal, to undergo the experiment of such a system for nearly twenty years, and to revert from the Mootahdar to Government with much less loss than could have been expected, and, in some instances, in a much better condition than they had ever been before. In a considerable part of the land, the Mootahdars found it advisable to lower the survey assessment, in order to induce the Rayets to extend their cultivation; in some cases they raised it illegally, by the aid of the influence derived from their situation; but in by far the greater part of the land, the survey assessment still continued to be followed in the engagements between the Mootahdar and the Rayets. This long continuance of a known and fixed assessment has begun to introduce saleable private landed property into the Burmah, where it was never known before. I do not speak of Mootahs or Zemindarries, because they are merely saleable portions of the Government revenue; but of the single field, or aggregate of fields, which usually compose the possession of a Rayet. In many Mootahs, several fields are saleable, and in some every field is so. This effect has been produced by the survey assessment, not from its moderation, for it is hardly lighter than that of the native governments usually is, but from its having been fixed, and so clearly defined as to leave no uncertainty, and thus to encourage one party to improve, and the other to purchase the land.

This effect, too, has been produced under many disadvantages, and it would have been much more extensive had it been assisted by a lighter assessment, and not been impeded by the petty oppression of the Mootahdarry system. The land which has become saleable in the Burmah has been sold from two or three to ten or twelve years' purchase. This is an advantage which it possesses over the old Meeras land of Arcot, which, though nominally saleable, is rarely so, except in the neighbourhood of Madras, or of towns on the coast, and there more commonly for building than for agricultural purposes. It possesses a great advantage in its simplicity; for it is not a complicated property, made up of various shares and fees, and bound to pay Government a large share of every improvement, like that of the Meeras; but is a fee simple, held immediately of Government, and liable only to the same fixed rent, however great the produce derived from improvement may be. The land of the Burmah will probably in time all become saleable, even under its present assessment; but private landed property is of slow growth in countries where it has not previously existed, and where the Government revenue is nearly

half the produce; and we must not expect that it can be hastened by regulations or forms of settlement, or by any other way than by adhering steadily to a limited assessment, and lowering it wherever, after full experience, it may still in particular places be found too high. By pursuing this course, or, in other words, by following what is now called the Rayetwar system, we shall see no sudden change or improvement. The progress of landed property will be slow, but we may look with confidence to ultimate and general establishment. We have never yet followed with perseverance any plan calculated to create or extend private landed property, and where we have laid the foundation of such a plan by a survey and fixed assessment of the land, as in the Baramahl, Coimbatore, and Arcot, and some other provinces, we have counteracted its design by injudicious leases and permanent settlements.

These settlements seem to have been adopted in deference to the example of Bengal, without sufficient knowledge of the claims of the Rayets. The rights of the Meerasadar Rayets of Arcot and Tanjore were well known at the time, but those of the Rayets of other districts, which were equally strong, though not called meerassy, seem to have been but little understood. Most of the well-intended but visionary plans for the improvement of India by the creation of Zemindars of whole districts or of single villages, appear to have originated in extreme ignorance of the state of the landed property of the country, and the rights of the persons by whom it was held. It has been supposed by some that the Zemindars were the landlords or proprietors, and the Rayets their undertenants or labourers; and by others that the sovereign was the sole landlord, and the Rayets mere cultivating tenants. But the Rayet is the real proprietor, for whatever land does not belong to the sovereign belongs to him. The demand for public revenue, according as it is high or low in different places, and at different times, affects his share; but whether it leaves him only the bare profit of his stock, or a small surplus beyond it as landlord's rent, he is still the true proprietor, and possesses all that is not claimed by the sovereign as revenue.

The land in most of the provinces under the Madras Government is occupied by a vast mass of small proprietors or Rayets, holding properties of every size, from two or three, to two or three thousand acres, and some few having whole villages.

These properties are in general very small; but they are of that extent which necessarily results from the limited means of

the owners, and the nature of the institutions of the country. The correctness of this description is not altered by the existence of great possessions in the hands of Rajahs and old Zemindars in some of our provinces, because these men are not private landholders, but rather petty princes, and the Rayets in their districts stand nearly in the same relation to them as to the sovereign in the Circar districts. The distribution of landed property differs in every country; it is different in Ireland from what it is in England, and in India from what it is in either of those countries. But we ought to take it as we find it, and not attempt, upon idle notions of improvement, to force a distribution of it into larger properties, when every local circumstance is adverse to its continuance in that state: the experiment has already been tried by the establishing of village Zemindars or Mootahdars, and has already very generally failed. The event could not possibly have been otherwise of a measure whose object was to bring a new class of proprietors into villages where the produce was too little for the old ones. Even in those villages which are still in the hands of the Mootahdars, the object of having larger landed properties will entirely fail, because the properties by sale and division among heirs are fast subdividing, and will soon dwindle into portions smaller than the properties of individual Rayets. There are instances in which this has already happened, and they will soon become so numerous that the system must, at no distant period, die a natural death.

There is no analogy whatever between the landlord of England and his tenants, and the Mootahdar, or new village Zemindar of this country, and his Rayets. In England, the landlord is respected by the farmer as his superior; here the Zemindar has no such respect, for the principal Rayets of most villages regard him as not more than their equal, and often as their inferior. He is often the former Pottail or head Rayet of the village, but he is frequently some petty shopkeeper or merchant, or some adventurer or public servant out of employ. Whichever of these he is, he has usually very little property; he has none for the improvement of the village; but, on the contrary, looks to the village as the means of improving his own circumstances. The Rayets, by being placed under him, sink from the rank of tenants of the Government to that of tenants of an individual. They are transferred from a superior, who has no interest but in their protection and welfare, to one whose interest it is to enlarge his own property at the expense of theirs; who seeks by every way, how-

But it is said, that the Zemindar does not infringe their rights, because he has no authority to demand more than the dues of Government, as regulated by the usage of the country, and that, if the parties be left to themselves, things will find their proper level. They will find the level which they have found in Bengal, and in several districts under this Government, and which the weak always find when they are left to contend with the strong. The question is, whether we are to continue the country in its natural state, occupied by a great body of independent Rayets, and to enable them, by a lighter assessment, to rise gradually to the rank of landlords; or whether we are to place the country in an artificial state, by dividing it in villages, or larger districts, among a new class of landholders, who will inevitably, at no distant period, by the subdivision of their new property, fall to the level of Rayets, while the Rayets will, at the same time, have sunk from the rank of independent tenants in chief to that of sub-tenants and cultivators?—It is, whether we are to raise the landholders we have, or to create a new set, and see them fall? This question, it is to be hoped, has been set at rest by the orders of the Court of Directors, to make the settlement with the Rayets in all districts in which the permanent Zemindarry settlement has not been established.

In all those provinces whose revenues are, by ancient usage, paid chiefly in money, surveys appear to have been made at different remote periods, in order to fix the assessment. In some districts they are only known by tradition; in others, they still exist, in a mutilated shape, in the Curnum's accounts; but there is no certainty that these accounts belong to any particular survey, or that they are not made of fragments of several; or, that the village accounts have not been so often altered by the Curnums, without any regular authority, as to contain no trace of any survey whatever. Though the village accounts were supposed to have a specific rate of assessment for every field according to the class to which it belonged, the Collectors were not made to conform very rigidly to this rate, but were usually somewhat above or below it, according to the nature of the season and other circumstances. The farm or estate of a Rayet was generally composed of three parts: the first and principal was his old farm, containing the lands which he always occupied; the second, but much smaller part, containing land of an inferior quality, was called his Kuttgootah, and was held at a low and fixed rent; and the third was his cowle land, taken from the

favourable to the cultivators or Rayets. It is also obvious, from what has been said, that if, after making such a fixed assessment, perfect freedom were given to the Rayets to throw up whatever land they did not want, they would throw up about one-fifth of their land, and thereby diminish the revenue nearly in the same proportion. But this diminution would only be temporary, because, as the Rayets, by concentrating their agricultural stock upon a similar extent of land, would obtain a greater produce from it, their means would gradually increase, and enable them to take and cultivate again the land which they had relinquished. Under annual settlements, and fluctuating assessment, they are not very anxious about throwing up land, because they know that, by the custom of the country, we can raise the assessment upon the remaining land, according to its produce and improvement; but whenever the assessment has been fixed, they soon discover the advantage which it gives them, and endeavour to get rid of all their extra land. The liberty of doing so has already been partially granted, and must be fully granted to them; for though it will cause a temporary loss of revenue, it is a sacrifice which ought to be made, for the sake of securing the great public benefit of a permanent revenue, founded upon the general establishment of private landed property. It is the ever-varying assessment which has prevented, and as long as it continues, will prevent land from becoming a valuable property; for even where the assessment is lowest, the knowledge that it may at any time be raised, hinders the land from acquiring such a value as to render it a saleable article. We cannot communicate to it the value which it ought to possess, or render it a private property, capable of being easily sold or mortgaged, unless the public assessment upon every part of it be previously fixed. When it is fixed, all uncertainty is removed, and all land, which is not absolutely over-assessed, soon acquires a value, which is every day increased by improvements, made in consequence of the certainty of reaping all the profit arising from them.

The introduction of the fixed assessment into the Baramahl, Coimbatore, and other provinces, has not been so successful as it ought to have been in establishing private landed property; but it has been as successful as could reasonably have been expected, when we consider that it had no fair trial, and that it had hardly begun to operate when it was supplanted by a new system of permanent settlements and leases. Had it been left to produce its own effect undisturbed by a change, there can be little doubt

their diminution. I trust that we shall never have occasion to go beyond the original assessment, and that we shall in time be able to make considerable reductions in it. The fixed assessment will not for some years have the same effect in encouraging improvements as it had before the introduction of the leases and permanent settlements; because these measures have shaken the confidence of the Rayets in the continuance of the present system, and will render them cautious in undertaking improvements, lest they should be prevented from enjoying the full benefit of them, by being again placed under a renter or Zemindar. Some years, therefore, must yet elapse before this apprehension can subside, and the survey assessment have its full effect in encouraging improvement, and promoting the growth of landed property.

There are, however, several extensive provinces in which we have no control over the assessment, and scarcely any means of bettering the condition of the Rayets; I mean the Northern Circars. When these districts came into our possession, one part of them was in the hands of Zemindars, and the other and most valuable part was in the hands of Government, and has since, by the permanent settlement, been made over to new Zemindars of our own creation. As in these provinces no fixed assessment has been introduced, nor the rights of the Rayets been defined, the Rayets never can become landholders, nor their lands acquire such a value as to make them saleable. It may be said that they have a right to be assessed only according to ancient usage, and that this right will secure them from undue exaction, and give them the same facility as the Rayets of the Government districts, of rendering their land a valuable property; but many causes combine to prevent this. The ancient usage was in every little district or even village. It is not recorded or defined, and is very little known to us. It is, I believe, in the Northern Circars very generally so high as to leave the Rayet no more than the bare recompense of his labour and stock, and thus to preclude his ever obtaining any portion of a landlord's rent. Even supposing that usage did leave to the Rayet some surplus as landlord's rent, the Zemindar might not permit him to enjoy it. He might raise the assessment. If he were an old Zemindar or hill Rajah, the fear of personal violence would deter the Rayet from complaining. If he were a new Zemindar, the Rayet would, nine times in ten, submit quietly to the loss, not from fear of personal injury, but from the well-grounded fear of losing his cause in the court. He knows that the influence of the Zemindar would easily pro-

cure witnesses to swear falsely on the question of usage, and that they would be supported by the fabricated accounts of the Curnum, who is entirely under the authority of the Zemindar ; and that, if he even gained his cause, it would be of no advantage to him, as the Zemindar, without transgressing any law, would be able to harass him in many ways, and make his situation uncomfortable.

There is, therefore, no prospect, or but a very distant one, of our being able to establish landed property among the Rayets of the Northern Circars, or to improve their condition in any material degree. In the old Zemindarries, which are chiefly among the unhealthy hills, our prospect is as good now as ever it was, because we never there exercised any direct authority over the Rayets, and could not expect to see landed property grow up among them, until time should gradually have wrought such a change in the manners and opinions of their leading men, as to make them see the expediency of encouraging it. But in the new Zemindarries we exercised a direct authority over all the inhabitants, and could have raised their condition and landed property at our pleasure ; but we lost the power of doing so by the permanent settlement. It may be said that Government having set a limit upon its demand upon the Zemindar, he will also set a limit to his demand upon the Rayet, and leave him the full produce of every improvement, and thus enable him to render his land a valuable property. But we have no reason to suppose that this will be the case, either from the practice of the new Zemindars during the twenty years they have existed, or from that of the old Zemindars during a succession of generations. In old Zemindarries, whether held by the Rajahs of the Circars, or the Poligars of the more southern provinces, which have from a distant period been held at a low and fixed peshcush, no indulgence has been shown to the Rayets, no bound has been set to the demand upon them. The demand has risen with improvement, according to the custom of the country, and the land of the Rayet has no saleable value ; we ought not, therefore, to be surprised that in the new Zemindarries, whose assessment is so much higher, the result has been equally unfavourable to the Rayets. The new Zemindarries will, by division among heirs and failures in their payments, break up into portions of one or two villages ; but this will not better the condition of the Rayet. It will not fix the rent of the land, nor render it a valuable property ; it will merely convert one large Zemindarry into several small Zemin-

judge, whenever there is a failure in the revenue, whether it arises from the assessment, or some other cause. As it is one main principle of Indian revenue, that all land when cultivated is liable to the public assessment, and when left uncultivated is exempt from it, it is manifest that, without the detailed settlement, the amount of the revenue for the year could not be correctly ascertained.

It has also been argued, that it is useless to impose a fixed assessment upon each field or lot of land, because the produce will always fluctuate according to the culture. This objection would be a very just one, if it were intended that the rent payable to Government should always correspond with the produce; but this is not the case. All that is necessary in fixing the Government rent is, that it shall not be higher than what the land is able to yield under the most ordinary degree of culture; whatever entire produce is derived from any culture beyond this should go exclusively to the Rayet; Government should have no share in it. Improved cultivation will, of course, regulate the rent between the proprietor or Rayet and his tenant, but not between the Rayet and Government; and if Government is satisfied with the moderate rent arising from common cultivation, the lands, if cultivated at all, will yield this rent, and there is no danger that any fluctuation in the degrees of culture will preclude the realization of the field assessment. By common usage, where there is no fixed field assessment, Government receives in kind a high share of the produce, or in money a high rent; and its rent, whether in kind or money, rises with the produce. By the field assessment, Government will receive a rent somewhat lower than the present one, and as it will be fixed, and not rise with improvement, it will be more likely to be permanently realized. It has been asserted, in speaking of the Meerassy privileges in the Carnatic, that the Rayetwar assessment destroyed by violence all these ancient usages and customs, and so completely, that both Mr. Grame and Mr. Ravenshaw have denied the existence of Meerassy in these provinces. The Rayetwar assessment had not been established more than four or five years when Mr. Ravenshaw took charge of Arcot. These ancient usages and customs had probably fallen into disuse, or the preservation of them been deemed of little value, or they could not in so short a time have been so lost, as to escape the notice both of him and of Mr. Grame. Even if it were true that they had been destroyed by violence, there can be no cause for attributing to the Rayetwar

an effect which might have been equally produced by any other mode of settlement. The Rayetwar settlement, when properly conducted, respects all private rights; to ascertain and secure them are among its principal objects. The carelessness, or the over-zeal of collectors, may invade them under any settlement whatever, if they are not restrained by superior authority.

It has been objected to the Rayetwar system, that it is intricate, difficult of management, and expensive; but experience contradicts these opinions, for wherever Rayetwar has been properly established, it has been found to be more easy, simple, and efficient than any other kind of settlement. The idea of its being more expensive arises from not considering that it includes all the expenses of collection which would be incurred by Zemindars if the country were under them, and which would in that case be necessarily deducted from the amount of the revenue, and not appear as a charge. One great advantage which the Rayetwar settlement has over every other, is the strength and security which it gives to our Government, by bringing us into direct communication with the great body of the Rayets, or landowners. Objections may be urged to every system. It is enough to recommend it to our adoption, to know that it is the common one of the country. It is one of the primary obligations of a Government like ours to suit its rules and forms of local administration to the condition of the people, to provide every establishment which it may require, and not to withhold any thing which may be necessary to its efficiency, for the sake of avoiding either labour or expense.

When we have determined the principles on which the land revenue is to be fixed, the next question is, by what agency it is to be managed? There can be no doubt that it ought, as far as practicable, to be native. Juster views have of late years been taken of this subject, and the Court of Directors have authorised the employment of the natives on higher salaries and in more important offices. There is true economy in this course, for by it they will have better servants, and their affairs will be better conducted. It is strange to observe how many men of very respectable talents have seriously recommended the abolition of native, and the substitution of European agency to the greatest possible extent. I am persuaded that every advance made in such a plan would not only render the character of the people worse and worse, but our Government more and more inefficient. The preservation of our dominion in this country requires that all the

both in the higher and in all the subordinate offices, by means of Europeans, it ought not to be done, because it would be both politically and morally wrong. The great number of public offices in which the natives are employed, is one of the strongest causes of their attachment to our Government. In proportion as we exclude them from these, we lose our hold upon them ; and were the exclusion entire, we should have their hatred in place of their attachment ; their feeling would be communicated to the whole population, and to the Native troops, and would excite a spirit of discontent too powerful for us to subdue or resist. But were it possible that they could submit silently and without opposition, the case would be worse ; they would sink in character, they would lose with the hope of public office and distinction all laudable ambition, and would degenerate into an indolent and abject race, incapable of any higher pursuit than the mere gratification of their appetites. It would certainly be more desirable that we should be expelled from the country altogether, than that the result of our system of government should be such a debasement of a whole people. This is, to be sure, supposing an extreme case, because nobody has ever proposed to exclude the natives from the numerous petty offices, but only from the more important offices now filled by them. But the principle is the same, the difference is only in degree ; for in proportion as we exclude them from the higher offices, and a share in the management of public affairs, we lessen their interest in the concerns of the community, and degrade their character.

It was from a conviction of the policy of extending native agency, that the establishment of the revenue board catcherry was recommended in 1822. The right of the people to be taxed only by their own consent, has always, in every free country, been esteemed amongst the most important of all privileges ; it is that which has most exercised the minds of men, and which has oftenest been asserted by the defenders of liberty. Even in countries in which there is no freedom, taxation is the most important function of government ; because it is that which most universally affects the comfort and happiness of the people, and that which has oftenest excited them to resistance ; and hence both its utility and its danger have, under the most despotic governments, taught the necessity of employing in its administration the ablest men of the country.

In this point, at least, we ought to be guided by the example of those governments, and employ intelligent and experienced

natives at the head of the revenue to assist the revenue board. If in other departments we give experienced natives to assist the European officers, shall we not give them in this, whose duties are the most difficult and most important? We cannot exclude them from it without injury to ourselves as well as to them; we cannot conduct the department efficiently without them. But even if we could, policy requires that we should let them have a share in the business of taxing their own country. It attaches them to our Government, it raises them in their own estimation, and it encourages them, by the prospect of attaining a situation of so much distinction, to qualify themselves for it by a zealous performance of their duty. Although we can never leave entirely to the natives the power of taxing the country, we ought to entrust them with as much of it as possible under our superintendence. We ought to make them acquainted with our objects in taxation, and with the principles on which we wish it to be founded, in order that, in communicating their opinions to us, they may not be guided by the mere object of raising the revenue, but that of adapting the revenue to the wants of the state and the circumstances of the people. It is desirable that this knowledge should be widely diffused among the natives; but it can only be effected by their having the benefit of free intercourse with us, and of acquiring experience in important official situations. They have the advantage of this intercourse already, in the catcheries attached to collectors and to the board of revenue; and under many of the collectors this advantage is rendered more general, by their hearing the opinions of the most intelligent heads of villages, and of respectable inhabitants, not in the service of Government, and discussing in their presence questions of revenue. This establishes confidence in us among the natives, and gradually extends among them juster and more enlarged views of the purposes for which taxation is intended.

This kind of intercourse, however, could hardly subsist, or be productive of any advantage, if we adopted the opinions of most of the advocates of Zemindarry settlements, that the collector ought not to enter into the details of revenue, but leave the natives to conduct them and settle with each other in their own way, and that he should confine himself to their general superintendence under the guidance of general principles. This appears to me to be a mistaken doctrine, which ought to be avoided; because, in order to maintain our power in India, we must have able and skilful servants, and such servants could not

forced by the duties of their situation to inquire, that know any thing about it, or can tell Government whether any particular law is popular or the reverse.

Government itself knows nothing of the state of the country, except what it learns from its local officers. In other countries, Government and its officers are a part of the community, and are of course acquainted with the effect of every public measure, and the opinion of the country regarding it; but here Government is deprived of this advantage; it makes laws for a people who have no voice in the matter, and of whom it knows very little, and it is therefore evident that it cannot adapt its laws to the circumstances of the people, unless it receive accurate information upon this subject from active and intelligent local officers, whose duty it is to investigate carefully the condition and opinions of the inhabitants, and to report upon them. But these officers can acquire this information only through an establishment of experienced native servants, who have beyond all other men, from the very nature of their official duties, the best means of obtaining it. Intelligent collectors are necessary at all times, but more especially when it becomes expedient either to raise or lower the revenue. Such an operation requires not judgment alone, but great knowledge of details; and if undertaken without these essential requisites, would be productive of much mischief. We ought, therefore, not to be satisfied with a superficial knowledge of the general state of the country, but make it a part of our system to obtain the most minute and accurate information concerning its internal condition, and preserve and accumulate that information in clear and detailed revenue accounts and statistical statements.

In comparing our internal administration with that of the Native Princes, it may be said that we have perhaps been more successful in our judicial than in our revenue institutions. In the criminal branch, the extent of our power has rendered the apprehension of criminals more sure, and in spite of the difficulties of conviction arising from the Mahomedan law, punishment is as certain, and justice much more so, than before. I doubt if in civil judicature we have the same advantage yet, or ever can have, until we leave to the Natives the decision of almost all original suits. The Natives can hardly be said to have had any regular system. What it was, has been well described by the late Commissioner of the Deccan; but their decisions by various local officers, by *roprus*, *punchayets*, and the prince, or

better; and it was opposed by some very intelligent men, on the ground of its form and proceedings being altogether so irregular as to be quite incompatible with the system of our courts. All doubts as to the popularity of punchayets among the natives must now have been removed by the reports of some of the ablest servants of the Company, which explain their nature, and show that they were in general use over extensive provinces. The defects of the punchayet are better known to the natives than to us; yet with all its defects they hold it in so much reverence, that they say, where the *punj* sits God is present. In many ordinary cases the punchayet is clear and prompt in its decision, but when complicated accounts are to be examined, it is often extremely dilatory. It adjourns frequently; when it meets again, some of the members are often absent, and it sometimes happens that a substitute takes the place of an absent member. All this is, no doubt, extremely irregular; but the native Government itself is despotic and irregular, and every thing under it must partake of its nature. These irregularities, however, are all susceptible of gradual correction; and, indeed, even now they are not found in practice to produce half the inconvenience that might be expected by men who have been accustomed to the exact forms of English courts of judicature. They ought not to prevent our employing the punchayet more than we have hitherto done, because its duties are of the most essential advantage to the community, and there is no other possible way by which they can be so well discharged. The natives have been so long habituated to the punchayet in all their concerns, that not only in the great towns, but even in the villages, a sufficient number of persons qualified to sit upon it can be found. We ought to avail ourselves of their aid, by extending the range within which the operations of the punchayet are now confined. Its cognizance of all suits within a certain amount, both in the Zillah and district *Moonsiff's* courts, should be abolished, and neither party should have the option of declining its jurisdiction. The same rule should hold in all cases tried by the Collector.

The use of the punchayet in criminal trials has been recommended by several persons, and among others by a very intelligent judicial officer, who submitted a draft of a regulation for the purpose. I am persuaded that the measure would be very beneficial, and that, until it is adopted, facts will never be so well found as they might be. The employment of the punchayet, independently of the great help it affords us in carrying on the

interest in the peace of the country, because it knew that in tranquil times its services were less wanted, and that its numbers would probably be reduced. Its gains were derived from disturbance, and its importance increased in such times, and it was therefore its business to exaggerate every disorder, and to keep up alarm. It was altogether a harsh and vexatious system of espionage.

We have now, in most places, reverted to the old police of the country, executed by village watchmen, mostly hereditary, under the direction of heads of villages, Tishildars of districts, and the collector and magistrate of the province. The establishments of the Tishildars are employed without distinction either in police or revenue duties, as the occasion requires; and it is the intimate knowledge of the inhabitants and of the country, which they and the village servants acquire from their occupation in the revenue, which enables them to discover by whom offences are committed, much more readily than could possibly be done by mere police servants. The village and district servants, as well as the Tishildar under whom they act, are deeply interested in the good order of the country, and they have therefore the strongest motives for exerting themselves in preserving its peace.

What is usually called police can seldom prevent crimes; it can seldom do more than secure the greater part of the offenders. Much has been said and written in favour of a preventive police, but I do not know that the attempt to establish it has ever been successful in any country. When a vigilant police renders detection and punishment more certain, it no doubt acts as a preventive, in so far as it deters from the commission of crime. The only efficient preventive is the improvement of manners, in which the punishment of offences can have very little share. A moderate assessment, by enabling all to find employment and to live, is, next to the amelioration of manners, the thing best calculated in this country to diminish crimes. It is generally found that theft and robbery are most frequent in districts over-assessed, and that, in seasons of scarcity, they become common in districts in which they were before of rare occurrence. Our present system of police is very well suited to its object, and is perfectly equal to all the purposes of its institution, though it is not always so well directed as might be wished. This, however, is not to be wondered at; it arises from our inexperience, and is not to be removed by any new rules, but solely by longer experience. The districts in which gang-robbery and plundering are most pre-

circumstances, will not enable us to form any just conclusion; and even with the greatest attention to every circumstance, it is difficult to arrive at any thing like accuracy. Many incidental causes tend to swell the number of crimes at one time more than another: peace or war, plenty or famine, the disbanding of troops in our own or the neighbouring countries, the passage through the country of a greater or smaller number of Brigandies, who are generally robbers. Besides these, there are causes of an official nature, which give a very great increase or decrease of crime where there is little real change. In some districts the magistrates and police apprehend great numbers of persons on groundless suspicion, or for trivial matters, of which no public notice ought to have been taken.

These irregularities arise from the ignorance and the over zeal of the native servants, or from their carelessness, and not unfrequently from those of the magistrates. The best way of ascertaining with tolerable accuracy the increase or decrease of crime, would be by a comparison of the number of the higher crimes in periods of ten or fifteen years. If we include petty thefts, or even burglary, we shall be led to an enormous conclusion, for in this country most of the offences called burglary are little more than petty theft. They do not generally involve housebreaking, but are much oftener confined to the carrying away some trifling article from a hut or house, which is either open or entered without violence. Crimes are, no doubt, sometimes concealed from fear, and other causes; but I believe that the number actually committed is usually overrated, and that many of the burglaries and robberies said to have been ascertained, but none of the offenders discovered, never actually took place. If, what is not uncommon in India, eight or ten thieves from a distant province enter a district, and after robbing a few of the inhabitants or their houses, disappear; an alarm is raised, statements are brought forward of losses which never happened, in the expectation of obtaining a remission of rent, and the magistrate himself is sometimes too easily led to give credit to these reports, and to represent the district as being in an alarming state, and to call for an increase of his establishment in order to meet the difficulty; whereas, if he had given himself leisure to investigate the reports, he would have found that his district was just in its ordinary state.

From the first introduction of our judicial regulations, the people of the country have been accused, both by the magistrates and judges, of not sufficiently aiding the police. The complaint

of offenders escaping, because people do not choose to appear as prosecutors or witnesses, from indolence, apathy, or distance, is common to all countries, and is as little chargeable to India as to any other. I believe that if the matter were fairly examined, it would be found that the police derives much more gratuitous aid from the people in this country than in England; but we expect from them more than ought to be required in any country. As the Mahomedan law officers in criminal trials rejected not only the evidence of the police but of all public servants, it was thought advisable to remedy this inconvenience, by making two or more of the most respectable inhabitants of the village, to which any criminal was brought for examination, attest the depositions, in consequence of which they were obliged to make two journeys to the station of the Zillah court, and many of them were obliged to perform this duty twice a year, because, the better their character, the more likely they were to be called upon as witnesses. They often complained of this heavy grievance; but it was not till lately that they were exempted from it, as it was considered by most of the judges as a duty which they owed to the public, and were bound to perform. The performance, no doubt, facilitated the business of the judge with the Mahomedan law officer; but it was certainly most unreasonable to expect that a respectable shopkeeper or merchant should be always ready to leave his house and his own affairs, and to undertake an expensive journey about a trial in which he had no concern, merely for the sake of public justice. Many of the judges have, however, done justice to the character of the people in their support of the law, and stated that they have of late shown great alacrity in the preservation of the peace of the country, and gallant behaviour in attacking robbers.

We should be careful that, in our anxiety to form an efficient police, we do not sacrifice the comfort of the people, and establish a system of general vexation and oppression. There is nothing by which we are so likely to be unintentionally led into systematic vexation as by schemes of police, registering the inhabitants of villages, making them responsible for each other, dividing them into classes to keep alternate watch, making them account for their absence. All these are fond imitations of the Saxon tything; a system well enough calculated, in an ignorant age, among a poor and scanty population, to ensure peace and personal safety, but calculated at the same time to check every improvement, and to perpetuate poverty and ignorance, and utterly unsuitable to a populous and wealthy country. In countries which have attained

any degree of civilization, it is always found best to provide for the police at the public expense, and to leave the people at perfect liberty to pursue their several occupations without any restraint, and without any call upon them for police duties.

The number of persons apprehended, released, and punished, gives, though not an accurate, yet a general idea of the state of crime in the country. The following is the abstract for the last six months of 1823; it is taken in preference to a similar period in 1824, because in that year the number of commitments was swelled by the famine driving many poor people to seek a subsistence by robbery, and plundering hoards of grain.

Abstract of the number of persons apprehended, released, and punished, from the 1st July to 31st December 1823.

Apprehended.	By the Magistrate.		By the Criminal Judge.	By the Court of Circuit.	Faujdarry Adawlut.
23,100	Acquitted and released	8,330	1,967	354	86
	Convicted and punished	10,826	1,602	170	120
	Sent to the Criminal Judge	4,728	1,205	205	
	Total	23,884	4,774	529	306

A short abstract of the civil suits for the first six months of 1824, taken from the report of the Sudder Adawlut of the 8th of November 1824, shows that the operations of the different civil courts appear to keep pace with the demands of the country.

Abstract statement of suits in all the Zillahs, from the 1st of January to the 1st of July 1824.

In all Zillahs.	Original Suits.			Appeals.		
	Disposed of.	Instituted.	Pending.	Disposed of.	Instituted.	Pending.
Before the Judge	272		910	295		1673
Register	432	2551	581	249	775	490
Sudder Ameen	1719		1707	322		171
Total	2423	2551	3198	866	775	1740
District Moonsiffs	27373	23670	20594			
District Panchayets	14	10	26			
Village Moonsiffs	1445	1533	606			
Village Panchayets	3	5	9			

It is observed by the *Sudder Adawlut*, that the whole number of suits depending on the 1st of July last in the *Zillah* courts is far short of the number which they may fairly be expected to dispose of within a period of six months; and that the number of causes of older date than 1822 pending in all the courts on the 1st of July last, was but thirty original suits and forty-four appeals.

The peculiar character and condition of the *Rayets* require that some laws should be made specially for their protection. The non-resistance of the *Rayets* in general to oppression, has been too little attended to in our regulations. We make laws for them as though they were Englishmen, and are surprised that they should have no operation. A law might be a very good one in England, and useless here. This arises from the different characters of the people. In England, the people resist oppression, and it is their spirit which gives efficacy to the law; in India, the people rarely resist oppression, and the law intended to secure them from it, can, therefore, derive no aid from themselves. Though the *Rayets* frequently complain of illegal exactions, they very seldom resist them; they more commonly submit without complaining, and they often abscond when they have no longer the means of paying them.

It is in vain to caution them against paying, by telling them that the law is on their side, and will support them in refusing to comply with unauthorized demands. All exhortations on this head are thrown away, and after listening to them, they will the very next day submit as quietly to extortion as before. Some of the more bold and intelligent, it is true, withhold payment and complain; but the number is so small as to have no sensible effect, for the great mass submit quietly, and will continue for generations to submit, until a total change shall have been wrought in their character. There is nothing extraordinary in this; it is the natural consequence of their condition. They had always under their native Princes been accustomed to implicit submission to the demands of the government officers. Both they and their Princes have long since been under a foreign yoke; first, of Mahomedans, and afterwards of Europeans; and their exclusion under both from all share in the Government, has rendered the *Rayets* of less consideration, and made them still less disposed to resist unauthorized exactions, than under their ancient native rulers. As, therefore, they will not protect themselves by resisting injustice, we must endeavour to protect them

by laws, which would be unnecessary in England, or in almost any country not under foreign dominion; and we must, for this salutary purpose, invest the collector and magistrate, the person most interested in their welfare, with power to secure them from exaction, by authorising him to make summary inquiry into all illegal exactions, to recover the amount, to restore whatever is recovered to the Rayets, and to punish the offenders. We suppose that our laws are founded on just principles, and that they must therefore have the same beneficial operation here as at home; but we forget that one great first principle, the freedom of the people, from which they derive their influence, does not exist here. Our institutions here, not resting on the same foundation as those of a free country, cannot be made to act in the same way. We cannot make the inanimate corpse perform the functions of the living body; we must, therefore, in making regulations here, think only of their probable effect in this country, not of what such regulations have or might have in England. We must often entrust powers here which we would not there: we must even sometimes make a man a judge, where he may be said to be in some degree a party; but in this case, we are to consider whether it is not indispensable to the protection of the people.

For some years past it has been the object of Government to legislate as little as possible, and the few regulations which have been passed, are less to provide for new matters, than to cancel or amend former regulations, found to be unsuitable to the circumstances of the country. Two great evils which resulted from the joint operations of our judicial code and revenue system, were, the frequent distraint of the property, and imprisonment of the persons of the principal Rayets, on account of balances. The confinement usually continued for many years; the prisoners frequently died in the course of it, and the debt was seldom realized. The default was sometimes occasioned by fraud, but much oftener by inability, arising from unavoidable losses, and it was always difficult to ascertain the real cause. It has been the main end of the provisions of some late regulations to lessen these evils, and if they produce the desired effect, which there is little reason to doubt, they will confer a most important benefit upon the people. The practice of distraint has been already greatly diminished, and the Collector of Salem, in his report of last year, observes, that the whole of the land revenue of that province, amounting to about seventeen lacs of rupees,

had been realised without a single case of distrust. It was my wish to have abolished altogether the punishment of imprisonment for arrears of land rent, because I thought that the loss from fraud would never be very considerable, and that it would be better that the revenues should suffer it, than that a remedy so harsh and unpopular should be continued; but it appeared safer, on the whole, to adopt the opinion of my colleagues, that the power of imprisonment should be retained, but its exercise limited. The good effects of this measure have already been extensively felt; the imprisonment of a Rayet for a balance of rent is now a rare occurrence. On the 30th of September last, the number of persons in gaol under this Presidency, confined by the several collectors for arrears of rent, was forty-five; but of these, only two were Rayets, the rest were adventurers, who generally engage in farming the sale of spirits, intoxicating drugs, and tobacco, and are usually fraudulent defaulters. When we consider that the land rent is collected from nine hundred and fifty-four thousand nine hundred and fifty-two individuals, holding immediately of Government, this result is extremely satisfactory.

Our great error in this country, during a long course of years, has been too much precipitation in attempting to better the condition of the people, with hardly any knowledge of the means by which it was to be accomplished, and indeed without seeming to think that any other than good intentions were necessary. It is a dangerous system of government, in a country of which our knowledge is very imperfect, to be constantly urged by the desire of settling every thing permanently: to do every thing in a hurry, and in consequence wrong, and in our zeal for permanency, to put the remedy out of our reach. The ruling vice of our Government is innovation; and its innovation has been so little guided by a knowledge of the people, that though made after what was thought by us to be mature discussion, it must appear to them as little better than the result of mere caprice. We have, in our anxiety to make every thing as English as possible in a country which resembles England in nothing, attempted to create at once, throughout extensive provinces, a kind of landed property which had never existed in them; and in the pursuit of this object, we have relinquished the rights which the sovereign always possessed in the soil, and we have, in many cases, deprived the real owners, the occupant Rayets, of their proprietary rights, and bestowed them on Zemindars, and other imaginary landlords. Changes like these can never effect a per-

manent settlement in any country; they are rather calculated to unsettle whatever was before deemed permanent. We erroneously think that all that is necessary for the permanent settlement of a country is, that Government should limit its own demand, and that it is of no consequence by whom this demand is collected; and that, provided the amount be not exceeded, the Rayet is not injured, whether he pay it to the officer of Government, or to a newly-created Zemindar landlord. But nothing can be more unfounded than this opinion, or more mischievous in its operation; for it is a matter not of indifference, but of the highest importance, by whom the Government land rent is collected and paid. Every proprietor or Rayet, great and small, ought to pay his own rent and that of his tenants, when he has any, to the Government officer. If, instead of doing this, some hundreds of proprietary Rayets are made to pay their public rents to a Zemindar, they will soon lose their independence, become his tenants, and probably end by sinking into the class of labourers. Such an innovation would be much more fatal to the old rights of property than conquest by a foreign enemy; for such a conquest, though it overthrew the Government, would leave the people in their former condition. But this internal change, this village revolution, changes every thing, and throws both influence and property into new hands; it deranges the order of society; it depresses one class of men for the sake of raising another; it weakens the respect and authority of ancient offices and institutions, and the local administration conducted by their means is rendered much more difficult. It is time that we should learn, that neither the face of a country, its property, nor its society, are things that can be suddenly improved by any contrivance of ours, though they may be greatly injured by what we mean for their good; that we should take every country as we find it, and not rashly attempt to regulate its landed property, either in its accumulation or division. That whether it be held by a great body of Rayets, or by a few Zemindars, or by a mixture of both, our business is not with its distribution, but with its protection; and that if, while we protect, we assess it moderately, and leave it to its natural course, it will in time flourish, and assume that form which is most suitable to the condition of the people.

If we make a summary comparison of the advantages and disadvantages which have occurred to the natives from our Government, the result, I fear, will hardly be so much in its favour as it

far as may be practicable in the existing relative situation of this country to Britain.

One of the greatest disadvantages of our Government in India is its tendency to lower or destroy the higher ranks of society, to bring them all too much to one level, and by depriving them of their former weight and influence, to render them less useful instruments in the internal administration of the country. The native Governments had a class of richer gentry, composed of Jagheerdars and Enamdars, and of all the higher civil and military officers. These, with the principal merchants and Rayets, formed a large body, wealthy, or at least easy in their circumstances. The Jagheers and Enams of one prince were often resumed by another, and the civil and military officers were liable to frequent removal; but they were replaced by others, and as new Jagheers and Enams were granted to new claimants, these changes had the effect of continually throwing into the country a supply of men, whose wealth enabled them to encourage its cultivation and manufactories. These advantages have almost entirely ceased under our Government. All the civil and military offices of any importance are now held by Europeans, whose savings go to their own country; and the Jagheers and Enams which are resumed, or which lapse to Government, are replaced only in a very small degree. We cannot raise the Native civil and military officers to their former standard, and also maintain our European establishment; but we can grant Jagheers to meritorious native servants more frequently than has been our custom; and we can do what is much more important to the country—we can place the whole body of the Rayets on a better footing with regard to assessment than ever they have been before, and we can do this without any permanent sacrifice of revenue, because their labour is productive, and will in time repay the remission of rent by increased cultivation. The custom of all the sons inheriting equal shares of the father's property, was among all Hindoos a great obstacle to the accumulation of wealth; and among the Rayets the high rate of assessment was an additional obstacle. Few Rayets could ever, even in the course of a long life, acquire much property from the produce of their lands; but many of their leading men or heads of villages had, under the Native governments, other ways of acquiring it. They leagueed with the revenue servants in underrating the produce and the collections, and, as they were necessary to them in this work, they received a share of the embezzlement.

opinion of themselves, by placing more confidence in them, by employing them in important situations, and perhaps by rendering them eligible to almost every office under the Government. It is not necessary to define at present the exact limit to which their eligibility should be carried, but there seems to be no reason why they should be excluded from any office for which they were qualified, without danger to the preservation of their own ascendancy.

Liberal treatment has always been found the most effectual way of alleviating the character of every people, and we may be sure that it will produce a similar effect on that of the people of India. The change will, no doubt, be slow, but that is the very reason why no time should be lost in commencing the work. We should not be discouraged by difficulties; nor because little progress may be made in our own time, abandon the enterprise as hopeless, and charge upon the obstinacy and bigotry of the natives the failure which has been occasioned solely by our own sickleness, in not pursuing steadily the only line of conduct on which any hope of success could be reasonably founded. We should make the same allowances for the Hindoos as for other nations, and consider how slow the progress of improvement has been among the nations of Europe, and through what a long course of barbarous ages they had to pass before they attained their present state. When we compare other countries with England, we usually speak of England as she now is; we scarcely ever think of going back beyond the Reformation; and we are apt to regard every foreign country as ignorant and uncivilized, whose state of improvement does not in some degree approximate to our own, even though it should be higher than our own was at no very distant period.

We should look upon India not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently, until the natives shall in some future age have abandoned most of their superstitions and prejudices, and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular Government for themselves, and to conduct and preserve it. Whenever such a time shall arrive, it will probably be best for both countries that the British control over India should be gradually withdrawn. That the desirable change here contemplated may in some after-age be effected in India, there is no cause to despair. Such a change was at one time in Britain itself, at least as hopeless as it is here. When we reflect how much the character of nations has always been influenced by that of Governments, and that some, once the most cultivated, have sunk

on the recurrence of war. The people would bear the addition willingly, when they knew that it was for a temporary object; and the remission which had been previously granted would dispose them the more readily to place confidence in the assurance of Government, that the increase was not intended to be made permanent.

THOMAS MUNRO.

I subjoin to this long, important, and deeply interesting minute, a few out of the many private letters written by Sir Thomas Munro during this stage of his career. They stand in need of no comment, nor shall any be offered.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

April 30th, 1819.

MY DEAR SIR,

WHEN I left Madras I had very little idea of ever visiting India again, but I had scarcely landed when I found that I should be obliged to go back to Madras. I would have preferred the overland route had I been alone, but as Mrs. M. accompanies me, my intention at present is to go in one of the Company's China ships to Bombay in April. My reason for going by Bombay is, that I may have the benefit of conversing with you on your arrangements in the Mahratta districts, and that I may learn something of the system of administration in the territories under Bombay. I am in hopes that I shall find many things in it which it will be useful for us to imitate at Madras; I am anxious that we should be able to ascertain the most effectual means of protecting the Rayets from oppression, and that every regulation for this purpose should be as short and plain as possible, and less encumbered with written forms than it was thought necessary to introduce at Madras with the regulations there.

I trust that Lord Hastings has continued the Peishwah's country under your superintendence, notwithstanding your appointment to Bombay; or that, if any change has been made, he has given the superintendence to Malcolm, whose eminent services so well entitle him to every distinction that can be conferred upon him. I hope that Macdonell is doing well, and that Captain Grant is bringing the Sattarah principality into good order. I found your uncle, William Elphinstone, in good health, but look-

ing old, which was to be expected at seventy-nine; he is, however, as warm and as zealous as ever in supporting his friends.

Yours very truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

Madras, 26th August, 1820.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

I HAVE many excuses, but no good one, for not answering your letter of the 14th June. The best I have is the oldness and consequent decay of my eyes, which, in place of serving me all day and all night, as in former times, can do duty only for a few hours daily. Since I came here they have been chiefly occupied in reading masses of papers of useless altercation between different departments; they require all my patience, and a great deal more, for I have very little left. Nothing is so tiresome as to waste time in discussions about matters of no importance in themselves, but which derive some from the absurd heat of the combatants.

Macdonell, who has just been with me, tells me that you want to know what the private secretary here has to do, in order that you may set Captain Terry to work in the same way. If you really wish to keep him busy, you should set all your public officers at variance with each other, and employ him to read their incubrations to you. This is what Macdonell and I do, and the Company are, no doubt, much obliged to us for occupying ourselves in a way so much to their advantage. If it were not for this, I really do not know what I could make of a private secretary. I find that there has always been an office for this gentleman here, with an establishment sufficient to have kept the records of a province, but I do not know what was done in it. I imagine that in early and better days, the private secretary's principal business was to lay every rich native under contribution for the benefit of his master; but as this class of natives has now become extinct at this place, my secretary will, I fear, have but little to do. I have therefore been thinking of desiring him to devote his attention to the discovery of a plan for restoring the prosperity of the country, and increasing the breed of rich men; and this will, I imagine, in the present circumstances of the country, save him from the evil consequences of idleness.

I think as you do of Macdonell, and shall be glad whenever I can find the means of acknowledging his service. Lady M. was much flattered by finding that your opinion of the merits of

Ivanhoe agreed so much with her own; but she still looks for your critique on Anastasius. I shall wait till October for your report coming back from England; if it does not come within that time, I shall conclude that it has been seized by some admirer of Indian institutions, and request you to give me another copy. I wish you would in the mean time let me have a copy of your Minutes, &c. respecting the education of your civil servants.

Yours ever,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE RIGHT HON. GEORGE CANNING.

Bombay, 15th May, 1820.

DEAR SIR,

EVERY thing is quiet under the Bengal and Madras Government, and under the Bombay Government, with the exception of some slight disturbance, occasioned by an incursion of a few banditti on the Cutch frontier, which has led to some preparation on both sides, but will, I hope, terminate without hostilities.

Mr. Elphinstone retains the general superintendence of the late Peishwah's dominions; but Mr. Chaplin acts as commissioner. This is just as it should be, for it keeps the Mahratta territories together, till they can be brought into some kind of order, and it places them under the immediate management of the man who, of all the Madras civil servants, is the best qualified for the purpose. Sir John Malcolm means to go home in December:—I am sorry for it; for I think his continuance in Malwa is of great importance to the preservation of tranquillity, and I do not see how his place is to be supplied. He ought undoubtedly to be kept in Malwa for some years, to look after the turbulent chiefs and conflicting interests in that province. The future prosperity of all recent conquests depends on the measures adopted during the few first years, in bringing them into form, and consolidating our power. If we are too impatient to get rid of some trifling expense, and to persuade ourselves that all is right, and that matters will go on smoothly, without the necessity of employing persons capable of controlling every hostile movement, we shall have the centre of India in a state of confusion from which it may be difficult to extricate it hereafter.

I have the honour to be, dear Sir,

Your faithful and obedient,

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 14th October, 1820.

DEAR SIR,

I see no reason to expect disturbances from any of the Native states now surrounded by our territory. They are all too weak to give us any uneasiness. The death of a chief may occasionally produce some dispute among the claimants to the succession; but our preponderating force, wherever its interposition is required, will always easily decide the contest. The Bheels and other plundering tribes, of whom so much has been said, are a miserable race, poor and few in number: they are plunderers, because they have themselves been plundered and oppressed; and if they are well treated, they will in a few years become as quiet as any of our other Indian subjects living among woods and hills.

In this country we always are, and always ought to be, prepared for war. But this very circumstance gives us the best security for the long enjoyment of peace, and we ought to avail ourselves of this favourable state of things in order to improve our own territories, and to establish, as far as possible, some degree of regularity in those of the Native powers dependent upon us. The first step for this purpose should be to assign limits to the different Presidencies within which they are respectively to exercise immediate authority, leaving to Bengal the general control over the whole. The limits which I would recommend for Madras are the Mahanuddy and the Nerbuddah to the north; to the west, the boundary between the Nizam's and the Peishwah's country, as it stood in 1793; and to the north-west a line drawn from the Kistna to the Ghauts, including within it the southern Mahratta states.

Within all this range I am confident that the immediate jurisdiction of Madras could be exercised with greater advantage to the empire than that of Bengal. The whole of this tract belongs either to the Carnatic or the Deccan, and its inhabitants are different both in language and character from those of Hindostan and Bengal, and can on this account, as well as from their local situation, be more easily managed by the Madras than the Supreme Government. When Hyderabad and Nagpoor were great foreign and independent states, and more likely to act against us than with us, the immediate control of Bengal was right, more especially as it did not affect the authority of the Madras

Government over its army, of which only two battalions were for several years at Hyderabad. But both Hyderabad and Nagpore are now as completely dependent upon us as Mysore; they must, at some period or other, fall entirely into our hands, and the internal administration must in the mean time be chiefly directed by our resident. No skill can make a country prosper under such a system; but still it may be preserved in a much better state under the Madras than the Bengal Government, because it lies more within our reach, its inhabitants are better known to us, and the country is occupied by our troops. At present the discipline of our army is much injured by our having about twenty thousand men beyond our frontiers, and removed in a great measure from our control. They are under the Bengal Government, or rather the residents, by whom all commands, even of the most subordinate kind, are distributed. When complaints are received respecting supplies, or any other matter, we find it difficult to interfere in a satisfactory manner; and from the absence of a complete and direct control in either government, much confusion and abuse arises, and the national character suffers. This might easily be remedied by placing Nagpore and Hyderabad with their residents under Madras. We could then through our own residents exercise direct authority over our troops; and by having both residents and troops under our orders, we should have better means than the Bengal Government have, of seeing that both did their duty. The Supreme Government would of course, in peace and war, and other great political questions, still direct the affairs of Nagpore and Hyderabad; and if we add to this the direction of our relations with all independent states, and with all the tributaries immediately on Bengal, we shall find that, after leaving to Madras the countries south of the Nerbuddah, it will have as much to do as it can well attend to.

I am, with great esteem, dear Sir,

Your faithful and obedient,

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE RIGHT HON. JOHN SULLIVAN.

Madras, 12th October, 1820.

DEAR SIR,

I HAD the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 31st January from Paris, some time after my arrival in this country.

I should expect more benefit from the circulation of short tracts by the natives, or of translations of short European tracts by

natives, than from translations precipitately made of the Bible, or any great work, by the missionaries. I have no faith in the power of any missionary to acquire in four or five years, such a knowledge of any Indian language as to enable him to make a respectable translation of the Bible. I fear that such translations are not calculated to inspire becoming reverence for the book. In place of translating the Bible into ten or twelve languages in a few years, I would rather see twenty years devoted to its translation into one. If we hope for success, we must proceed gradually, and adopt the means by which we may be likely to attain it. The dissemination of knowledge is, I think, the surest way; and if we can prevail upon the native princes to give it the support you propose, it will be a good beginning. I shall communicate with the Resident of Tanjore on the subject; and if the Rajah, who is now near Conjeveram on his way to Cassi, calls here, I will mention it to him. There is such a mass of mere routine reading here, that I have scarcely been able to give my attention to general questions since my return. I have lately been for many days engaged in reading the papers connected with the single case of —; and unless we contrive some means of reducing the quantity of reading, the members of government will have no time for giving due consideration to matters of general importance.

The points of improvement in our general system, which I wish to carry into effect soonest, are the regulations proposed in 1816 by the Board of Revenue, for the prevention and punishment of extra collections and embezzlements, and the drafts of regulations proposed by the Commissioners in 1817, upon puttahs, distraints, &c. in consequence of the orders of the Directors. I have always thought that Rayets ought never to have been imprisoned for arrears of revenue, and I wish to abolish the practice. I think that it may be done entirely without any risk of loss of revenue. But as the Board of Revenue and some of the collectors think it would be a dangerous experiment, I shall yield to their alarms, so far probably as to confine the exemption to Rayets holding immediately of the sikkar, and even among them to permit imprisonment only in special cases of contumacy. I am satisfied however, from my own experience, that with regard to the Rayets, the exemption might safely be made complete. The power of distraint is quite sufficient to protect the revenue: it harasses the Rayet, without disgracing him; and if he can pay, will be more likely, than throwing him into gaol, to make him

but I have never lost sight of the principles on which they are founded, namely, the relief of the people from novel and oppressive modes of judicial process ; the improvement of our internal administration, by employing Europeans and Natives in those duties for which they are respectively best suited, and the strengthening of the attachment of the Natives to our Government, by maintaining their ancient institutions and usages.

I have always thought that the practice of confining Rayets in the common gaol like felons, so disgraceful to our code, might not only without inconvenience, but with advantage, be abolished. I have had much discussion on the subject since my return to India, and have so far yielded to the general opinion, as to agree that Rayets shall still, in some extreme cases of contumacy, be liable to imprisonment, and a regulation on the subject is now preparing. This regulation will also enable the Tisheldars and other native officers under the magistrates to punish trivial thefts, when not committed by professional thieves. At present, every petty theft of labourers from their masters' grain, of children in the power of their parents, or of idlers at fairs, which the Natives themselves would either regard as mere mischief, or as an offence to be punished by reprimand or slight chastisement, are considered as crimes, and the offenders and witnesses dragged away from their homes fifty or a hundred miles, to the presence of the magistrate. As the court of the District Munsiff is much more frequented by the Natives than that of the Zillah Judge, it is intended to extend his jurisdiction to five hundred rupees, that of the Sudder Amin to seven hundred and fifty, and of the Register to a thousand.

The only other regulation which I have in view at present, is one for entailing the possessions of ancient Rajahs upon their heirs, and to secure them against sale for debt. Our sweeping code of 1802 has made the domains of tributary Rajahs, which have been in the same families for ages, which all Governments but ours have respected, and which no money-lender could touch, all liable to sale. There will be some difficulty in replacing these Rajahs in the situations in which we found them, but it must be done.

* * * * *

TO THE RIGHT HON. G. CANNING.

Madras, 30th June, 1821.

MY DEAR SIR,

You judge right in thinking that your resignation of the office of President of the Board of Control is an event in which I must take "some little interest," for no event could have happened in which I could have taken more. I lament it deeply, both on public and private grounds. I should, even if I had not seen your letter to your constituents, have concluded without hesitation, that your motives for resigning were just, but I should not the less have regretted the loss to the nation.

I trust that we shall soon again see you filling some high office; but I confess I would rather see you in your former one than any other, for my own situation becomes doubly valuable when it is held under a man whose name communicates some show of reputation to all his subordinates.

I always dread changes at the head of the India Board, for I fear some downright Englishman may at last get there, who will insist on making Anglo-Saxons of the Hindoos. I believe there are men in England who think that this desirable change has been already effected in some degree; and that it would long since have been completed, had it not been opposed by the Company's servants. I have no faith in the modern doctrine of the rapid improvement of the Hindoos, or of any other people. The character of the Hindoos is probably much the same as when Vasco de Gama first visited India, and it is not likely that it will be much better a century hence. The strength of our government will, no doubt, in that period, by preventing the wars so frequent in former times, increase the wealth and population of the country. We shall also, by the establishment of schools, extend among the Hindoos the knowledge of their own literature, and of the language and literature of England. But all this will not improve their character; we shall make them more pliant and servile, more industrious, and perhaps more skilful in the arts,—and we shall have fewer banditti; but we shall not rouse their moral character. Our present system of government, by excluding all natives from power, and trust, and emolument, is much more efficacious in depressing, than all our laws and school-books can do in elevating their character. We are working against our own designs, and we can expect to make no progress while we work with a feeble instrument to improve, and a powerful one to

deteriorate. The improvement of the character of a people, and the keeping them, at the same time, in the lowest state of dependence on foreign rulers, to which they can be reduced by conquest, are matters quite incompatible with each other.

There can be no hope of any great zeal for improvement, when the highest acquirements can lead to nothing beyond some petty office, and can confer neither wealth nor honour. While the prospects of the natives are so bounded, every project for bettering their characters must fail; and no such projects can have the smallest chance of success, unless some of those objects are placed within their reach, for the sake of which men are urged to exertion in other countries. This work of improvement, in whatever way it may be attempted, must be very slow, but it will be in proportion to the degree of confidence which we repose in them, and to the share which we give them in the administration of public affairs. All that we can give them, without endangering our own ascendancy, should be given. All real military power must be kept in our own hands; but they might, with advantage hereafter, be made eligible to every civil office under that of a member of the Government. The change should be gradual, because they are not yet fit to discharge properly the duties of a high civil employment, according to our rules and ideas; but the sphere of their employment should be extended in proportion as we find that they become capable of filling properly higher situations.

We shall never have much accurate knowledge of the resources of the country, or of the causes by which they are raised or depressed; we shall always assess it very unequally, and often too high, until we learn to treat the higher classes of natives as gentlemen, and to make them assist us accordingly in doing what is done by the House of Commons in England, in estimating and apportioning the amount of taxation. I am, with great regard and esteem.

Your faithful servant,

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO,

TO THE HON. MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE.

Madras, 2nd May, 1821.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

I HAVE only heard once from you since your unfortunate fall, which is as often as I could expect when it is considered, that you have been twice in that interval engaged in war with Arabia. Macdonell has sent you occasionally such of our regu-

and distribution of taxation are perhaps the most important concerns of public authority ; there are no others on which, as on them, the universal comfort and prosperity of the people depend. In this country, the management of taxation rests almost entirely with the collector, for he is the only channel through which Government can obtain any tolerably correct information on the subject, and it is chiefly from his opinions that their own must be formed. An officer from whom so much is required, must not be looked for in a class which is not at least equal in rank and emolument to any other in the service. In order to secure a succession of men qualified to discharge properly so important a trust, we must place the revenue on an equal footing with the judicial line.

In countries where the assessment is very light, the ignorance or misconduct of a collector does not seriously injure the revenue ; but in the greater part of the Madras territories, where the revenue presses closely upon the utmost means of the people, the misconduct of a collector is often very prejudicial both to the revenue and to the people ; because the country has not the means of speedily repairing the losses which it may have sustained from his ignorance, in too rigidly exacting the full assessment in a bad season, or from his indolence in permitting the native revenue servants to levy unauthorized sums from the people. On this establishment therefore it is essential to the welfare of the country, as well as to the security of the revenue, that we should have skillful collectors ; and we find from experience, that they are only to be formed in districts where the rayetwar system prevails. Collectors who have been employed only in districts permanently settled, are not qualified for any revenue duties beyond those of the most ordinary routine. When the revenue of a district has fallen into disorder, they are unable to ascertain the cause, and still less to point out the remedy. On such occasions, recourse must always be had to a collector from a rayetwar district ; and when investigations become frequent, the withdrawing of these collectors from their own districts, to conduct inquiries into the state of others at a great distance, is frequently productive of great embarrassment to the public service. One main object therefore in raising the revenue to a level with the judicial department is, that we may always have a supply of men calculated to carry on investigations into the revenue, and into all the details of the local civil administration ; and as it is only in the rayetwar districts that the requisite knowledge can be acquired,

an extra number of revenue servants will be trained in those districts.

I am in great hopes that, before the end of 1822, we shall be able, without any aid from Bengal, to make our income adequate to all our disbursements. But it is not enough that we should be enabled to meet our ordinary expenditure: we should have a surplus to enable us to meet contingencies, and it ought not to be less than from thirty to forty lacs of rupees. We ought not to depend on Bengal for any pecuniary aid. When a Government has nothing to trust to but its own resources, its affairs will always be managed with more order and economy. But the resources of Madras are not in a condition to enable her to meet unexpected demands; and the only way in which they can be made so is, by transferring to her authority a considerable portion of the southern Mahratta provinces. She has not acquired a single acre of territory either by the Mahratta war of 1803 and 1804, or the late one; so that she has been stationary, while Bengal and Bombay have been rapidly increasing in power and extent of dominion. And as the greater part of her army has during both of these wars been employed in the field, her military charges will consequently appear to have increased during that period in a greater proportion to her revenue than those of the other Presidencies. The annexation of the southern Mahratta provinces to Madras is not only desirable for the sake of rendering this Presidency able to provide for all its expenses without assistance from Bengal, but also for the sake of their local administration. Their situation, and the language and character of the inhabitants, seem to adapt them better for being under Madras than Bengal or Bombay.

The similarity of character among the people of the different provinces of the Deccan will always render it easier to maintain our authority over that country by means of the Madras than of the Bengal army, which is composed of natives of Hindoostan, differing in language and usages from those of the Deccan. With the exception of the western part of the Deccan, composed of Mahratta districts now under Bombay, all the rest of the Deccan south of the valley of the Nerbuddah is occupied by Madras troops, while Bengal and Hindoostan are left to those of Bengal. This arrangement is the most simple that can be adopted. It will give the most satisfaction both to the troops and the inhabitants, and will therefore be most likely to insure tranquillity.

It will be the most efficient and economical, and ought never to be abandoned for any temporary benefit. I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient and faithful servant,

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

TO SIR GRAHAM MOORE, K.C.B.

Madras, 5th Nov. 1821.

MY DEAR GRAHAM,

Your letter of the 9th September reached me only in September last; it was sent to me from Penang by Sir H. Blackwood. I am glad that you sacrificed your seat at the Admiralty for the command in the Mediterranean, though I shall, perhaps, on returning home some years hence, and not finding my old friend in that comfortable corner-house of the Admiralty, which I liked so much to visit, lament the romantic notions which tempted him in an evil hour to leave it. I must console myself for the loss by going out now and then to Brook Farm, and getting an account from yourself of your voyages and travels in the most delightful regions, and once the abode of the most interesting people of the earth. No wish has ever with me been so strong and constant from my earliest years as that of visiting Italy and Greece; and were I twenty years younger, I should certainly spend seven of them there. But this last boyish expedition to India has, I fear, been fatal to all my rational plans of travelling in Europe; for by the time I get home I shall, I fear, be too old, or too doited, to feel the recollections which ought to be excited by the sight of the Capitol, or the Pæneus. I wished myself along with you when you describe the portraits of De L'Isle, Adom, and Valette, in the hall of the Grand Masters at Malta. I feel more interest in Malta than Gibraltar; and I would rather see Rhodes than either, because it is more connected with the ancient Grecians, whom I admire above all nations, not even excepting the Romans. These nations had not the benefit of the art of printing, and from the effects which it has of late years produced in our own country, I am not sure that they were not as well without it. Perfect liberty of the press would be an excellent thing if we could have it without its licentiousness, but this is impossible; and I therefore suspect that it will one day become necessary to increase the restrictions upon it, for it is an instrument by means of which it is much easier among the lower orders of the people to do evil than good. A writer like Tom Paine can

equally fortunate at home; she has sent 'out her picture, her very image — another speaking likeness, I suppose. It looks about five-and-twenty, and is as like any other woman as her, but more like a milliner's girl than any thing else. It is very odd that women never know what is like them; but the case is perhaps the same with the men: but, my goodness! what can be the cause of it? It is, however, lucky for the women, and for the painters too, that they can be easily pleased by a picture which does not in the least resemble the original. What a heap of stuff about pictures! Let us talk of something more rational before I finish my letter. I am afraid that we have little prospect of seeing you in this country, because I hear with regret that though you are said to be looking as well as ever, you are still liable to the return of a little pain in your side, whenever you make any unusual exertions; and while this continues, your medical men will advise you to remain in England. I have not seen Lady M. since the middle of May, but she is in very good health, and likes Bangalore, and if she had you there, she would never wish to leave it, unless to go home and see her son, whom his Craigie friends are spoiling so fast. I have heard nothing of her eye for some months, and I therefore conclude that no great change has taken place in it. When I last saw her, I thought that it would never entirely recover in this country, and perhaps not even at home. But the defect is now so slight as to be of no great consequence. I do not know where this will find you, but if with any of your own family, give my love to them, and believe me, my dear Margaret,

Yours affectionately,

THOMAS MUNRO.

I have been travelling through the rain for the last three days. The country is everywhere under water, and it is still pouring, and I am sitting at the door of my tent in order to get light enough to write. Every thing looks uncomfortable. The servants and followers are huddling together, and the horses and bullocks are hanging their heads, but I enjoy the gloomy scene, because it is cool, and is like home.

T. M.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Madras, 26th November, 1822.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

I RECEIVED some time ago yours of the 27th October, and I have in consequence desired Mr. McDonnell to look over, with

By not coming to India, you have escaped the irksome task of toiling daily through heaps of heavy, long-drawn papers. I never had a very high opinion of our records; but it was not until my last return that I knew that they contained such a mass of useless trash. Every man writes as much as he can, and quotes Montesquien, and Hume, and Adam Smith, and speaks as if we were living in a country where people were free and governed themselves. Most of their papers might have been written by men who were never out of England, and their projects are nearly as applicable to that country as to India.

The Bombay Government have had the benefit of the experience of Bengal and Madras, and their arrangements will, in consequence, be better adapted to the state of this country than those of either of these Presidencies. Their settlements will, in general, be Rayetwar, which is no new system, but an old one of the Deccan, and of most other countries, and of England itself. In a rayetwar settlement of England, every landowner, whether his rent were 5*l.* or 50,000*l.* a-year, would be called a rayet, and the agreement would be made with him. But in a Zemindary settlement of England, we should consider the Lord Lieutenants of counties, and other public officers, as Zemindars and landlords, and make our agreement with them, and leave them to settle with the actual proprietors, whom we should regard as mere tenants. These are matters in which I have long taken a deep interest; but for the last twelve months I have felt a much deeper one in the affairs of Greece. Europe is more indebted to that country than has ever yet been acknowledged. I have seen no book which gives to Greece all that is due to her. Even the constitution of our own country would, without her, probably not have been what it is, notwithstanding the boasted wisdom of our ancestors. We have always, I think, been more solicitous about the preservation of the Ottoman Empire than was necessary. If the Turks were driven out of Europe, there would be no cause to apprehend any danger from their territories being occupied by other powers, unless Constantinople fell into the hands of the Russians. England could lose nothing by other states becoming stronger and richer. It is for the advantage of a great and enlightened nation to have powerful rivals. By the emancipation of the Greeks we should, in one year, make more Christians than all our Eastern missionaries will convert in a hundred. If the Greeks, without foreign aid, could emancipate

your airy bungalows every time I think of them. Your description is enough to make a plain man romantic. You want nothing but sheep to finish your landscape.

The Governor-General talks of sailing on the 20th.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MR. CHAPLIN.

Maddurpalli, 14th October, 1833.

MY DEAR CHAPLIN,

I AM much obliged to you for your letter on the survey assessment of this country, as it contains all that can well be said on the subject, and many details which had either never occurred to me, or escaped my memory. I have never seen the Report to which you allude; it had not reached Government when I left Madras, and I had only heard the general scope of it. It is said that a three years' experience of the Rayetwar, with the advantage of the twenty-five per cent. reduction, has proved that it will not answer. You would suppose from this, that the reduction has been enjoyed by the Rayets for the last three years. No such thing; waste has been added nearly equal to the remission. Ever since you left the Ceded Districts, the Tishildars have been in the habit of adding waste to every village, as it fell in from the lease. In February 1230, the Collector was ordered to make the full remission; but when his report of his settlement came in, it appeared that he had, according to his own statement, induced such Rayets as were able, to take waste equal to one-half of the remission. He does not mention the amount, but I believe it was between three and four lacs of rupees, in addition to what had before been imposed; and in place of being only half, was, on the whole, nearly equal, if not fully equal, to the remission. There are many cases in which it was more. Many Rayets, whose remission was twenty pagodas, were obliged to pay twenty-one or twenty-two for waste which they never saw, and have done so for three years. Government, of course, censured the imposition of the waste in Thirty, and expected it to be taken off in Thirty-one; but nothing of the kind was done. The Collector, it seems, had heard of Putkut, and had taken upon himself to give each Rayet a Quami Puttah, as it was called, for his Putkut, including the waste, and no settlement was made in 1231, but the collections were made upon these Quami Puttahs. In this year, about six lacs and a half fell in, and waste was added

to them; and in 1232 still more waste was added. The Collector seems to have thought that these fresh additions were all the waste, for he took it for granted, that all that had been inserted in his Quami Pattahs was long ago cultivated. But it is all waste, as it was in 1229, and had I not come into this District, the Rayets would have had to pay for it in 1233, and many of them will, I have no doubt, do so still. In place, therefore, of a three years' trial of the remission, there has not been one; it has not yet begun, and the Rayets have suffered more than if there had been no remission. They pay the amount under another name, and with much contention and ill-will, from knowing that it is contrary to the orders of Government. All confidence has been destroyed between them and the Collectors, and a system of concealment has been introduced by the operation of adding waste, which has rendered most of the catcherry accounts undeserving of credit. We are now, in the fourth year after the remission was ordered, only beginning the experiment, and under much more unfavourable circumstances. The Ceded Districts have been very unfortunate in their Collectors; two more unfit men could hardly have been found, and it is difficult to say whether they have suffered most from the listlessness of the one, or the mischievous haste of the other.

I never supposed it possible to make a scale which should not require revision; but I thought that, after a trial of six or seven years, every material defect would be discovered, and that such a revision might then have been made as would have been permanent. Had there been no leases, and had you and Ross remained, I am convinced that in 1214 you would have had no difficulty in doing it. What I have lately learned on the spot has rather strengthened than weakened this belief; for, in spite of all the changes and accidents during the leases, the greater part of the Rayets continued to pay according to the survey rates, and I am satisfied that, after the remission shall have been fairly carried into effect, the amount of lands, which may be left uncultivated on account of the rent, will not be one, certainly not two per cent. which is too inconsiderable to cause any injury. Even this will probably be cultivated ten or twelve years hence, when the Rayets have recovered; and should a part of it even then be found too high, it may be remedied by another and final reduction. Had there been a good Collector on the spot, it might have been done, by authorising him to make the remission, instead of one quarter everywhere, in some places a fifth, and in others a

every moment of his waking existence spent in endeavours to promote the welfare and happiness of others; and his own happiness, as a necessary consequence, received, though on his part almost unconsciously, a daily, I might have said, with perfect truth, an hourly increase.

Such was the manner in which Sir Thomas Munro spent day after day, as often as he remained stationary in one place: his mode of acting while prosecuting the journeys, of which notice has been taken, was not dissimilar. The morning's march was always so regulated, as that the party might reach their ground in sufficient time to permit breakfast to be served at eight o'clock; when the routine of conversing with such European functionaries as chanced to be near the spot was continued. Four was still the hour of dinner; but the period set aside at Fort St. George for carriage-exercise was now given up to hearing the complaints of the natives. Whilst the family sat at table, multitudes of Hindoos and Mussulmans were seen to collect round the door of the tent, anxiously expecting the moment when the Governor would come forth; and when it arrived, the eagerness to address him was such as to occasion at times considerable inconvenience. It very seldom happened that the *charnana*, or audience-tent, proved sufficiently capacious to contain the whole of the applicants. Sir Thomas Munro was accordingly in the habit of walking abroad to some open space, where he stood listening to all who desired to address him, till Nature itself appeared sometimes in danger of giving way. He never retired from these audiences otherwise than jaded and fatigued, as well from the excessive heat of the atmosphere, as from the continued exertion which he found it necessary to make.

A life thus exclusively devoted to the discharge of important public duties, whilst it presents few points of which his biographer can make particular use, necessarily left little leisure for the continuance of familiar correspondence on the part of Sir Thomas Munro himself. Not that he ceased at

times to communicate both his feelings and circumstances freely to his family ; but every moment was now too precious to permit the opportunities of doing so to occur frequently ; and hence the number of private letters written by him between the years 1820 and 1824 are less numerous than at any other period of similar extent throughout the course of his active career. The following specimens will however show, that the tone of feeling which casts so bright a charm over his earlier correspondence, was by no means altered ; and that if he wrote more rarely, he used no greater reserve than when his mind, less harassed by the cares and responsibility of office, poured itself forth in descriptive or playful controversy upon paper.

It is necessary to premise, for the right understanding of several allusions in these letters, that a serious accident occurred to Lady Munro on the 11th of February 1821. She was thrown from her horse, and, falling upon her head, received a severe injury in one of her eyes, for the preservation of which doubts were entertained many weeks. Happily, however, these proved to be groundless ; and her recovery, though tedious and distressing, was complete.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Madras, 15th October, 1820.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I WRITE to you merely to say, that I have got your letters of the 8th of September about your plans, and of the 15th about more plans, and the *Malwa Encyclopedia*. I have weighed the ninth chapter in my hand ; and I could not help thinking, when perusing it as Sencho did when perusing Mambrino's helmet in his hand, "What a prodigious head the Pagan must have, whose capacious skull could contain thirteen such ponderous chapters as this !" I look at it with reverence when I open the drawer in which it lies deposited ; but I must not open it till I can get a little spare time to consider the second matter with which it is filled. Any remark that I can make must be very general, for *Malwa* is as little known to me as *Tartary*. I hope, from my

not hearing of Lord H——'s answer to your proposals, that it is to be more favourable than you expected.

Yours most truly,

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 15th April, 1821.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I HAVE got your letter of the 19th March from Oodipore, and thank you for the interest you so kindly take in Lady M——. She is recovering, though slowly; and I fear, with regard to complete recovery, doubtfully. Your friend Captain Laurie will write to you about his proceedings. He has acted like a school-boy, with fine feelings, where strong ones were wanted. I think the better of him for it, but am vexed at his weakness. I did not think that your Teviotdalers had been such simple swains as to be circumvented by a conmicopilly. I am glad to hear that you are well again; and I trust you will have no more relapses. Maedonald sent me your introduction to your history of Malwa; and when I think of it, and of your chapters, or volumes rather, on revenue, police, &c., I wonder how you have found time for such works. I think that all this must end in your writing a general history, and making all other histories unnecessary, by beginning, like the Persians, with Hazrat Adam, or at least with Mohta Noah. I have been much pleased with your first chapter; it contains a great mass of information: much of it is new; and though much of it also is what was known before, it is not the less interesting on that account; but rather the contrary, as it shows us how general and uniform many of the Indian institutions and customs were in provinces very remote from each other. If you persist in your plan of going home at present, and if ever you venture to India again, I hope you will come and relieve me; for I should be delighted to see this Government in the hands of a man who has had more practical experience in India, than any European who ever visited it. If I am permitted to choose my own time for retiring, and if you have any desire to return, I shall give you intimation that you may take your measures.

Yours most truly,

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO LADY MUNRO.

Nagargeri, 30th May, 1821.

THIS is the last day in which I am likely for some months to be in a cool climate; and if I do not write to you now, I do not know when I shall. We had a great deal of rain the night we left Bangalore, and we have had showers every day since. Our journey has so far been very pleasant; but it will be very different to-morrow, when we descend into the burning plains of the Carnatic. We are now encamped about two hundred yards above the spot where our tents were when we last passed this way, and very near the large banian tree to which we first walked. It is a beautiful wild scene of mingled rocks and jungle, and aged trees and water. I wish we had something like it at home. It is pleasant to see the different groups of travellers with their cattle coming in one after another; some sitting and some sleeping under the shady trees and bushes so thickly scattered around. There is something delightful in viewing the repose and stillness which every one seems to enjoy. To me it has always the effect of something that is plaintive, by recalling times and beings which have long since passed away. I wish I could indulge in these dreams, and wander about in this romantic country, instead of returning to the dull and endless task of public business in which I have already been so long engaged. When we last landed in England, I never expected to have been again toiling under an Indian sun, or that I should ever have been obliged again to leave you among strangers. I thought that we might have often travelled together, or that if we sometimes parted, from my being a greater wanderer than yourself, you would at least have remained among your friends and relations. But as these expectations cannot now be realized for some time, we must endeavour to make ourselves as contented as we can, while we continue in this country.

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TO GEORGE BROWN, ESQ.

Bangalore, 28th September, 1821.

MY DEAR GEORGE,

I CAME here two days ago, to accompany Lady M—— back to Madras. I found her perfectly recovered in every respect; but her eye, though much better, is not quite right. I should have made an excursion at this time, even if it had not

been necessary, on her account, because I require occasionally to renew my old habits of travelling in tents, as the heat of Madras, and constant application, without bringing any sickness upon me, exhausts and wears me away. The last season at Madras has been one not of extreme, but of continued heat.

* * * * *

I am afraid that I never shall be able to make what is called a respectable appearance in the world. I have been too long in getting money, and I am too old to wish to remain long in this country to save it, even if I had the option of remaining.

* * * * *

TO HIS SISTER.

Trichpolore, 13th October, 1821.

MY DEAR BRISKINE,

I do not write to you to answer letters, but rather to renew the memory of old times, when you and I were regular correspondents, and when I seldom made a journey without your hearing of it. I set out for Bangalore about a month ago, where Lady Munro had been ever since for the recovery of her health; and I am now on my way to Madras with her, where I shall arrive about the 25th of this month. The distance from Bangalore to Madras by the direct route is two hundred and eight miles; but I have come round by the Baramahl, which is about fifty miles farther, both for the purpose of seeing the inhabitants, and making some inquiries into the state of the country, and of revisiting scenes where, above thirty years ago, I spent seven very happy years. They were the first of my public life, and I almost wish it had ended there; for it has ever since, with the exception of the time I was at home, been a series of unceasing hard labour. The place where I now am, is one where Colonel Read lived between 1792 and 1799, where I often came to see him, with many old friends who are now dead or absent. I thought I had taken my leave of it for ever when I went with the army to Serlingapatam; but I have since twice returned to it—once in 1815, and now; and I shall probably yet return to it again before I leave India. We get attached to all those places where we have at any former period lived pleasantly among our friends, and the attachment grows with the increasing distance of time; but, independently of this cause, the natural beauty of the place is enough to make any one partial to it. There is nothing to be compared to it in England, nor, what you will

think higher praise, in Scotland. It stands in the midst of an extensive fertile valley, from ten to forty miles wide, and sixty or seventy long, surrounded by an amphitheatre of mountains of every shape, many of them nearly twice as high as the Grampians. The country here among the hills has none of the cold and stunted appearance which such countries have at home. The largest trees, the richest soil, and the most luxuriant vegetation, are usually found among naked masses of granite at the bottom of the hills. We are travelling with tents; our stages are usually from twelve to sixteen miles. You will think this but a short distance, but we find it long enough. It generally takes three or four hours, and the last half of the journey is usually in a burning sun: when this is to be repeated every day for some weeks, it becomes very fatiguing. In cloudy or cool weather it is delightful, and far preferable to any travelling at home; but at present, just before the change of the monsoon, the weather is clear and sultry. When therefore we reach our tents, though we get out of the burning sun, we merely escape from a greater degree of heat to a lesser; for we have no refreshing coolness, as you will readily perceive when I tell you that the thermometer in my tent is generally ninety-two the greater part of the day.

Your affectionate brother,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO LADY MUNRO.

Tekit, 9th August, 1822.

I got your short note of the 28th July this morning, after a very hot march. We have now made four marches from Itchapoor, and have four more to Chicacole, where we must give our cattle rest for two days, if they get there without stopping, which is very doubtful, for the roads are very bad. In many places no road at all, except through deep paddy fields, the country covered with water, and the nullahs all full with steep muddy banks, which make it difficult either to get into or out of them. We have had only two fair days since we landed. The sun is always very hot during the day, and in the afternoon, or at night, the rain pours down upon us. I am in hopes however, from so much having already fallen, that it will not continue at the same rate, and that we shall now have every second day fair. The country through which we pass is very beautiful. It has the largest trees of old mangoes I have ever seen; jungles of every kind, close and open; rice-fields and wood-covered mountains; but the great

debt, I should have been rather inclined to have supported her. I see that the Opposition are clamorous for war, and yet say that we cannot maintain our Peace Establishment. It is the old cry—Plenty of war and fighting, without any expense of British blood or treasure.

* * * * *

I have had more inquiries about my declining health since I wrote you last. As far as I can judge myself of my constitution, I shall return to England with as good health as when I left it. There will be one difference—I left England very grey, and I shall return very white. Kind remembrance to Mrs. Brown and family.

TO LADY MUNRO.

Cuddapah, 4th October, 1823.

I RECEIVED this morning yours of the 1st; we have now got to the fourth day of the last month of our absence. I expect to see your young Toto some time between the 25th and 30th.

We shall leave Cuddapah to-morrow; and I shall be glad when I turn my back upon it, for it is hotter than even it used to be. The thermometer is at 94, with a dry parching wind, curling up the paper, thickening the ink, and, I imagine, aiding time in impairing my sight. I was often at this place twenty years ago, but the heat made me always glad to get away. It is surrounded by lofty hills; but the country has no other beauty. It is flat and highly cultivated, but, unless when the harvest is on the ground, naked and without verdure, and this is one main cause of the heat. You know how much warmer a day becomes by having your tent pitched on sand or black ground; and if this difference is produced by a small spot, you may guess how much greater it must be in Cuddapah, where a great part of the surface of the country is either sand or black earth. I still like this country, notwithstanding its heat. It is full of industrious cultivators; and I like to recognize among them a great number of my old acquaintances, who, I hope, are as glad to see me as I to see them.

him so favourable an opportunity of carrying it into practice. It was this, and this alone, which induced him to give up a thousand pleasurable schemes which he had formed for himself and his family at home, and to quit England after a sojourn there of little more than four months.

But though he cheerfully consented to make so great a sacrifice, it was by no means his design to linger on under the burning sun of India, till the capability of relishing existence, were it continued so as to permit his revisiting Europe, should be entirely taken away. He desired indeed to set the machine in motion, but he desired also to leave its working to be superintended by younger hands than his own. In other words, he sailed for Madras with the fixed determination of abandoning it for ever, after a residence of three or four years. The consequence was, that in September, 1823, when India appeared to enjoy a state of profound repose, he addressed a memorial to the Court of Directors, requesting to be relieved; and so urgently in earnest was he as to the success of the application, that he dispatched, by different conveyances, no fewer than four copies of the letter in which it was contained.

The appointment of a successor to a man like Sir Thomas Munro was not, however, a point to be settled in a moment; and the authorities at home seem to have been little disposed to settle it at all. Month after month rolled on, without bringing any answer to his application, till the year 1824 was as far advanced as 1823 had been, when the application was first dispatched. In the mean while, however, a great change occurred in the political prospects of British India. A failure in the usual rains caused, as it invariably does, a scarcity amounting almost to famine in the Madras territories; while a war broke out, if not more justly alarming, unquestionably more dreaded, than any in which the Company had of late years been involved. The war to which I allude was that with the Burman empire, of which, though it is now admitted on all hands to have been one of defence and violated

territory, there were not wanting multitudes at the moment, to condemn both the causes and the conduct.

I am not called upon to enter, in a work like the present, into any inquiry, however slight, touching the general grounds of animosity between the rival powers. Let it suffice to state, that for many years previously to 1824, movements had been made plainly indicative of an unfriendly disposition on the part of the Burmans, and that during the latter months of 1823, and the earlier of the year following, a series of desultory hostilities was carried on between the troops of that nation and certain British posts on the eastern frontier of Bengal. Still no expectation seems to have been formed, nor any preparations made for a general war, till in the month of February it was deemed essential by the Supreme Government to make a formal appeal to arms. The following letter, written some time posterior to the opening of the campaign, will show how the writer was affected by the measure, and how little it had been anticipated, at least in the Presidency of Madras.

TO HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Madras, 10th September, 1824.

MY DEAR DUKE,

THE few young men who have brought me letters from your Grace, have, I fear, derived little benefit from my acquaintance. I have however done what I believe you would have done yourself. I have requested the officers under whom they were placed to look after them, and make them learn their duty. In September last, I sent an application to the Court of Directors to be relieved. I had been quite long enough in India; and as every thing was quiet and settling into good order, I thought it a proper time for my leaving it. Had I then suspected, that within a few months we were to have both war and famine, I should of course never have thought of resigning until our difficulties were at an end. But I regret that it is now too late. I was probably more surprised at hearing of the intended war than people at home will be; for I never had the least suspicion that we were to go to war with the King of Ava, till a letter reached

this Presidency, in February last, asking us what number of troops we could furnish for foreign service. I thought that the local officers of Chittagong and Arracan might have carried on their petty aggressions on both frontiers for another year, and that they would probably have got tired and settled matters among themselves. Such fellows do not read Grotius or Vattel; and we must not expect them to be guided entirely by their piety. Now that we are actually at war, it is some satisfaction to have those great names on our side. Our case is a clear one of self-defence and violated territory; and I have little doubt but that fortune will on this occasion take the right side. Our force, under Sir A. Campbell, got to Rangoon in May, with the intention of embarking when the river should rise next month, and proceeding by water, before the S. W. monsoon, to Amra-poor, a distance of five hundred miles. This plan failed for a want of boats; but even if there had been boats, it would have been impracticable. I think that this force can advance only by land, when the river falls, and the country is dry, in November. It has, to be sure, no draught or carriage cattle; but we can send enough for a few light field-pieces, and it ought to be able to pick up more in the country. Its heavy baggage and stores must go in boats, which, with proper exertion, may be prepared in sufficient number. I am more afraid of sickness than of any thing else: the rains have been constant, and unusually severe, since the end of May. Fever is very general, but not often fatal; but many Europeans have been carried off by dysentery, and we are not sure that, by continuing two or three months longer in the same confined spot, the sickness may not increase so much as materially to cripple the army. The Europeans have no fresh meat: they are fed on salt beef and salt fish. There are plenty of cattle in the country, and there were numbers at Rangoon when the troops landed; but they were not permitted to be seized, lest it should offend the prejudices of the natives. This is carrying the matter farther than we do in India. We must not allow our feelings for the cows to starve ourselves.

The Bengal Government do not seem to have yet determined on their plan of operations. They intended at one time to have entered Ava with their main force from Arracan, and with a small one from Cachar. They have learned that Arracan is too unhealthy, and talk of making their principal attack by Cachar and Munnipoor. They seem to think that Sir A. Campbell cannot advance towards the capital, as he has no bullocks nor

maritime expeditions, it is essential that we should have the means of embarking or disembarking rapidly,—an object for which the common ships' boats are totally unfit. The last expedition that sailed from Madras had an ample supply of flat-boats, which were built for the purpose. The preparation of such a number as would be necessary for four or five thousand troops, would require some months. The distance between Calcutta and Madras making it nearly a month before an answer can be received to a letter, renders all sudden operations, in which the forces of both Presidencies are to co-operate, extremely liable to accidents, because there is no time for consultation or explanation; and under such circumstances, no operations are so liable to failure as maritime expeditions. A service of this kind requires, more than any other, that every equipment should be ample, because there can seldom be any medium between complete success and failure; partial success is little better than an expensive failure.

The Supreme Government have, no doubt, some information which may render a sudden operation against the enemy advisable, provided it can be effected; but the want of tonnage, if tonnage is expected to be found here, will certainly render it impracticable, unless some unlooked-for supply should arrive soon. I must own, with the little information which I can be supposed to possess, I should think it better to avoid all inferior expeditions, to wait until we are fully prepared for the main one, and to undertake it with such a force as should leave no doubt of success. This would give time for the two Governments to communicate freely, and for the subordinate one to understand exactly what it was to do, and to make its arrangements accordingly; and it would be more likely, in the end, both to ensure success and to save expense. The occasional hostilities on the eastern frontier of Bengal might, perhaps, still be allowed to continue for some months without much serious inconvenience; and even if the Burmans brought a greater force to that quarter, it might divert their attention from the main object of the attack.

Our troops in the Peninsula lie convenient for all such expeditions, and they are eager to be employed. I am no less anxious that they should go wherever there is service; but I wish, at the same time, that they should go with every means to guard against failure. The drought and scarcity make the march of troops difficult; but this is a difficulty we can get over; but the want of

shipping is one for which there is no remedy, unless longer time be allowed for our preparations:

I hope that your Lordship will pardon the freedom with which I have offered these remarks. We shall address the Supreme Government again in two or three days.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

In pursuance of the above promise, Sir Thomas Munro again addressed the Governor-General on the 6th and 20th of March. Of these letters it may suffice to state, that they give an account of the progress of the preparations, and report, with much apparent satisfaction, the alacrity displayed by the sepoys in volunteering. Mention is likewise made of the difficulties attending the construction of flat-boats, whilst care is taken to keep the superior authorities in mind, that the scarcity which still pressed severely upon the inhabitants of the Carnatic, ought not, even on account of the war, to be neglected. In the mean while, however, Lord Amherst had written at length, giving a detailed account of the plan of operations which it was intended to pursue, and enclosing two memoranda, one by Captain Canning, relative to the mode of conducting the war, the other by Mr. Larkin, head of the Marine Board, touching the supply of tonnage. The following is a copy of his Lordship's letter, to which the answer of Sir Thomas Munro is appended.

Calcutta, 10th March, 1834.

MY DEAR SIR,

WHILE waiting for the communication which you promise us in two or three days, I take upon myself to acknowledge the letter of the 25th ult., which I had the honour to receive from you yesterday; and I will even go so far as to hazard a few observations on matters on which I cannot but speak with considerable diffidence.

With reference to the difficulty which you state respecting tonnage, I send you a copy of a private note from Mr. Larkin, head of our Marine Board, to Mr. Swinton, our Secretary in the Secret and Political Department, by which it would appear, that quite as large a quantity of tonnage as we shall be likely to require, will be available at Madras. I likewise enclose a copy of a me-

I acknowledge a difficulty which is not yet removed. I do not know how we shall transport to Rangoon a sufficient number of gun-boats, to protect the advance of our troops up the river to the capital. I understand that the flat-bottom boats which you naturally point out as essential to a maritime expedition, will not be required to land the troops at Rangoon.

You have stated many reasons, which I acknowledge to be powerful ones, why the expedition should be deferred till farther communication can be held between this place and Madras. I think they are overbalanced, not only by the consideration of the proper period for ascending the Irawaddy River, and the impossibility of moving from Rangoon to Ummerapoora by land, but also by the security which an early blow would afford to our eastern frontier, and by a reference to the unprepared state in which we may expect to find the enemy.

It is really with considerable hesitation that I have entered into this detail with you. Arrangements like these are far beyond the reach of my experience; and I may have overlooked objections which would readily present themselves to persons more conversant with these matters. But I have thought it desirable that you should be made acquainted with circumstances as they stand at present; and you may rely upon frequent communications from this Government, upon all matters connected with the measures in contemplation.

I am, with sincere respect and esteem, &c. &c.

ANNEXED.

To this sensible and modest letter Sir Thomas Munro wrote the following reply:—

Madras, 21st March, 1824.

MY LORD,

AFTER writing to your Lordship yesterday, I had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 10th instant.

I have read Captain Canning's paper* with great attention.

* I subjoin this document, as essential to a right understanding of the accompanying correspondence. The memorandum of Mr. Larkin is omitted, because it contains nothing whatever of public interest.

MY LORD,

ANXIOUS to obey, with the least possible delay, your Lordship's injunctions, I proceed to offer a few hurried remarks on those points towards which you have been pleased more immediately to direct my attention.

The subjects on which your Lordship has more particularly required in-

from Rangoon, and that another force advance by Munnipoor. This plan appears to me to be a good one. We have here no knowledge of the country or of the people, and have therefore

the beginning of July to the end of September, a degree of difficulty, and perhaps risk, exists, particularly if vessels, in bad and foggy weather, overshoot the Rangoon river, and become entangled among the dangerous shoals of the Salang river and Gulf of Martaban. For the advance of a force on the capital, the commencement of the rains, or beginning of June, should be selected, when the rise in the river would remove all obstacles from the sand-banks, &c. &c. &c. and a strong southerly wind convey the troops to their destination in a month or five weeks, the distance from Rangoon being about five hundred miles.

The effect that an attack on Rangoon might have on the property and lives of the Europeans settled there, becomes next an object of consideration. Their number in 1812 may have been ten or twelve; and I do not understand it has increased since. That their lives would be sacrificed, I do not believe. They would, I conceive it likely, be sent up to the capital, where the mild character of the present king would probably screen them from personal violence. Their property would of course be seized. But this question becomes, in some degree, connected with the measure now in contemplation, of an attack on the island of Chedubab. Whenever this takes place, it will naturally become a signal to the Burmese to fortify, to the utmost of their means and resources, every place in their dominions accessible to our forces; and even a weak and contemptible enemy, thus put on his guard, must, in some degree, become formidable. Of these places, Rangoon is indubitably the most prominent and important. The consequence will therefore probably be, that available vessels, of which a sufficient number is always to be found in the port, will be seized and attempted to be sunk on the bar, whereby the entrance of the river would be rendered impracticable. The approach by land is by an impervious jungle of eighteen miles, and endless swamps, morasses, and creeks put it out of the question; and even were that not the case, and supposing our troops to have obtained possession of the town by an overland route, what inconvenience would not be sustained by the absence of all shipping? Should an early and separate attack on Chedubab be deemed preferable to a combined and simultaneous attempt on that place and Rangoon, and possibly Mergé and Tavoy, the two latter places involving weighty considerations as connected with Siam, the danger of the Burmese closing the entrance of their river might effectually be obviated by a cruiser, or I should rather recommend two being stationed within the bar, which, by moving up and down between the town and that spot, would prevent all mischief; and the commander of these vessels might, with a little management, give notice to the European settlers of the situation of affairs, and receive such on board as might choose to avail themselves of their protection.

Of the number of men that the Burmese could bring into the field, it is difficult to form even a distant conjecture. The population of the country has been greatly overrated by Colonel Symes (see account of his mission) at eighteen millions. The uncertain data on which I was enabled, in 1816, to build a rough guess, did not give three millions, which may be probably under the mark. Of a regular army they have no idea. When troops are required, such

hardly any means of forming a judgment as to the best plan for a campaign against the Burman empire. But there are some general rules which are applicable to campaigns in all countries, viz. not to lose time in subordinate objects, if we have the power of attaining great ones; not to divide our force too much; to act on those points which will most facilitate the subjugation of the enemy; and from whatever quarter we advance into his country, to do it with such a force as may be amply sufficient to drive before it any thing that he can oppose to it. We can easily furnish ten thousand men, the force proposed to operate from Rangoon; and the Bengal Government can probably furnish an equal or a greater force to advance by Munnipoor, or any other route that may be deemed more practicable. I should certainly place more dependence on the ultimate success of an attack by Munnipoor than by Rangoon, because, though it may require more time, yet regular troops possess greater advantages against irregulars in acting by land than by water; and the success of their operations is not left to depend on their finding a sufficient number of boats.

It would be desirable that hostilities should be avoided by the enemy acquiescing in the conditions which may be prescribed; but military operations ought not to be relaxed for a single day on account of negotiations, but should be carried on as if there were no chance of peace. Such an enemy will endeavour to gain

district of a province is assessed at a certain number of men, who are levied from the different houses, agreeably to the number of male inhabitants they contain. The men thus raised receive no pay; in lieu of which they are provided with food; powder and ball, each man manufactures from the raw materials supplied him by the Government. The ammunition thus compounded can, of course, be little effective; but at close quarters the *dah*, a species of broadsword, is in the hands of the Burmese a formidable weapon. Strength and individual courage they possess in a high degree. Independent of which, desertion or cowardice they well know will be punished by the most savage execution of the whole family. Artillery they have none, with the exception perhaps of a few old ship guns of the very worst description.

The above details may probably be already known to your Lordship; at all events, they appear deserving of notice. To look upon the Burmese as a foe altogether contemptible, and treat them as such, might lead to serious evil; while, by adopting the means to the end in view, certain success may be anticipated, and your Lordship be enabled to dictate terms to the Burmese Monarch, or otherwise dispose of his country in his own capital and palace.

I have the honour to remain, &c.

Government House,
March 4th, 1824.

(Signed) J. CANNING,
D. A. D.

time, because it will be more useful to him than to us ; and will not hesitate to break off at any time when he thinks he can do it with advantage.

I do not know in what state the countries of Pegue, Arracan, Cassey, and other provinces subdued by the Burmans, now are ; but they are probably anxious to regain their independence ; and in this case they might, for their own sakes, aid our operations, and might, by judicious treatment, be rendered of great use in providing us with every kind of supply in provisions, boats, &c. They might be promised future protection in proportion as they might exert themselves in expelling the Burmans, and co-operating with us.

As it appears to be necessary that Rangoon should be occupied by a sufficient force as soon as possible, both for the purpose of securing the place and of enabling us to assist the people of Pegue in any attempt to regain their liberty, we shall send the whole force now ready to the rendezvous. The chief part of the expense has already been incurred ; there could be no use, and much inconvenience might be found in detaining them. They will sail about the 8th of April ; and by the end of May we shall have a second division ready for embarkation.

It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader, that at the period when the above letter was written, the most profound ignorance touching the resources, population, and even the geography of the Burman empire, prevailed. By some strange oversight, no care seems to have been taken to obtain even a moderate knowledge of the circumstances of a people with whom it was scarcely possible to doubt that, sooner or later, the Company's troops must come into collision. The consequence was, that when war was finally decided upon, no higher authority than that of Captain Canning could be consulted, as to the best mode of conducting it ; and as he spoke with the confidence of a man who had spent some months in Ava, it was natural that his suggestions should receive their full share of attention. But it will be seen from a variety of expressions in the correspondence yet to be brought forward, that of the plan of advancing entirely by water, Sir Thomas Munro never thought highly, and that there were other

be Europeans, the rest natives, and there will be about two thousand public and private followers. The whole will have water for six weeks, and provisions for three months. After the expiration of that period they must depend wholly on Bengal for all supplies beyond what can be procured in the country, because the dearth on the coast will render it impossible to send any from Madras, except the single article of arrack. Bengal, I imagine, can have no difficulty in supplying whatever is wanted; but it is a matter which will require early attention, and in which nothing should be left to chance. If the second expedition, required to be ready by the end of next month, should proceed to Rangoon, the force in that quarter will be doubled; and even if the inhabitants should be well-disposed, and the country to the southward open, though it may contribute materially to the subsistence of our troops, it will not be safe to trust to it entirely in so essential a point.

* * * *

The selection of Colonel Sir Archibald Campbell, by the Supreme Government, to the chief command of the expedition, necessarily interfered with other arrangements which the Government of Madras had proposed to make; and the coast division, as is well known, departed in charge of Colonel M'Bean, an officer junior to Sir Archibald in point both of rank and standing. No petty jealousy, however, was permitted for a moment to break in upon the good understanding which had hitherto prevailed between the two Governments. On the contrary, Sir Thomas Munro gave his ready approbation to the motives which actuated the Governor-General in the proceeding; and whilst he congratulated Lord Amherst on having at his disposal an officer of Sir Archibald's high character and acknowledged gallantry, he himself persevered in endeavouring to give to the Madras contingent all the efficiency which circumstances would permit. The next question discussed between them involved a consideration of the terms on which peace ought to be offered.

"The Siamese," says Lord Amherst in a letter dated from Calcutta, 2nd April, 1824, "inveterate enemies of the Burmese, would cause a most powerful diversion in the South. The aid

should know what we had to expect, and be able to act with confidence. We have no information regarding that country here, excepting what is given by Symes, Cox, &c. ; but even from what is stated by them, I can have little doubt that, if boats sufficient for going up the river in the wet season could not be collected, the troops, after the rains, might advance by land along the banks of the Irawaddi, with their heavy stores in boats." * * *

I add to this two short extracts from letters dated the 22nd and 28th of April, for the purpose of showing that, whilst the general issues of the war occupied a large share of Sir Thomas Munro's thoughts, the most minute point connected with its progress was not forgotten.

" We have not yet received any official instructions regarding the preparation of transports for the second division of troops now under orders for foreign service ; but as it is stated in your Lordship's private letter to me of the 2nd ultimo, that it will be necessary to leave at Rangoon those which accompany the first division, we shall take our measures accordingly, without waiting for any more formal communication. It will, no doubt, interfere with the rice trade, and subject us to a high freight ; but upon occasions like the present, it is always best to sacrifice inferior objects to the attainment of the main one. There is however a difficulty which we cannot get over without help. We have no water-casks, and are deficient in wood, and still more in hoops, for making them. After taking into the calculation all that can be done by means of what we have on hand, and of what is expected from other quarters, we shall still want one thousand three hundred water-casks ; and as we shall not, without a supply to this extent, be able to equip the second expedition, we have this day written to Colonel M'Bean, desiring him, with the concurrence of Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, to send back instantly one of the transports with one thousand three hundred water-casks, all the hammocks, or as many as can be spared, and about one-half of the ship-utensils."

* * * * *

Again,

" Tonnage and water are the only things which will occasion the least difficulty in sending a part of the second division to the rendezvous, so as all to arrive in May. We cannot purchase

its becoming expedient to advance troops in that direction during the next cold season ; and although I am willing to hope that the possession of Rangoon and other maritime places belonging to the Burmese, may induce them to listen to reasonable terms of peace, I do not propose to relax in the preparations for attacking the capital, not from the south only, but also from the countries adjoining our north-eastern frontiers ; and whether it may be necessary or not, ultimately to advance a force in that direction, it is highly important not to lose the opportunity of making ourselves acquainted with the readiest means of waging offensive war against our turbulent neighbours. * * *

SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO LORD ANHERST.

Madras, 22nd May, 1824.

MY LORD,

WE have been two days later than I estimated ; but we have got the pioneers, whom I did not expect so soon ; they have been enabled to join only by very extraordinary exertion. A detachment of them from the neighbourhood of Hyderabad, has marched at the rate of twenty-five miles daily for fifteen days, without a halt, in the hottest time of the year. Our sepoy battalions have embarked without a man being absent. Their conduct has been highly meritorious : no Europeans could have evinced more readiness to go on foreign service than they have done. * * *

LORD ANHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Calcutta, 22nd May, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

You will have been informed yesterday by Mr. Swinton of the wish of this Government, that two battalions, with two six-pounders each, forming part of the last portion of your second detachment, should be sent direct to Chittagong. We have thought it best not to interfere, even if we could, with that portion of the second detachment which was to sail on or about the 20th instant, thinking it probable that Sir Archibald Campbell will have calculated upon its joining him, and wishing to avoid the disappointment which might be occasioned to Sir Archibald Campbell by any diversion of that part of the force. It is possible that he may not require the remaining portion of the second detachment. At all events, we have urgent need of its assistance at Chittagong. The irruption of the Burmese into that district

was not expected by our agents there, until within a very few days of its taking place. I regret it most on account of the necessity which it imposes on our troops of remaining longer in the southern portion of the district, where I am afraid their health will be unavoidably exposed to injury. It is not our intention, however, to prolong a contest in a part of the country where it will be scarcely possible to preserve the health of our troops. Much as I shall lament the loss of property, and the personal inconvenience and danger which the inhabitants will suffer from the presence of the enemy, I think that, in the balance of evils, the occupation of the country by the enemy must for a time be endured, rather than risk the almost certain destruction of our troops by the effects of the climate; and our authorities there will therefore be directed to retreat gradually, unless they shall see strong reasons to the contrary, on Chittagong, between which place and the present scene of hostilities, we are informed that the country is of such a nature as to make it easy for a retiring force to check the advance of one much superior to itself in numbers. Chittagong itself is not considered an unhealthy station; and we shall look to our operations at Rangoon for the recovery of such portion of our territory on the Naaf as may be temporarily in possession of the Burmese. Indeed, although we are taking such measures as seem to be necessary for the protection of Chittagong, in the event of the enemy moving still farther forwards, I think I am not too sanguine in expecting that it is very possible they may make a sudden retreat on hearing of what, I hope, is on the eve of taking place—the occupation of the island of Cheduba. I cannot think that the Rajahs of Arracan, and other neighbouring districts, now forming the force which has advanced into our territory, will remain easy when they shall hear that we are at the very gates of their homes. Besides, we are led to believe that the Burmese now in the field derive their supplies from that island.

The Burmese appear to be making considerable exertions to resume offensive operations in more than one quarter. We are told that reinforcements have advanced into Munnipore, where an effort is about to be made by Gumber Sing, whose family of late ruled that country, to shake off the Burmese yoke. It is also pretty clear, that an addition must have been made to their force in Assam, as it is not easy to account in any other manner for the advance which they have, within these few days, made to the westward, after having hastily abandoned the country as far as Rangpore, the eastern capital.

from the troops having been harassed by being employed in small detachments. Colonel Shapland, when reinforced, will, I hope, be able to drive the enemy out of the province. The territory itself may be poor, and not worth a contest; but it is of importance that our military character should be maintained, and that the reputation of the enemy's arms should not be raised at the expense of our own, by their being permitted quietly to occupy our territory. I am sorry that it should have been rendered necessary by circumstances to divert any part of the force intended for Brigadier-General Campbell from its first destination; but he will still have a very respectable force at his disposal. The best way of rendering it adequate to every purpose for which it is intended, would be by encouraging the Peguers to throw off the yoke, and engaging to support them in recovering their independence.

From the character which hostilities have assumed, there can be no hope that the Burmans will listen to any reasonable terms; and our safest course for bringing the war to a successful termination is, to enter into it with all our means.

* * * * *

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 14th June, 1824.

MY LORD,

SHOULD the loss of Rangoon and Chedubah induce the Burman Government to make peace on such terms as your Lordship may deem satisfactory, nothing more can be desired; but should it refuse to do so, it will then become necessary to prosecute the war with all the force that can be spared, both on the side of Rangoon and of Bengal, and to be prepared for its lasting more than one campaign. Sir Archibald Campbell will require the aid of all the second division that was originally destined to join him. He ought to have ten Native battalions, besides his European force. Whether he advances towards Ummerapoora by land or water, or partly both, he will have a long line of communication, and must have some posts to secure it; and after making these detachments, he must have with himself such a body of men as the whole force of the enemy shall be unable to oppose. The co-operation of the inhabitants would be the easiest way of securing his communications and the arrival of supplies. The system of terror employed by the enemy, by enabling him to drive away the inhabitants from their villages, and to hinder

them from supplying our wants, gives them a great advantage over us; and this advantage will operate against us as long as the people continue to believe that their country is again to be delivered up to the Burman Government. The people themselves will never venture to act in opposition to their present tyrannical masters: before they will venture to take so dangerous a step, they must be satisfied that they are not to return under their dominion; and they must have leaders and a prince of their own to look to. As the southern and most fertile provinces of the Burman empire were formerly under Pegu, it would perhaps be advisable to proclaim the restoration of the ancient family, and to guarantee to it the possession of whatever part of its old territory might be recovered from Ava. Were this done, Sir Archibald Campbell would soon have a friendly instead of a hostile country, along a great part of the line of his operations. If we hold out to the people no hope of their not being placed again under their ancient sovereign, but leave them to suppose, that whenever our troops are withdrawn, they are again to fall under the Burman Government, we must expect no co-operation from them, but to be harassed by their withholding supplies and cutting off stragglers.

LORD AMHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Calcutta, 10th July, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE read with due attention your suggestions respecting an offer of our protection to the Peguers, in the event of their assertion of their former independence. We are at present quite in the dark as to the existence of a single individual of their former royal race. I think, indeed, that the whole was exterminated at the time of the final conquest and annexation of the kingdom of Pegu to the empire of Ava. Nothing like a disposition to revolt has at any time manifested itself, I believe, during the present generation; and as circumstances are at this moment, I imagine it would be hopeless to expect that we could excite a disposition to throw off a yoke which has long ceased, at least, to be a foreign one. But circumstances may arise, both in Pegu and in Arracan, to make it our policy to offer assistance in separating those two kingdoms from that of Ava. In fact, if the Court of Unmerapoora obstinately refuses to listen to any terms of peace, there is nothing left for us but to attempt the subversion of that power as it exists at present, and to divide it once

but to our own troops: it would encourage the Burmans, and it would shake, in some degree, the confidence of our troops in their commanders; it would leave the Burmans in quiet possession of their southern and richest provinces; it would discourage the Siamese and Peguers at the moment perhaps that they were ready to have risen against the enemy; and it would deter the inhabitants of the province to which the war might be transferred from affording us any aid. After all, however, that plan ought to be preferred which clearly offers the greatest certainty of speedily subduing the enemy. To form a correct judgment on this point requires a knowledge of the country and its resources, its obstacles, its roads, and its water communications, which can be best procured by the officer on the spot.

I think it is evident that Sir A. Campbell applies for the 54th regiment and a battalion, because these corps are the remaining part of the second expedition, and because he does not know that any other troops can be spared; but I have no doubt that he would rather have three battalions of sepoys, because they are so much more easily subsisted, and because the proportion of Europeans to native troops in his force is already much too great. One battalion of sepoys will therefore sail in the course of five or six days for Rangoon; but we shall keep the 54th regiment until we hear again from Calcutta, as I have no doubt that that regiment will be wanted for the Bengal force destined for the eastern frontier. Draught and carriage cattle, and a small body of cavalry, seem to be much required by Sir A. Campbell, and it is desirable that he should have them as soon as possible. They can be furnished much easier from Bengal, and much sooner than from hence; but if any are required from this quarter, we shall take steps to furnish what we can on receiving your Lordship's orders.

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LORD AMHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Fort William, 3rd August, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

You will receive, in a day or two, copies of the last dispatches which have reached us from Sir Archibald. He seems to think it nearly impracticable to prosecute his voyage up the Irrawaddy, and he consequently asks our instructions upon what he considers the only two remaining plans for him to pursue, either to advance to the capital by the road from Martaban through Old

SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO LORD ANHERST.

Madras, 23rd August, 1824.

MY LORD,

I HAVE been delaying my reply to your Lordship's letter of the 3rd instant, until I should have seen Sir A. Campbell's secret dispatch, and the instructions sent to him in consequence. In my last letter, however, I have, in fact, already given my opinion on the main point; namely, that the plan of advancing by the Irawaddy was preferable to that of either marching south, or re-embarking and landing in Arracan. I can see no object in his going to Martaban, because it would not facilitate his advance to the capital, as, according to his own account, even if the Siamese and Peguers were to take a part in the war, he would still require draught and carriage equipments from Bengal. I suspect too, that operations by sea against the enemy's maritime possessions would, at this season of the year, be liable to great delays, and even to danger. If a field-equipment be indispensable, it would still, I think, be advisable to advance by the Irawaddy, for the equipment could not possibly be to such an extent as to move all the stores without water-carriage. The Siamese should be left to make war in their own way; and the Peguers, if they rise at all, will be more likely to do so by Sir A. Campbell's moving up the river, and drawing the enemy out of their country. With regard to the plan of re-embarking the Rangoon force, and landing it at Arracan, nothing could justify such a measure but the certainty of being furnished there with an equipment of draught and carriage cattle. If they could not obtain it, they would be still more helpless than where they are now, and we should have lost reputation, and given confidence to the enemy by abandoning the original plan of operations.

Sir A. Campbell says, that the prospect of advancing by the Irawaddy is at an end, in consequence of the square-rigged vessels having been found not to answer, the want of country-boats the want of provisions, and sickness. The square-rigged vessels are surely not absolutely useless, and the other wants may be supplied. If it be found impracticable to ascend the river when it is full, the difficulty will probably be removed when it falls, and the stream loses its rapidity, and the country becomes dry enough to admit of troops marching near the banks. Should this be the case, the advance to Prome would be of the greatest advantage: it would give Sir A. Campbell the command of a rich

I see from some correspondence, that a reward of fifteen rupees was paid for every slaughter-bullock or buffalo brought. This is nothing ; it would be better to give fifty and ensure a better supply. Carriage cattle ought to be taken, if they are to be got, for fifty or even a hundred rupees a-head.

There can be no doubt that, in a populous and well cultivated country, there must be abundance of animals, both for the plough and carriage, and that they may be got by paying double, but not by paying half-price. Paying double prices in an enemy's country, is the cheapest way of carrying on war ; and if it is done in Ava, it will produce the same beneficial effects as in India. When the force ascends the Irawaddy, and gets possession of the points where the main branches separate, the Burman troops will probably abandon the Delta. I imagine that they will also evacuate the country between Rangoon and Martaban, and that the inhabitants of all these countries, if well treated, will be ready to sell cattle to our army at cheaper rates, and in greater numbers, than they can possibly be sent from India.

It would greatly facilitate the military operations, if some civil administration were established in the districts from which the enemy might be expelled. I do not mean for the purpose of raising revenue, but protecting the people collecting supplies, and seeing that they are amply paid for in ready money. The officer who may be employed on this business should be one who has had some experience in such matters,—such a man may no doubt be found among the officers present with the force.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 2nd February, 1826.

MY LORD,

It is of great importance that no time should be lost in ascending the river, to the point where the branches first separate from the main stream, in order to prevent the enemy from carrying off the grain and cattle of the Delta, and secure them for ourselves. I am more solicitous about cattle than grain, because grain can be easily sent from India, if necessary ; but the transport of cattle is slow and expensive. If there are officers with the force who understand the business of purchasing cattle in an enemy's country, I am persuaded that enough may be found in the Delta, and the districts occupied by our troops, to supply what is absolutely necessary both for draught and carriage.

even the Burmans with an inadequate force; on the contrary, his unceasing exertions were applied to place the army of Sir A. Campbell in such a condition as should enable it to move in every direction, with a moral certainty of success; wisely arguing, that, even in point of economy, it were better to act thus than to risk a prolongation of the contest by adopting a narrower policy. Again, though not less desirous of peace than other public men, Sir Thomas Munro uniformly declared himself against the conclusion even of an armistice till after the enemy should have been thoroughly humbled. He contended that nothing short of this—nothing less than the necessity of purchasing a suspension of hostilities by a money-payment, or the surrender of a portion of his territories, would convince the King of Ava of his own inferiority; and as the same sentiments were happily adopted by the Government of Bengal, the judicious measure was enforced. But perhaps there is no feature in his public conduct at this eventful period more remarkable than the absolute confidence which he reposed in the loyalty and good feeling of the people of India. While apprehensions prevailed elsewhere of commotions and conspiracies, and a cry was raised for more troops to supply the place of those employed at Rangoon, Sir Thomas Munro uniformly maintained that there existed no ground of alarm; and even the mutiny at Barrakpore failed to convince him that the force already embodied was not fully adequate to preserve the tranquillity of the country. From several long and able minutes recorded by him during the progress of the war, we gather that, at one period, full twenty out of fifty regiments of Native infantry were withdrawn from the territories of Madras; yet he resolutely opposed every effort to increase the military establishment, except by adding a few extra men to each company. Never was policy more magnanimous, more equitable, or productive of more fortunate results. By acting thus, he gave the surest proof to the natives, that Government neither feared nor distrusted them; and as no disturb-

ance occurred, a heavy additional expense was saved to a treasury already far from being rich.

The following confidential letter to an officer in the Mysore country, will suffice to show how Sir Thomas was accustomed to treat the awful rumours which from time to time came in. It was written in reply to a report made under circumstances of no common agitation and alarm. It is scarcely necessary to add, that of the horrible plot which involved the massacre of all the European officers in the Company's service, not a syllable was afterwards heard.

I HAVE received yours of the — and read the awful denunciation sent to us by ——. Bundageer Sahib is, I imagine, a man whom I have frequently seen in the neighbourhood of Vascottah, and who has often complained to me of the resumption of some enaum, partly by Tippoo and partly by Purnea; but in this respect he is in the same predicament with hundreds as good as himself. The native prince gives and takes away such enaums at pleasure, and we have no business to interfere.

Bundageer seems to have got up a new and very extensive holy alliance against us, comprehending all the most discordant powers in India; but I have been so long accustomed to them, that I think nothing of them. I have heard of one every five or six years since 1792, when a very alarming one was brought forward by some adherents of Tippoo, and circulated through the country by tappal. They usually arise from the political speculation of some holy Hindoo or Mussulman.

Bundageer knows too much to deserve any credit: had he been satisfied with telling us that the old Rana of Kittoor was a mal-content, many would have believed him, because nobody doubted that she was dissatisfied at having been robbed of her property. But he gives us a leaf out of an old almanack, in which it is said, —“In that year there will be in the Eastern quarter bloody wars, and great slaughter, and earthquakes,” &c.; and he, or some other almanack man, seems to have been foretelling eclipses in Bengal, “perplexing monarchs with the fear of change;” for they are raising men enough there for a crusade. The shortest and most effectual way to dissipate the present grand confederacy would be, to restore Bundageer's enaum, or to give him a purse of money, as is usual in Persian tales. The General cannot give the enaum, but he may the purse; and pagodas will answer as

well as dinars. The story of the confederacy, if not already sent, should be sent forthwith to —, in order that he may know that his disorder is not fever, as has been supposed, but magic, and that his medical attendant may adapt his remedy to his complaint. I hope in goodness, as the old ladies say, that these fellows will not bewitch —, for we could ill spare him in the present state of affairs. We should not be able to say that we could have better spared a better man, for we have none better; and I therefore sincerely hope that he, and all of us, may get safe through this ominous year.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

On another occasion, at an earlier period of the war, a disturbance of rather a serious aspect actually broke out at Kittoor, in the southern Mahratta country, which created, as usual, excessive alarm, for which there was no solid ground. The following letter to Mr. Chaplin, who was at the time Commissioner at Poonah, will show the view taken by Sir Thomas Munro of that affair.

Madras, 7th November, 1824.

MY DEAR CHAPLIN,

I HAVE to-day received yours of the 30th ultimo. The attack on Kittoor has been a melancholy affair; but I do not imagine that the insurrection will extend beyond the district. Chintamene Row, though always discontented, has, I think, too much at stake to risk a contest with us. You will see, when the official papers reach you, that large reinforcements have been ordered to Darwar, which would have been sufficient for every purpose without calling upon you; but the more force on such occasions the better; it concludes the business sooner, and deters those who are wavering from stirring. There was great imprudence and presumption in the whole of the operation. — should have had no troops. He ought to have gone alone, if he went at all; nobody would have injured him. He should have explained his intentions. If they refuse to accede to them, he should have parted from them peaceably, and written to the commanding-officer, or to you, that a proper force might have been sent to enforce submission. In all such cases, there ought either to be no force at all, or an overwhelming one. A good tishildar would have been a much better agent at Kittoor than the collector: he would have caused no commotion; and if he failed, there

it can be done with prudence. It is a measure which is absolutely necessary, not only for the ease of the people, but for the ultimate stability and progressive increase of our revenue. It is not a measure which demands hasty or general adoption; but is one which must not be lost sight of, and which must be carried into effect cautiously and gradually, and suiting the extent of reduction to the condition of the several provinces. Our revenue is now tolerably permanent. There is no very great fluctuation in its annual amount, but it takes from the cultivator too large a share of the produce. If we lower the assessment a little, he will be enabled to improve his land, and get other crops, and his gain will be more than the mere abatement in his rent. But neither this, nor any plan calculated for his relief, can be successful, unless we abandon theories, and follow with perseverance the practical system in use among the Native Governments when best administered. The Rayetwar, the ancient and most common system in the peninsula of India, is that by which only we can know the real state of the country, and protect the people. It has by some misconception, arising out of a superficial knowledge of the customs of the country, been supposed to be something new. It is in fact nothing more than Government, through its officers, receiving the land revenue directly from the land-owners of the country, instead of farming it out to adventurers. Had the whole landed property of a district been in the possession of a few great proprietors, nobody, I believe, would have thought of such a plan; but because it is distributed among a great body of small proprietors, or rayets, it seems to be considered as quite reasonable that they should be turned over to any body, who will pay a fixed annual revenue for them, and that Government should thus be relieved from the trouble of looking after them. As long as the native rules of inheritance remain unchanged, landed property must be small and numerous. But whether a district be divided among a hundred, or ten thousand proprietors, it ought to make no difference as to the relation in which the proprietors stand to Government. They are all tenants in chief, and have a right to the same protection. It is no excuse to say that a direct settlement with them causes greater detail and some additional expense. It is the duty of Government to adapt its arrangements to the convenience of the people, rather than to its own ease.

reached you long ago ; earlier probably than it did us. It was a real misfortune. With his zeal and talents, and the rapid progress he had made in every thing, he must have proved a public servant of the very first order ; and every day makes me more sensible of the difficulty with which such a loss is supplied." How sadly this fair prospect has been darkened, and all the anxious cares and hopes of his friends disappointed by his melancholy death !

I have forgotten to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th April last, and of one after your visit to Craigue, which Lady M. has kept ever since it came. Erskine had enough to distress her before, but John's death will be a terrible shock, which I fear it will be long before she can recover.

I have heard nothing certain of my stay here, or of any successor.

Your affectionate brother,

THOMAS MUNRO.

EXTRACT.

30th May, 1825.

It gives me great pleasure to hear you speak so favourably of the Rayetwar system, which, though the old system of the country, is by some strange misapprehension regarded in England as a new one. It has been unfortunate for the territories under Madras, that almost all the earlier discussions regarding Indian land and its owners or occupants, were carried on in Bengal, where the long previous weakness of the Mahomedan rulers had allowed the officers of the revenue to assume rights which did not belong to them, and which the British Government augmented, by considering them as landlords, under the term of Zemindar. The opinions derived from Bengal regarding Zemindars, were extended to this Presidency, where, in fact, they are unknown, excepting in the northern Circars, where they were suffered to grow up in the same manner as Bengal. The greater part of our territories have been acquired from Native Princes who did not employ Zemindars, and who collected the revenue, as we now do, from the Rayets, by means of Tishildars, receiving a monthly salary, and appointed and dismissed at pleasure. Most of our provinces have in ancient times been surveyed and assessed ; but as the accounts have in general been altered or lost, we make a new survey and assessment, in order that we may know the resources of the country ; and in order that every Rayet may know the exact amount of his assessment, and thus be

protected against any extra demand. The tendency of the Native rules of inheritance to subdivide the land is no doubt an inconvenience; but the evil is not found in practice to be so great as might at first sight be supposed. We know its utmost extent. It can never go beyond what it is now; for in all Rayet-war countries the course of time has long since carried the subdivision of land to its utmost natural limit; and it has been carried beyond it by frequent wars and arbitrary exactions having impoverished the Rayets, and prevented them from cultivating so much land as they would otherwise have done. Peace, and a moderate assessment, will in a few years considerably increase the size of the Rayet's little properties or estates, by increasing their agricultural stock. The subdivision of estates is also counterbalanced in a considerable degree by the custom of the different branches of a family often remaining for one or two generations undivided, under one head. The subdivisions must, however, be great, as long as the present laws of inheritance continue to be followed. But it is our business to let the distribution of property remain as we find it, and not attempt to force it into larger masses upon any theoretical notion of convenience or improvement. There are many Rayets who have not more than four or five acres; there are some who have four or five thousand. Between these extremes, there are great numbers who have from one to five hundred. I have no doubt that if the law of inheritance is found to be materially inconvenient to the Rayets, it will in time fall into disuse.

It is desirable in every country that the natives should be employed in every branch of the internal administration, and that their situations should be made respectable. The Indian governments begin to be sensible of this, and they have, during the last twenty years, considerably improved the condition of the judicial and revenue officers, and I imagine that they will gradually do all that is necessary in this respect if supported from home.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER TO MR. SULLIVAN.

Madras, 14th July, 1826.

THE Burmese war still occupies our attention more than any thing else; but its active operations are for the present nearly suspended by the monsoon. As the official accounts of the progress of the war are sent home regularly up to the latest date, it will be unnecessary for me to enter into any details. The ori-

clearly that our main line of operations could only be by the course of the Irawaddy, partly by land and partly by water, and that this would give us the double advantage of passing through the richest part of the enemy's country, and of cutting off his communication with it, whenever we got above the point where the branches separate from the main stream of the Irawaddy. I calculated that if Sir A. Campbell adopted this plan, he would reach Prome before the rains; and that when they were over, he would be able to continue his march to Ummarapoora. When I reckoned on his getting no farther than Prome this season, I had not so low an opinion of the Burman troops as I now have. I was induced to form a very low estimate of their military character, from their cautious and irresolute operations against the detachment at Ramoo, in May 1824; and from all their subsequent conduct they appear to be very inferior in military spirit to any of the nations of India. There were no letters from Prome later than the 6th of June: the monsoon had set in, and every thing in the neighbourhood was quiet. The heads of districts had submitted, and were sending in supplies. It was expected that offers of peace would be sent from Ava as soon as the occupation of Prome should be known. It is difficult to say what such a government will do; it may submit to our terms or reject them; but we ought to be prepared to insure them by advancing to Ummarapoora, and, if necessary, dismembering the empire, and restoring the Pegue nation. If we encouraged them, a leader would probably be found, and we might, without committing ourselves to protect him hereafter, make him strong enough, before we left the country, to maintain himself against the broken power of Ava.

We have sent on foreign service beyond sea, from Madras, five regiments of European infantry, fourteen regiments of Native infantry, two companies of European artillery, a battalion of pioneers, and above one thousand dooly bearers, and we have relieved the Bengal subsidiary force at Nagpoor. The rest of our troops are thinly scattered over a great extent of country, and will have very severe duty until those on foreign service return. We are obliged to be more careful than in ordinary times; but I see no reason to apprehend any serious commotion, or any thing beyond the occasional disturbances of poligars, which we are seldom for any long time ever entirely free from in this country. I confess I cannot understand what the Bengal Government want to do with so many additional troops, or with any addition at all.

Mr. Adam left them quite enough, and more than enough, to carry on the Burman war, and to protect their own territory. They have not sent a single Native regiment beyond sea, except a marine battalion: they have in Arracan and their Eastern frontier twelve or thirteen Native regiments more than formerly; but they have got nine of them by troops at Nagpoor and Mhow having been relieved from Madras and Bombay, while these troops, which have moved to the Eastward, still cover the country from which they were drawn. We had once five battalions in the Barmahl; we have one there now;—the whole have been advanced to the Ceded Districts. The military authorities in Bengal seem to think that when troops are drawn together in large bodies in time of war, new levies must always be made to occupy the stations from which troops have been taken to join the large body. If we follow such a principle, there can be no limit to the increase of our armies. I found much inconvenience from its adoption in Bengal, because the increase of the Bengal army is narrowly observed by the armies of the other Presidencies, and raises expectations which cannot be satisfied.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
C. W. W. WYNN.

Madras, 10th July, 1825.

DEAR SIR,

ONE of our greatest defects in this country is our readiness on every occasion to exaggerate the power and resources of the enemy. This is productive of very serious evils: it discourages enterprise, excites idle apprehension, causes a large force to be employed where a very small detachment would be sufficient, and leads to much delay and heavy expense in making great preparations where there is no enemy. There are many officers who never see five or six hundred of the enemy without estimating them at as many thousands, and who suppose that the Burmans must have an army of Rangoon, an army of Arracan, and an army of every province we can approach. I think it is clear that they have but one army, or but one large body of men, which from its number may be called an army; that they have great difficulty in keeping it together; and that, when it is together, it is much inferior, in every military quality, to the troops of any Indian prince. The long time required by Bunderloh, in December last, to bring a force against Sir Archibald Campbell, shows plainly enough that he had great difficulty in collecting it;

men to the north-west of Delhi, when half that number might do; or that the stations left by the troops, when drawn together, should be occupied by new levies.

TO MR RAVENSHAW.

18th July, 1825.

WE want no additional regiments of Europeans. All that is wanted, is to keep the corps already in the country complete during the war. I am induced to mention this again, by hearing reports of an intention of sending out more regiments. We have already more than we have use for, and have in consequence sent more to Rangoon than can be fed or moved. The Bengal people are alarmed about their frontier. They could take care of it when they had not a single regiment of cavalry, and now that they have two, they talk of want of protection: they seem to think their force must, even in numerical strength, be equal to that of the enemy. One to five, or even to ten, was once thought enough.

TO KIRKMAN PINLAY, ESQ.

Madras, 16th August, 1825.

MY DEAR SIR,

I do not know that I have ever yet acknowledged the receipt of your letter about Dr. Anderson. I have never seen him, but I understand that he is a very good public servant; which, being our townsman, I consider as a matter of course. I hope that you are a friend to free trade for public servants, as well as for other articles; and that you do not think that men ought to have a monopoly of offices, because they come from a particular town; or that we should call them China, when we know that they come from the Delft-house. I find, however, that there is no shaking off early prejudice, and becoming quite impartial, as a friend to free trade ought to be; I find that, notwithstanding my long exposure to other climates, I am still Glasgow ware; for if I had not been so, I should not, when I saw your opinion quoted by Mr. Huskisson, in support of his measures, have felt as much gratification as if I had had some share in the matter myself.

I remember, when I was in Somerville and Gordon's house, about the time of the appearance of "*The Wealth of Nations*," that the Glasgow merchants were as proud of the work as if they had written it themselves; and that some of them said it was no

country, where the cows are still uncivilized enough to cock up their tails and chase strangers.*

Yours sincerely,
THOMAS MUNRO.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. CUNNINGHAM.

Madras, 10th July, 1820.

MY DEAR CUNNINGHAM,

I GOT your letter of the 11th of January only a fortnight since: I don't know where it had been so long, but it seems to have been in bad weather, for it was drenched in salt water, had opened, and was hardly legible. I was, however, able to make out a great deal of satisfactory information about our old friends. They all seem to be very well, except Webb and Jourdan, who never were very strong. I observe you never say any thing about —; I suppose you never see him now, and that he may have betaken himself to better company.

I need not write to you about this country, for I believe there is hardly a person in it whom you know, except Generals Hall and Doveton; one of whom commands the southern, and the other the centre division. I wish we had Scott or Nat. Forbes here, for we are much in want of old officers for divisions.

You will have heard that our Burman war is over. General Bowser, if you have seen him, will tell you all about it much better than I can, or any body else. Our loss in officers has been severe, and both they and the men deserve great praise for their behaviour. The troops will all be here in the course of the month, except one regiment of Europeans and five regiments of native infantry, which remain for the present at Rangoon, and on the coast of Tennasserim.

As peace has returned, I have no object in remaining in this country now, and shall be very happy when a successor arrives and sets me at liberty. It is a long time since January 1780, when I arrived here as a Cadet, and borrowed thirty pagodas of Andrew Ross about six months after, to equip me for the field against Hyder Ally. I begin to feel, though my health is good

* This expression refers to a little adventure in which Colonel Munro and Mr. Finlay took part. They had walked into a field in which a number of cattle were grazing, and Colonel Munro was describing to his companion some military movement, when the animals suddenly rushed at them, and they with some difficulty escaped over a wall.

enough, that I am not so active as formerly; that my hand is not so steady; and that either the heat, the climate, or the lapse of time, has had the usual effect, and made me older than I was then. It is now too late to think of getting younger by dying my hair, or changing my dress, or going home. I shall quit this country, where I have passed so much of my life, with great regret, but still I shall be delighted to go home. Yours, very truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Bangalore, 29th September, 1825.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

By the desire of Macdonald, I enclose you an interesting paper of his on the difficulties of a Russian invasion of India. I have always considered such an undertaking as impracticable, without the previous conquest of Persia, and the quiet submission of the people to their new masters, neither of which events are likely, unless we are very negligent. At all events, the Russian invasion will not come so soon, I hope, as to find us in Ava. Let us get out of that country, and then come Russians and Persians when they will.

The armies, as they are called, of Ava, are, as far as we have yet seen of them, a most miserable half-armed rabble, greatly inferior to the peons of any Indian zemindar. They are the best ditchers and stockaders since the time of the Romans; but as a military body, they are little better than an assemblage of badly-armed tank-diggers. The army from Ummarapoora, which was approaching Prome the end of last month, and of which about one-half, or twenty thousand, were then entrenched at Munday, are said to be chiefly, if not entirely, armed with muskets. I should as soon believe that they were all armed with Manton's fowling-pieces. You must of course have long since observed, that ten or fifteen thousand men, more or less, make very little difference in the military arithmetic of Ava.

One of the most extraordinary circumstances attending the Burman war is, the effect which it has in increasing the Bengal army;—fresh regiments are raised, because others have gone to the frontier, and more are raised to fill up the places of some which it is proposed to draw together in order to strengthen some of their field-forces, already strong enough.

The Bengal army, as it stood before the Burman war, was at least as numerous as it ought to have been. No increase was

necessary for Ava. It never has been customary in India, when ten or fifteen thousand men are sent into the field, to raise an equal number to supply their places in garrison and cantonment. The Bengal Government has got more troops by transferring Nagpoor and Mhow to Madras and Bombay, than it has sent into Ava. It can hardly be said to have sent any into that country; for those in Arracan and Cochar are still on their own frontier. Since the commencement of the war, we have sent beyond sea, viz.—

Fighting men	{ Europeans	.	5237	
	{ Natives	.	15,277	
Bearers	.	.	1088	
Followers	{ public	.	2644	
	{ private	.	2326	
<hr/>				26,572

The great addition to the Bengal army on account of the war in Ava, in which we have so great a share without any addition, is a subject much felt and much talked of in this establishment. I regard the increase as entirely useless in itself, and as worse than useless as it affects the Madras army. An adjutant-general officer will always find very urgent reasons for increasing, and even for doubling, the army, if Government is disposed to receive them.

Yours most sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MR. WYNN.

Madras, 5th January, 1826.

DEAR SIR,

WE have private accounts from Rangoon up to the 28th, which mention that Sir A. Campbell had passed Meaday without seeing any thing of the enemy, who had abandoned their stockades at that place after their defeat near Promé. The enemy have evidently retreated in great consternation and disorder; and Sir Archibald will, I imagine, push on as rapidly as he can to Maloon, or even to Sembewgow, in order to prevent the enemy from re-assembling in force at those places. Should he even find both abandoned, he will probably be obliged to halt a short time in order to let his supplies overtake him; for I suspect that his ardour has made him outrun them.

In the beginning of last month he had reason to expect that Colonel Morrison's force in Arracan would reach Sembewgow, on the Irawaddy, about the middle of the present month; but this

hope must now be at an end, because the Arracan force has been destroyed as an army by sickness much more fatal than that experienced at Rangoon the preceding year. The loss of a powerful diversion from Arracan will not however, I think, hinder the Rangoon army from reaching Ummarapooa in the course of the present campaign, unless the enemy show more resolution and more skill in harassing us than they have ever yet done. There are two ways by which our advance to the capital might be rendered impracticable: one is by the enemy not fighting us in front, but sending numerous detachments from their army to act on our flanks and rear; and the other is by the people of the country becoming hostile and intercepting our supplies. As far as I can judge, from all the past conduct of the enemy, I think that we have nothing to fear from detachments from their army acting in our rear, because these detachments never seem to trust themselves at any great distance from the main army, never to come forward without it, and never to remain long behind when it retreats. A rising of the people is what is most to be apprehended, as it would involve us in very serious danger. Among most nations, the knowledge that they were to be restored to their former conquerors would produce a hostile feeling, which would raise them against their new masters; but among the Peguers, I rather think that this will not be the case, because the mass of the people are too unwarlike, and because they do not seem to have a local militia, so common in India. It must be owned, however, that our avowed intention of giving up Pegue to Ava furnishes that power with the best means of exciting the Peguers against us, and which, though it may have little effect while we are successful, might be very dangerous if we met with any reverse. It is not unlikely that another armistice will be immediately requested by the Burmans; but, as it may be merely with the view of gaining time and wasting the fair season, I scarcely believe that Sir A. Campbell can with prudence accede to it, until he reaches the capital or its neighbourhood. I should then hope, though not very confidently, that we may have peace. We shall then, at any rate, have possession of the most fertile part of the empire, and be able, by collecting the revenue, to reimburse ourselves for a portion of the expenses of the war. The deplorable state of what was the Arracan army compels us to give what farther aid we can possibly spare, with safety to ourselves, to the army in Ava. We are sending to Rangoon one or two additional regiments of sepöys, and we are preparing to relieve all the weak corps of sepöys now in Ava, by fresh and

complete ones from hence. I have left India as naked of troops as it can safely be ; and if I have committed any error, it is rather in having sent away too many than too few. But I have not acted without fully considering the state of the country, and all the chances of disturbance ; and as I find that we must either weaken ourselves a little more than is prudent, or expose the army in Ava to failure from the want of reinforcements, I have not hesitated to support Sir A. Campbell to the utmost extent of our power. Any evil which might arise in this country from the want of troops in one quarter, may be repaired by drawing them from another ; but the want of troops in Ava would be fatal to the success of the campaign.

I am, with great esteem and respect, dear Sir,

Your faithful and obedient servant,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Madras, 16th April, 1826.

MY DEAR DUKE,

I DID not think of troubling you with another letter ; but as we have at last made peace with the Burmans, I think I may as well give you a few lines, by way of finishing the war. I mentioned in my last what kind of troops the Burman armies were composed of, so that it is not necessary to say any thing more of them, except that they did not improve in the progress of the war. We are well out of this war. There have been so many projects since it commenced, that I scarcely expected ever to see any one plan pursued consistently. There has been no want of energy or decision at any time in attacking the enemy ; but there has certainly been a great want of many of the arrangements and combinations by which the movements of an army are facilitated, and its success rendered more certain. There were, no doubt, great difficulties ; every thing was new ; the country was difficult, and the climate was destructive ; but still, more enterprise in exploring the routes and passes on some occasions, and more foresight in others in ascertaining in time the means of conveyance and subsistence, and what was practicable, and what was not, would have saved much time. We are chiefly indebted for peace to Lord Amherst's judgment and firmness in persevering in offensive operations, in spite of all arguments in favour of a defensive war, founded upon idle alarms about the power of the Burmans, and the danger of advancing to so great a distance as

lieutenant-colonels. Boles, R. Scott, and Deacon are going home. McDowell will be the only colonel in the country. After him comes Welch, a very brave and respectable officer; and then ——— and ———, both at present, for the sins of the Company and a judgment upon the Madras army, in temporary command of divisions. G. Scott and Forbes, or any respectable officers who want divisions, should be sent out.

Nothing can equal the absurdity and wrong-headedness of ———, and his advisers the prize-agents. When I saw Cadell, after the arrival in this country of the first communications between ——— and the trustees, I told him ——— was mad, and would do nothing but mischief, and advised him to withdraw from the alliance. What could the man want with lawyers? We had got in the Duke of Wellington the best trustees that could have been found in the kingdom; and if lawyers were wanted, he had the aid of those of the Crown. As the Court of Directors will now send my successor to Madras, I hope that you will be appointed without opposition. I do not understand the politics of the matter; but it appears strange to me that there ever should have been any question on the subject of the candidates. I do not know that you will now, after the lapse of so much time, wish to come; but I trust you will, for you are yet younger than I was when I came out last. I hear that you are going into Parliament. This would be very well if you had nothing else to look to; but it is almost too late to begin a new trade and serve a new apprenticeship. You would be much more at home, and could do much more good at Madras than in the House of Commons. I do not know whether your health be an insuperable obstacle; but if it is not, there is no way in which you could, so honourably to yourself, and so usefully to the nation, close your career as in the government of Madras. Nothing will give me greater pleasure, than to leave you in this country preparing materials for a new edition of your Political History.

Yours ever,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO DAVID HALIBURTON, ESQ.

Camp near Combaconum, 3rd August, 1826.

MY DEAR SIR,

I RECEIVED, some time before leaving Madras, your letter of the 19th February, by your friend Mr. Findlay Anderson. He appears to be a smart lad, and I hope will in time make a

EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH DELIVERED BY SIR THOMAS MUNRO,
AT A PUBLIC MEETING 26TH OF APRIL, 1826.

"We must all deeply lament the melancholy cause of our being now assembled here. My own acquaintance with our late excellent Bishop was unfortunately but of short duration, yet in that short time I saw in him so much to admire, that I can hardly trust myself to speak of him as I could wish. There was a charm in his conversation by which in private society he found his way to all hearts, as readily as he did to those of his congregation by his eloquence in the pulpit. There was about him such candour and simplicity of manner, such benevolence, such unwearied earnestness in the discharge of his sacred functions, and such mildness in his zeal, as would in any other individual have ensured our esteem; but when these qualities are, as they were in him, united to taste, to genius, to high station, and to still higher intellectual attainments, they form a character, such as his was, eminently calculated to excite our love and veneration.

"These sentiments towards him were everywhere felt. Wherever he passed in the wide range of his visitation, he left behind him the same impression. He left all who approached him convinced that they never had before seen so rarely gifted a person, and that they could never hope to see such a one again. The loss of such a man, so suddenly cut off in the midst of his useful career, is a public calamity, and ought to be followed by an expression of the public feeling."

Before concluding the detail of Sir Thomas Munro's meritorious services during this season of war and famine, it is necessary to state, that clouds no sooner began to gather in the political horizon, than he repented of a step which had been taken under widely different circumstances. Eager as he was to return home, a sense of duty prompted him not to abandon his post now that dangers and difficulties beset it; and he at once volunteered, in the event of no successor being nominated, to continue at the head of the Madras Government. As may be imagined, no offer could have come more opportunely, or been more readily embraced, as the following official document will show:—

EXTRACT FROM A PUBLIC LETTER TO FORT ST. GEORGE.

Dated 10th December, 1827.

2. Our Chairman has acquainted us that he has received from the Governor of Fort St. George two communications, under dates the 3rd March and 19th July last, in both of which Sir Thomas Munro states the reasons which would have induced him to have withheld the intimation of his wish to be relieved from the office of Governor of Madras, made known to us in his address of September 1823, and expresses his intention to remain till the arrival of his successor. The Right Honourable the President of the Board of Commissioners has likewise made known to our Chairman a letter to the same effect which he received from your President under date the 8th July last.

3. We have derived the most sincere satisfaction from the foregoing communications. We consider Sir Thomas Munro to have evinced the same high public spirit and ardent zeal to promote the interests committed to his charge on the present, as on all past occasions, throughout his long and honourable course of public service. As no arrangement has yet been made for the appointment of a successor to the Governor of Madras, we are happy to signify to you our unanimous desire to avail ourselves of an extension of Sir Thomas Munro's services in that high station, at a period when his distinguished talents and peculiar qualifications cannot fail of being eminently beneficial to the country under your government, as well as to our interest; and we have accordingly unanimously resolved to abstain from nominating any successor to Sir Thomas Munro, until we shall have received from you an acknowledgment of this communication, and an intimation of his wishes in consequence.

4. With the view of making known to the service and public in general the sentiments which we entertain regarding Sir Thomas Munro, we direct that this dispatch be published in the Government Gazette.

I cannot better close this chapter than by the insertion of the following official correspondence between the Governments of Bengal and Fort St. George. Many other testimonials to the merits of Sir Thomas Munro's services are contained in the private letters of Lord Amherst; but enough

On the 24th of November, 1826, shortly after the conclusion of the Burmese war, the Court of Directors passed the following resolution, with reference to the part taken in it by Sir Thomas Munro, which was confirmed by the Court of Proprietors on the 13th and 19th of December following:—

Resolved unanimously—That the thanks of this Court be given to Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, Bart. K.C.B. for the alacrity, zeal, perseverance, and forecast which he so signally manifested throughout the whole course of the late war, in contributing all the available resources of the Madras Government towards bringing it to a successful termination.

A vote of thanks was also passed, on the same occasion, in favour of Lord Amherst and Sir Archibald Campbell; but neither the vote to that nobleman nor to Sir Thomas Munro were echoed in Parliament, though my Lord Goderich, in the House of Lords, declared “that it was impossible for any one to form an adequate idea of the efforts made by Sir Thomas Munro, at the head of the Madras Government.”

CHAPTER V.

Private Proceedings.—Illness of his Son.—Departure of Lady Munro for England.—Letters to Lady Munro.

WHILE these great transactions were passing, a variety of events befell, calculated, some of them to gratify, others not a little to harass, the private feelings of Sir Thomas Munro. Among the gratifying occurrences may be enumerated his elevation to the dignity of a Baronet of Great Britain, an honour which, like all the rest, came upon him unsolicited, but which was conferred as a mark of His Majesty's gracious consideration of his distinguished exertions in the conduct of the Burmese war. This event took place in June 1825, and was, as may be supposed, valued as it deserved; but it may be questioned whether, to a man of Sir Thomas's high and honourable sentiments, another project, then in contemplation, caused not at least equally pleasurable sensations. It is now well known, and need not therefore be denied, that when the Burmese war began to assume a serious appearance, great dissatisfaction was experienced and expressed at home, touching the conduct of the Governor-General. By some, his Lordship was accused of entertaining ambitious designs, to the accomplishment of which the interests of the Company were about to be sacrificed; whilst others laid to his charge a total absence of such qualities as are essential in the head of every government. However groundless these accusations might be, affairs certainly came at one period to an extremity, and serious thoughts were said to be entertained of recalling him.

In this emergency, it was suggested that no fitter person could be nominated to succeed to the Supreme Government

than Sir Thomas Munro. How far arrangements were actually entered into with that view, I am not enabled to state; but that there was a considerable disposition to bring the matter about, is rendered indisputable from the tone of the following letters. They were addressed to a friend in the India House, from whom Sir Thomas had received intimation of the designs then in agitation; and they are given, not less as explanatory of the writer's opinions and wishes, than because they contain a full and manly vindication of Lord Amherst's public character.

FROM SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO ———.

16th July, 1826.

As to my going to the City of Palaces, it is now too late; but had I gone, I should have had no fear of envy and jealousy; nobody could have thwarted me; I should have taken care of that. I think, however, that the present Governor-General is as good as any other that you are likely to send, and that great injustice is done to him in the idle clamour which has been raised against him. His situation was a very arduous one. He was new to India; the Burmans were an enemy entirely unknown to us; we were ignorant of their military force—of their mode of warfare—of their resources, and of the face of their country. Lord Amherst, in his first ideas of the plan of operations, was probably guided by Captain Canning, and the men who were best acquainted with Ava. When he found that the project of sailing at once up the Irawaddy to Prome or Uramarapoora could not be effected, and that other measures must be adopted, he no doubt, in his new plans of military operations, consulted the best military authorities in Bengal, and followed their opinions. I do not see that any other Governor-General, in similar circumstances, could have done more; and ever since he has been fairly embarked in the war, he has taken the best means of bringing it to a successful close, by never relaxing in his exertions to keep the forces in Ava efficient. Some of the military arrangements are not exactly what I approve of;—but what of that? No two men ever agree on such points. There is, I think, one error by which the Bengal plans are all too much influenced; namely, a most exaggerated estimate both of the numbers and prowess of the Burmans, and indeed of all other enemies. This has led to the dis-

Lord Amherst has taken Bhurtpoor, and humbled Golden Foot, I do not see what use either you or I can be of any longer in this country. If I am lucky, I may sail sooner than you think, and see you in June or July next year. I wish to make a long tour this year, if nothing extraordinary occurs to detain me here. I want to examine the state of affairs in the Southern Provinces.

* * * * *

TO THE SAME.

Guindy, 11th June, 1836.

* * * * *

I HAVE been reading and writing very hard all day, which always for the last year makes my hand shake so much, that I can hardly write. This is a sign that I have been long enough in a warm climate. The weather at this season has been cooler than ever I knew it at Madras. It has been continually overcast all last week, which induced me to come out here yesterday evening, after the usual Saturday's dinner. I took a walk in the morning of an hour and a half, and ended with the garden, where every thing is growing in great luxuriance. After getting out of the carriage yesterday evening, I looked at the new well, and found it had water enough to hold out till it got a fresh supply from the rains; but I did not find you or Kamen there, or in the drawing-room. I always miss you both here more than at Madras, because we had fewer visitors, and I was more accustomed to see you and him quietly. Your rooms look very desolate; they are empty all day, and in the evening have one solitary lamp. I now go along the passage without seeing a human being, and often think of him running out to pull my coat. I cannot tell you how much I long to see him playing again. I believe that I shall follow your father's example when I go home, in playing with children. When you reach Craigie, give me a full account of Tom, and of all the points in which he is like or unlike his brother. I have no letter from you since the 24th of March; and I begin to fear that I shall not hear from you until your arrival in England.

The troops are returning from Ava. Major Kelso arrived a few days ago in command of the Kimendyne regiment. There is no chance of hostilities, as the Burmese are completely tired of war. I am glad of it, as I can have no pretence for staying longer in the country; and if the weather were not too hot for calling names, I could call them "*barbarous, and ferocious, and*

arrogant," for not letting me go home with you. I am quite at a loss to know what I am to do when I go home. Where are we to live? In town or country? or both? Are we to travel and see the world and sights, or to jaunt about in our own country, or to stay fixed in one place? You must consider of all this, and be ready with a plan when we meet. Love to all at Craigmie.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 29th June, 1826.

As I understand that a ship for England has left Calcutta, and is to touch here, I shall begin a letter to you; because by this means I shall be ready at any time to send you one, whether it contains four lines or four pages. The *Chinamen*, and other ships lately arrived, have brought several letters for you from your friends. I shall send them all back to you, because you will, I think, be sorry to lose some of them, and will like to read them all, if it were only for the sake of comparing the feelings with which you read them at home and would have read them in India. I read them with pleasure; but would much rather have sat down in Mr. Elliot's chair and listened to you reading them, after returning from our evening ride or walk. I shall keep a letter from Tom to you, as it is on the same sheet with one from him to me, both in his own hand-writing. He is the only one of the family whom I now see. I go into the room where his picture is every day for two minutes, on my way to the dining-room, or rather verandah. I think him more like Kamen than I used to do; and sometimes almost fancy that he looks happier since you went away. I am not sure, however, that there is any change. It is likely enough that, even when you were here, he looked as well pleased as now, but that I did not observe it.

7th July.—I went to Guindy on Saturday evening, and shall probably not go there again before November, as I must set out on the 21st on a long journey to the Southern Provinces. I took as usual a long walk on Sunday morning: there had been so much rain, that the garden looked more fresh and beautiful than I ever saw it; but I found nobody there, except a boy guarding the mangoes and figs from the squirrels—not even the old French gardener. It was a great change from the time when I was always sure of finding you and Kamen there. It is melancholy to think that you are never again to be in a place in which you took so much pleasure. This idea comes across me still more strongly when I enter the house and pass from my own

prouch, and stayed three days with us at Cootallum, where we left him this morning. He has been so ill that the doctors despaired of him; but his six months' visit to the Nilgheries has almost restored him: he is thin and weak, but in good spirits, and desires to be remembered to you. If he does not recover his strength, he means to go home in January. He will be a great loss to the service, both as a political and a military officer.

We marched sixteen miles this morning, on our way to Dindigal. We do not return to Madara, but leave it about fifteen miles to the eastward, as we mean to take the road which runs near the foot of the great range of hills.

You have not, I hope, forgotten Dr. Jones, whom you saw at Dindigal. I wish you were there now; but you are better at home with your sons, among your friends.

TO THE SAME.

Dindigal, 16th September, 1826.

Nothing has given me so much pleasure as your letter and journal from St. Helena. I can think of nothing else since I got them; they have removed all my apprehensions about you and Campbell. From the state in which he left this, I was almost afraid to hear of him from St. Helena, and was glad that Captain Watson's note mentioned that you and he were well before I began to read my letter. Now that he has got so near home, and he would only be a few weeks longer in a tropical climate, I am in great hopes that he will have no return of his complaint. Poor child! It is a very hard thing to have such a complaint impending over him, to be obliged to keep him on low diet, and to be afraid to see him looking strong and healthy. I hope, however, that after he has been a short time in Scotland, and had the benefit of its cool climate, he may, without danger, be treated as other children. I like to hear of all his little sayings and doings on board ship,—of his making acquaintance with the passengers and the sailors, and of his attachment to his old friends, Rosa and Abdul Cawder; and I hope you will continue your narrative of all these interesting things in your voyage from St. Helena to England. I never doubted that you would feel for Buonaparte in his wonderful reverse of fortune. I should have been surprised if you had not; for no person, I think, of proper feeling, can approach the black solitary rock of St. Helena, without being moved at his fate.

24th September.—We arrived at the bottom of the Nilgheri hills this morning. Our tents, or rather Sullivan's, are pitched about a mile from the hills; and the tent in which I am now writing is one of the two sitting tents which sheltered you and me, after many a hot march, when you were first in India. The scenery here is very grand; but you can form a much better idea of it than I can give you, by recollecting what you saw at Guejhatty. We begin to ascend to-morrow, under the guidance of Sullivan, who met us at Darraporum. It will take about five hours to reach Kotagbery, where we are to be accommodated by Colonel Cubbon and Captain Fyfe. We remain with them the following day. On the 27th we proceed to Cotukamund, where Sullivan lives, and stay with him till the morning of the 30th, when, having seen all the waters of these upper regions, rising at one place as high as eight thousand nine hundred feet above the sea, we shall, with the help of horses and palankins, make a run of forty miles to Goondlapet in Mysore, where we shall find our tents, which went off yesterday by Guejhatty. On the 1st of October we shall march about twenty-four miles to Sharn Rajpet, near Ardenhilli, where the tents we left this morning will be waiting for us. You know the rest of the road by Collegal and the Happy Valley, and Sattigal, and the Falls of the Cavery to Bangalore, which I shall be delighted to see again, and which I shall leave with a heavy heart.

29th September, Whotakamund.—Our party reached Captain Fyfe's house, at Kotagbery, on the 25th, after a very tiresome ascent and descent of five hours. The house is that which was occupied by Colonel Newal, and which you, I believe, once thought of taking. We found Mrs. F. and her children much improved in their looks and health. We felt the cold much more than I expected. We took a walk of three hours after breakfast; but several of the party, as well as myself, were more sun-burnt than ever we had before been in India. We have walked a great deal, both in the forenoon and in the evening, ever since we came up to the hills. The country round Kotagbery is about six thousand feet above the sea; it differs from every thing you have seen. It has no level ground, but is composed of an assemblage of hills green to the summit, with narrow winding valleys between. The sides of the hills are at present covered with a purple flower, of the size of your Bangalore geraniums, which makes them look as if they were covered with heath. A few hamlets, inhabited by the Bangers, an agricultural race, are scattered on the face of

the hills; for they never live either at the bottom or on the summit. The cultivated fields, running up the face of some of the hills to the very top, have a beautiful effect; but the cultivation is thinly spread, and probably does not cover one-tenth of the ground.

We set out for this place on the 27th at daylight. The distance is about fifteen miles. The ride was, beyond all comparison, the most romantic I ever made. We were never on a level surface, but constantly ascending or descending, winding round hills, and stopping every now and then for a few minutes to rest our horses, who thought it hard work, and to admire the ever-varying scene. Before reaching Sullivan's house, we came upon the highest ridge of the Nilgheri, rising in general above eight thousand feet, and many of the peaks from eight thousand three hundred to eight thousand eight hundred feet, which is the elevation of Dodubet, the highest of them all. We dismounted on the top of the ridge, and ascended a hill about three hundred feet above it, from whence we had a view so grand and magnificent, that I shall always regret your not having seen it. We saw over all Coimbatore, a great part of Mysore and Wynand, and the hills of Malabar. But the district of Whotakamund, every spot of which lay below us like a map, surprised me most: it at once reminded me of Bullim. It is Bullim, but Bullim on a grand scale. The face of the country is covered with the finest verdure, and is undulated in every form. It is composed of numberless green knolls of every shape and size, from an artificial mound to a hill or mountain. They are as smooth as the lawns in an English park, and there is hardly one of them which has not, on one side or other, a mass of dark wood, terminating suddenly as if it had been planted, just in the same way as you must remember to have seen in Bullim. In comparing the two countries, I should say that this was much the grandest, but that Bullim was perhaps the more beautiful; for it is better wooded, and has fine cultivated fields, of which Whotakamund is destitute, as it is inhabited solely by the Todars, a pastoral tribe. But when I look at the fine rich verdure with which this country is everywhere covered, and at the beautiful form of its hills, I begin to think that even in beauty it is superior to Bullim. You must not suppose, that what are called ridges and peaks are rocks. There is hardly a stone to be seen upon them. They are round and smooth, and clothed with firm grass. You may ride over every one of them, even Dodubet himself: they differ from artificial

went from this fall to the northern one, which, as the river was more than half-full, appeared to much more advantage than when we visited it ten years ago. Close to the Fakcer's retreat at this fall, our breakfast-tent was pitched. After breakfast we returned to Sattigall, and crossed the Cavery there to our encampment. Our march was very fatiguing; it amounted altogether to about thirty miles. We were obliged to make it so long, lest the Cavery should rise and become too rapid for our basket boats. In passing Colligal, I looked towards the Happy Valley, where the villagers cropped the spreading branches from so many fine trees, lest you should run your head against them. We came to Bangalore by the Rankanhilli road; we encamped about five miles from the cantonment, on the 9th, and came in in the evening. I found Colonel Scot, as usual, looking for us; but neither you nor Campbell standing on the steps to receive us.

We leave this on the 13th: we go to Oscottah, and by regular stages by Pednaig Darsum. I am sorry we are too late to take the Baramahl road. There has been more rain here than for many years, which has made the country green and beautiful. It still rains heavy every night, which makes the garden a little wet in the morning, but makes every thing in it grow rapidly. Though I have no great enjoyment in so short a visit, I count every hour which brings me nearer the time when I must take a final leave of this place, and grieve that they pass so fast.

* * * * *

TO THE SAME.

Golnoly, 17th January, 1827.

* * * * *

THE arrival of your letters has made me quite unsettled for some days, but they have been a wonderful relief to me, as I began (from the length of the voyage) to fear at times that you had been obliged to go into some place for water, or that some accident had happened to the ship. But all these alarms are now over; and I hope that, by the end of the year, we shall meet again, and never again have the sea between us. I could almost stay here for the pleasure of getting your letters, and reading how you were employed on certain days, and what Campbell was doing and saying. Nothing can be so interesting as all his little ways, and to see him reconciling himself to the ship, and learning new things every day. But it is a strange and melancholy feeling to see India, the land in which he was born, and all past

events, gradually fading from his memory. It is wonderful to see how they are sometimes brought back to his memory by slight incidents; as when, upon your telling him that the day was Friday, he said, "Council-day." I dare say he thought that the Council-house was not far off, and that I might have come to the ship in the evening, as at Guindy.

TO THE SAME.

February, 1827.

It is above two years now since I had the first attack of increased deafness. During the first year, it was so much better occasionally, that I was in great hopes it would have left me; but for the whole of last year it has been so uniformly the same, that it will probably never be better. I hear nothing that is said in company: it is with difficulty that I can hear the person who sits next to me, and then only by holding up my hand to my ear. It is fatiguing to people to raise their voices high enough to talk to me, and still more to me to listen to them; but still this does not affect my spirits in the least. I have plenty of business on my hands, and much of it consists in reading papers, writing notes, and giving orders, which do not require much hearing. When sitting in company, I amuse myself with thinking of any thing else. The loss of my conversation is not felt, and my silence is perhaps attributed to disguised gravity, or profound thought on state affairs, when the subject of my meditations is very likely Campbell riding on a stick, or one of your lectures on my temperance, which you so often prophesied would ruin my health. It is a great pleasure to think I shall see you before this year is at an end: it will be a year, next month, since you left this.

TO THE SAME.

Guindy, 11th April, 1827.

It is difficult to part with a country where we have lived long, and become attached to the people, without a heavy heart at thinking that we shall never again see it, or any of its inhabitants. I wish however that the time for my departure was come, for, as I am to go, it is tiresome to be waiting for the day.

I went to Madras on Monday, the 9th. You will wonder what took me there on that day:—it was to see the *Enterprise* steam-vessel manœuvre for the gratification of the public. She got up her anchor, and sailed past the Government-house a little after

CHAPTER VI.

Tour to the Ceded Districts.—Illness, Death, and Character.

REPEATED mention has been made, in the preceding chapters, of the anxiety experienced by Sir T. Munro to return to England; and the letters just given contain ample testimony that this desire gained, as it was natural that it should, increased force every day. It was not, however, till the Burmese war came to a close, that he considered himself justified in again bringing the subject before the notice of the Court of Directors. But intelligence of that event no sooner reached him, than he hastened to take advantage of it. On the 28th of May, 1824, the very day when the signing of the definitive treaty was communicated to the Madras Government, he dispatched not fewer than six copies of a letter, in which his extreme impatience to resign office was stated, and an urgent request made that a successor might be sent out as early in the following year as circumstances would permit. Whence it came about, I pretend not to possess the means of explaining, but not one of these dispatches was laid before the Court earlier than the 6th day of the following September; and though a successor had already been fixed upon, in the person of the Right Honourable S. Lushington, the 4th of April, 1827, arrived, ere he was formally appointed. To sum up all, Mr. Lushington remained in England till the month of July in the same year, thus rendering it barely possible for himself to reach Madras, and quite impossible for Sir Thomas Munro to quit it, previous to the commencement of the Monsoons.

Far be it from me to insinuate any thing harsh as to the intentions of the authorities at home; but no man, I conceive, can be aware of these plain facts, without arriving at

ensured him distinction in any line of employment. These qualities were admirably adapted to the duties which he had to perform in organizing the resources, and establishing the tranquillity of those provinces where his latest breath has been drawn, and where he had long been known by the appellation of *Father of the People*. In the higher stations, civil and military, which he afterwards filled, the energies of his character never failed to rise superior to the exigencies of public duty. He had been for seven years at the head of the Government under which he first served as a Cadet, and afterwards became the ablest of its revenue officers, and acquired the highest distinction as a Military Commander. He had raised its character and fame to a higher pitch than it ever enjoyed before. His own ambition was more than fulfilled; and he appeared to be about to reap, in honourable retirement, the well-earned rewards of his services and his virtues, when these have received the last stamp of value from the hand of death.

Though sensible how feeble and imperfect must be any hasty tribute to Sir Thomas Munro's merits, yet the Government cannot allow the event which they deplore, to be announced to the public without some expression of their sentiments.

The flag of Fort St. George will be immediately hoisted half-staff high, and continue so till sunset.

Minute-guns, sixty-five in number, corresponding with the age of the deceased, will be fired from the ramparts of Fort St. George.

Similar marks of respect will be paid to the memory of Sir Thomas Munro, at all the principal military stations and posts dependent on this Presidency.

By order of Government,

D. HILL, Chief Secretary.

Fort St. George, 30th July, 1827.

The publication of the preceding order was followed by the calling together of a meeting of the inhabitants of Madras, which was held, according to advertisement, on the 21st of July. Of the general proceedings of that day it is unnecessary to give any detailed account; but the following resolution proposed by Sir John Doveton, and unanimously adopted by the large assemblage of persons present, deserves insertion.

Resolved,—That this meeting largely participates in the affliction of all classes of the community, Native as well as European, at the calamity which has occurred in the death of our late revered Governor, Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, Baronet, K.C.B., in the province where he had long been known by the appellation of *Father of the People*, and at a time when he was on the eve of returning to his native country, after a public career, extending to upwards of forty-seven years, and growing in success and honour up to its close:

That this meeting, many of whom were members of the same profession, many fellow-labourers in the same field, and all eye-witnesses of his conduct, take pride in the fame which this most honoured servant of the East India Company first acquired in duties and scenes that are familiar to them, and which, during the last seven years, he consummated by the most eminent and approved public services, at the head of the Government of this Presidency:

That his justice, benevolence, frankness, and hospitality, were no less conspicuous than the extraordinary faculties of mind with which he was endowed, and the admirable purposes to which he constantly applied them; and that he commanded, in a singular degree, the veneration of all persons by whom he was known:

That to perpetuate the remembrance of his public and private virtues, a subscription be immediately opened for the purpose of erecting a statue to his memory:

That a Committee be requested to undertake the management of the business, and to adopt such measures as shall appear to them best calculated to give speedy effect to the foregoing resolution.

As soon as the above resolution became known in the several provinces subject to the Madras rule, subscriptions were eagerly offered by all classes of the inhabitants; and a sum was raised in an incredibly short space of time, great beyond all precedent. Out of this the Committee appropriated eight thousand pounds for the purpose of procuring an equestrian statue of the lamented Governor; and seven gentlemen* in England, friends and admirers of the deceased, were solicited to take upon themselves the charge of seeing

* Colonel Blackburne, Colonel Cunningham, Colonel Wilks, Colonel R. Scott, C.B., John G. Ravenshaw, and Alexander Reed, Esq.

the 10th of July, the 17th of September arrived ere Mr. Robertson was enabled to make his report upon the subject. In doing so, he regrets the delay that had occurred and adds—

“In a matter so interesting to the Native community, I did not like to write till I had heard from all the talooks, but which I could not accomplish sooner, in consequence of the prevalence of that fatal disease, the cholera, having for a time deterred the inhabitants from meeting together.”

He then says—

“The veneration with which the character of Sir Thomas Munro was regarded by the people of the Ceded Districts, being so perfectly known to the Government, it would be idle on my part to describe the affliction they felt at the misfortune of his death; I shall therefore proceed at once to state the propositions *they* have suggested to do honour to his memory.

First—“That a choultry of sufficient dimensions to accommodate Native travellers, and merchants of all castes, be erected at Gooty by a *voluntary* subscription, as a permanent memorial of the unanimous feelings of the Native inhabitants of the district, on the death of their venerated benefactor.

Secondly—“That an extensive top of mango and other fruit-trees (besides a well with steps) be planted at Putteescondah, at the spot where their venerated benefactor breathed his last.

Thirdly—“That should the funds raised by subscription be more than enough for the above purposes, the surplus shall be appropriated to the erection of Native choultries elsewhere, or of other useful works of public convenience.

Fourthly—“That the Honourable the Governor in Council be respectfully solicited to endow the charity choultry with sufficient funds for its support.

Fifthly—“That the tomb which it is intended by Government to erect over the remains of the illustrious deceased, and the charity choultry at Gooty, be placed in charge of one and the same establishment, for the purpose of ensuring the preservation of both.”

Mr. Robertson then adds, in support of the proposition of the Natives to erect the choultry at Gooty, “that it would prove eminently useful; and that in Native estimation, a better monument could not be devised to preserve the memory of the great, the good, the just Sir Thomas Munro.”

With respect to the amount of subscription to be calculated upon, he estimates that at thirty thousand rupees; whilst the cost, to be defrayed by Government, of providing food for travellers and their servants, will not, he presumes, exceed the moderate sum of sixteen hundred. After taking these propositions into consideration, the Government resolved—

“That a proper and substantial stone monument be erected at Gooty, over the remains of the late Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, Bart. and K.C.B. :

“That ten caconies of land be allotted for planting trees and sinking wells at the public expense, round the spot at Puttecondah, where Sir Thomas Munro died :

“That a choultry and tank be built at Gooty for the accommodation of travellers, to be called ‘The Munro choultry and tank,’ suited in extent to the population of the place, and to the nature of the thoroughfare :

“That an establishment of servants be maintained for the preservation of the tank and choultry, and for providing travellers with water,—all at the public expense.”

The proposition of the collector to convert the choultry into a charitable establishment was however rejected, upon the ground that it would be difficult to restrict the expenses, and that it might otherwise lead to abuses; whilst the offer of the Native inhabitants to erect the choultry by subscription was also declined, for reasons which deserve to be given in the words of the Acting Governor himself.

“The benevolent, the disinterested, the unostentatious, and modest nature of Sir Thomas Munro,” says Mr. Grieme, “made him avoid any personal gratification at the expense of others, and it should be the object of this Government to protect his memory from any evil, direct or remote, which the too eager enthusiasm of his admirers might produce. In this view, it appears to me objectionable that the choultry at Gooty should be erected by the subscriptions of Natives. If it were confined to the most opulent among them, it would be of little consequence,—they can afford it, and they can judge for themselves, and they may be supposed to be acting voluntarily when they contribute; but it

is to be apprehended, that contributions may be exacted, by undue influence or control, from many by whom they would be felt as an inconvenience, and thus to the irreparable calamity of the loss of a great benefactor would be added the hardship of an extra assessment.

"The inhabitants of the Ceded Districts should not only be declared relieved of the expense of building it, but the collector should be enjoined not to permit the levy of contributions for this purpose; they should derive every benefit, but be spared every inconvenience from erecting monuments which are to do honour to Sir Thomas Munro. There should be no feeling arising from it but what is unequivocally pleasurable."

Instead of the distribution of alms, however, Mr. Græme proposed,—“That a building, to be designated the Munro College, should be erected not far from the choultry, in which should be maintained six professors, for the gratuitous instruction of a certain number of youths of the Ceded Districts, in the English, Sanscrit, Mahratta, Persian, Hindostanee, Telooگو, and Canarese languages. Such an institution,” he observes, “will secure a perpetual association of Sir Thomas Munro’s name and character, with the system of education of the Natives of this Presidency, which was introduced by him; whilst the annual expense of the institution, falling short of three hundred and fifty pounds, could not possibly be felt as a burthen upon the Company’s treasury.”

Judicious as this proposition was, it received the decided opposition of the Commander-in-chief, on the ground that it would occasion an unnecessary drain upon the Company’s finances. “It cannot be supposed,” continued he, “that the Court of Directors, who did not feel it necessary to grant even a tomb to their old and faithful servant, the late Sir Alexander Campbell,* who expired in their service, however favourably they may regard the memory of the late Governor, should approve of an expense so disproportionate to its object,—an expense not even attached to the memory of our sovereigns.”

* Formerly Commander-in-Chief.

more able or devoted functionary. He lived but to promote the public good ; whilst, in a thorough knowledge of the manners, customs, institutions, wants, and wishes of the Natives—in his endeavours to obtain their confidence—in the success which attended those endeavours—and in just conceptions of the measures best calculated to contribute to their welfare, few men have ever equalled—fewer still have ever surpassed him.

Though possessing, and not unaware that he possessed, all these great and shining qualities, there was about Sir Thomas Munro a degree of modesty such as rarely attaches to men in public life. So far from obtruding his own claims on the notice of his employers, it required something like positive exertion on their part to drag into light not a few of his meritorious actions ; whilst more than one instance might be recorded in which praise and honours were bestowed upon individuals who merely carried into effect his suggestions. It has been already stated, that if there was one disposition which, more than another, Sir Thomas Munro held in sovereign contempt, it was that of exaggerating the value of particular services for the sake of obtaining distinctions ; and he rarely concealed his disgust as often as he saw the Government of a country prostitute its choicest prerogative by the promotion of persons undeserving of its notice ; yet no man could more justly appreciate unsought honours than he. He regarded them as the just recompense of industry and talent ; and he conceived that every government was as much bound to seek out and reward its meritorious servants, as the servants of the government were bound conscientiously to discharge their duty.

Of the literary habits of this remarkable man, so much notice has already been taken, that it appears scarcely necessary to advert to them here. There was no subject within the range of philosophy or science, no question connected with poetry or the belles lettres, in which he failed to take an interest, and which he was not prepared to discuss ; whilst the

facility with which he could pass from one to another was scarcely less surprising than the degree of correct knowledge which he possessed upon all. For metaphysics alone he appears to have encouraged no taste; inasmuch as he looked upon the different systems to be equally founded in conjecture, and equally ending in doubt; but he was a profound mathematician, an able chemist, a judicious speculator in political economy, and a keen and successful student both of moral and natural philosophy. His acquaintance with the European languages, moreover, ancient as well as modern, was very extensive; whilst of those in use throughout the East, there were, comparatively speaking, few of which he knew not something. Persian he wrote and spoke like a native; he was well versed in Arabic; Hindostanee was perfectly familiar to him; and in Mahratta, Canarese, and others of the vernacular tongues, he could maintain, with great exactness, either a correspondence or a conversation. Of his English style, the reader has by this time judged for himself; and I am mistaken if many professed authors will be found to be more completely masters of it.

Notwithstanding these numerous accomplishments, few governors of an Indian province have ever devoted their energies, as he devoted his, to the public service. There was no department of the state the chief proceedings of which he did not personally superintend and minutely watch: there was no important question brought forward, concerning which he failed to record his written opinion: and the quantity of records and other papers which he perused in consequence, would surpass belief, but for the notes, in his own hand-writing, which remain. From among these minutes and notes, many might be found, the publication of which would do honour to the Court of Directors, whilst the opportunity of studying them would confer a lasting benefit upon both the civil and military servants of the East India Company.

In the private character of Sir Thomas Munro, again, as

APPENDIX.

I.

THE FOLLOWING ARE A FEW OF THE MANY NOTICES ON RECORD, OF THE VALUE ATTACHED TO THE SERVICES OF MAJOR MUNRO AS A COLLECTOR.

THE Government of Fort St. George, under date the 9th October 1800, informed the Court of Directors that the Company's authority had been completely established in Canara and Soon-dah, by the activity and prudence of the Collector, Major Munro, whose "success had enabled him, at an early period, to pursue his inquiries into the resources, administration, and history of these districts;" and that the result of the researches of that able officer had been submitted to them, "in one of the ablest reports (dated 30th May 1800,) which had passed under their observation."* That Major Munro had traced the government of those countries, from the wise and liberal policy of the ancient Gentoo institutions, down to the tyrannical exactions of Hyder and Tippoo. That in the former, the Collector had discovered, from the existence of authentic records, the foundations of that simple form of government which it was then intended to reintroduce, (*viz.* the proprietary right of land under fixed assessments,) and, in the latter, had exhibited those destructive changes which had undermined the wealth and population of once flourishing districts. That the revenue settled by Major Munro, for the year 1209, amounted to Sr. Pags. 5,99775, being an increase of about 93 per cent. on the schedules produced by Tippoo Sultan in 1792.

* Printed in Appendix, No. 24, to Fifth Report of the Committee of the House of Commons on India affairs, page 803 to 814; and highly spoken of by the Committee.

in augmenting the present assessment, even should you entertain an opinion that it is disproportioned to the actual resources of the country, since we feel very much inclined to the opinions of the Revenue Board—"That the revenue will improve, not by increasing the assessment, but by inspiring confidence that it will be moderately fixed."

From Major Munro's report of the 9th November 1800, we observe, that the proprietary right in the lands of Canara had been derived from a very remote period, and the existing knowledge and estimation of the value of those rights among the descendants of the original proprietors, indicated the easy means of introducing a permanent system of revenue and judicature. We likewise observe, that previous to Hyder's conquest, the districts were divided into small estates, which were considered the actual property of the holders, and assessed at a fixed moderate rate. When we consider the attachment of the proprietors to the lands of their ancestors, we recommend to your most serious attention the observation contained in Major Munro's report of the 9th November 1800, respecting the impolicy and injustice of placing a number of small estates under the collection of one head-landlord, preparatory to the perpetual settlement. It were best to adhere, as nearly as possible, to the division which at present subsists; to conclude the settlement with the proprietors of small estates, and not to break in upon ancient boundaries or land-marks, lest any attempt at innovation may be productive of disquietude and disgust, especially as almost all the land in Canara is represented as private property, derived from gift, or purchase, or descent, too remote to be traced; where (according to Major Munro) "there are more title-deeds, and where the validity of those deeds have probably stood more trials than all the estates in England." Of such lands, however, as are denominated sirkar lands, you will make such a division as may appear to be most convenient.

*Extract from a Report of the Board of Revenue
at Fort St. George, 5th October 1806.*

THE annual Jummasbandy report, with its accompanying general comparative statements of the revenues of the Ceded Districts, for July 1215, which we had the honour to lay before your Lordship in Council, with our address, under date the 14th August last, will have afforded satisfactory evidence of

the improved resources of the province,—of the growing confidence of the inhabitants,—and of the unrelaxing energy and successful result of the administration of the principal collector.

114. We consider these remarks as applicable to the judicious and considerate regard which Lieutenant-Colonel Munro has uninterruptedly evinced in advancing the revenues of these districts, from the reduced condition in which he found them, to their present state of comparative prosperity, in proportion only to the capability of the people and the capacity of the country. This is one of the most delicate and difficult of the various important duties with which a collector is entrusted; and in the present case it has been performed in a manner highly creditable to the collector, and entirely satisfactory to us. Amidst the care and exertions necessary for conducting and upholding such extensive collections, the assiduity, ability, and success with which Lieutenant-Colonel Munro has prosecuted, and now nearly accomplished, the arduous duty of surveying and classifying the lands of so large a tract of territory, and assessing thereon a moderate and equitable money-rent, are equally entitled to public approbation. In his experience and intelligence we had the best earnest for the correctness of this important undertaking; but the punctual and complete manner in which the collections have for several years been made, is the most convincing proof of its accuracy and moderation.

Extract from a Report of the Board of Revenue
at Fort St. George, 5th October, 1806.

THESE countries, valued at a gross annual jumma of canterroi pagodas 19,18,758, or star pagodas, 16,51,465,* and, by a census made within these last two years, computed to contain 1,917,376 inhabitants, were, in the month of October 1800, confided to the executive management of Lieutenant-Colonel (then Major) Thomas Munro, who, with the aid of four subordinate collectors, acquitted himself of the trust with eminent ability and success, from the date above-mentioned until the month of October 1807.

The judicious policy, we remarked, could not be too highly applauded, by which Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, fixing in the first instance on a moderate scale of jumma, and increasing it

* Though the value at which they were ceded was 16,51,465 star pagodas, the first year's jumma amounted only to 10,06,543 star pagodas.

says Colonel Wilkes, " of stating an incident related to me by a respectable public servant of the government of Mysore, who was sent in 1807 to assist in the adjustment of a disputed boundary between that territory and the district in charge of the collector. A violent dispute occurred in his presence between some villagers; and the party aggrieved threatened to go to Anantpore, and complain to their *father*. He perceived that Colonel Munro was meant, and found upon inquiry that he was generally distinguished throughout the district by that appellation."

In 1808, after his return to England, Colonel Munro received the following letter, with a piece of plate of the value of five hundred pounds, which was presented to him by several civil servants who had been employed under him in Canara and the Ceded Districts. It was a silver-gilt vase of an Etruscan form, decorated with Oriental ornaments; and the plinth on which it stands is supported at each corner by elephants' heads.

10th February, 1808.

DEAR SIR,

WE have all had the happiness of serving under you, either in the Ceded Districts or Canara. We admire the generosity, the kindness, and the magnanimous equality of temper which, for eight years, we constantly experienced from you, amidst sickness, difficulties, and fatigue. As public servants, we can bear witness to the justice, moderation, and wisdom with which you have managed the important provinces under your authority. We know that the Ceded Districts hold your name in veneration, and feel the keenest regret at your departure. As for ourselves, we attribute our success in life, in a great measure, to you, and think, if we are good public servants, we have chiefly learnt to be so from your instruction and example. We are at a loss how to express our feelings; but we request your acceptance of a cup, which Mr. Cochrane, your former deputy in the Ceded Districts, will have the honour to present to you.

Inscription on the piece of plate.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Munro, by William Thackeray, G. J. Travers, H. S. Græme, Alexander Read, Peter Bruce, Frederick Gulagan, William Chaplin, and John Bird, as a mark of their respect and affection for his public and private virtues,

witnessed by them in the course of their service under him during his administration of the provinces of Canara and the Districts ceded to the East India Company by his Highness the Nizam.

The subject represented on this vase is copied from a drawing by Thomas Daniel, R.A. of a bas-relief of great antiquity sculptured in the excavated mountains of Ellora.

I subjoin a letter addressed to Colonel Munro just before he quitted India, by Lord William Bentinck. It speaks for itself.

Fort St. George, July 30, 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,

I AM concerned to say that I have no good excuse to offer for having so long delayed the acknowledgment of both your letters. In truth, the arrival of the Governor-General, and his protracted stay, has deranged the ordinary course of business, and has been the cause of a great mass of private and public papers being put off for future consideration. I trust I need not take any pains to convince you of the sincere concern which I have felt at your intended departure. I say to you now, what I shall recommend may be stated in the most public manner, that the thanks of this Government are, in an especial manner, due to you for the distinguished and important services which you have been performing for the East India Company for so many years. These have been no ordinary revenue duties; on the contrary, the most difficult work that can be assigned to man has been most successfully accomplished by you. You have restored the extensive provinces committed to your charge, long infested by every species of disorder and calamity, private and public, to a state of prosperity, and have made them a most valuable acquisition to your country. It is a consolation to know that the most important part of the revenue arrangement, the survey, which could scarcely have been executed under any other superintendence, has been completed before your departure. This will make the road, in respect to the revenues, easy for your successors. But I fear that, in provinces not long since so very much disturbed, a continuance of the same good policy will be indispensable. It is to your advice that I must refer for determining by what arrangement these districts shall be hereafter managed,—whether by a principal and subordinate collectors, or by two or three separate

zillah collectors. The zillabs are the cheapest and most convenient mode. Are the servants at present there equal to the charge? The present arrangement was always, according to my judgment, the most eligible. A principal collector partaking of the confidence of Government, is more particularly necessary as your successor. It may be expected that the absence of your authority and arrangement must be attended with some injurious effects. These effects may grow into serious consequences, if there is not immediately established an able and efficient superintendence. It had occurred to me that Mr. Thackeray might be inclined, and would be the most proper person, from various considerations, to succeed you, in case the same arrangement as now obtains should be continued. I am desirous, in the first instance, to receive your sentiments upon this subject. My great and anxious object is to preserve to the Ceded Districts, as far as possible, a continuance of the same system, in all its parts and branches, by which such vast public benefits have been obtained.

I remain, my dear Sir, with great respect and esteem,

Your obedient servant,

W. BENTINCK.

II.

MISCELLANEOUS MEMORANDA BY COLONEL MUNRO.

IN the formation of a government for India, we are not left to mere theory; we have not to create a new system; the present one has existed long enough to show us how far it is calculated to answer the purposes for which it was intended, and to enable us to judge with tolerable precision what are its advantages and its defects. The arrangements originally formed for the management of a few factories have gradually, without any preconceived plan, but following the change of circumstances, been enlarged and organized into a system fitted for the administration of an extensive empire. The mixture of commercial and political principles in which it is founded, however contrary to all speculative notions of government, have not been found unfavourable to its practical operations. The commercial spirit which pervades its constitution, by introducing habits of regularity, perseverance, and method into every department, civil and military, has enabled

it during many long and arduous contests, sometimes for existence, sometimes for dominion, to support reverses and overcome difficulties, which, under any other form of government, would perhaps have been impossible. But it must be confessed that this commercial spirit has also frequently interposed delay where vigour and decision were necessary, and embarrassed the execution of the most important enterprises. But the system, on the whole, with whatever defects may adhere to it, calls rather for amendment than fundamental change.

The India Board, as it is now constituted, does not appear to require any material alteration. It would be desirable that the President should hold his office for a fixed period, and as much longer as might be thought expedient, and not be renewable on every change of ministry; but this would, I fear, be incompatible with the nature of our government. The powers which he possesses of sending orders to the governments of India for the formation of alliances, and for making peace or declaring war, and of altering all dispatches from the Court of Directors, when not purely commercial, invest him with authority amply sufficient for the due control of the important affairs confided to his management. It might be proper to authorize him to originate dispatches on any matter whatever, when the Court of Directors either declined doing so, or delayed it beyond a specific time. The exercise of this authority would occasionally be required, particularly in restraining the local governments from enacting fundamental laws, where the subject merely demanded temporary regulation. No regulation ought to be adopted as a part of the constitutional law of India, until it has received the sanction of the India Board.

Ceylon, and the conquered European settlements to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, with the exception perhaps of the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon, are so intimately connected with India, that they ought to be placed under the Governor-General and the Board of Commissioners.

prophets. The change, if ever it is effected, will be extremely slow, and will not even begin until, by the improvement of the country, India shall abound in a middling class of wealthy men, secure in the possession of their property, and having leisure to study our best authors translated into the various languages of the country.

It is a mistaken notion, that the growers of cotton make, in their own family, their light clothing: they get it from the weaver and merchant, and they have a desire for the produce and manufactures of Europe, provided they are suitable to the purposes for which they intend them, are equally good and cheaper, and they can afford to pay for them.

Upon the claims in the India Bill of 1813, which provides that, after establishing a guarantee fund of twelve millions sterling, the excess of territorial revenue paid into the Exchequer is to go in the proportion of five-sixths to the public, and one-sixth to the Company, he remarks, "This is converting India into a rack-rent estate for England."

Every great state must have the means of raising extraordinary taxes in time of war. If it has not, it can only meet its expenses by reductions in peace; a resource which must soon fail, as it cannot, without danger, be carried beyond a certain limit.

This principle ought to be kept in view in all revenue measures, and ought to be fully explained to the inhabitants.

Military allowances, both to European and Native officers, ought to be regulated on the principle of holding out increasing advantages at every progressive step, and the means of realizing a competency after a certain period of service; but under no government will the public resources be adequate to this object, if the allowances to the inferior ranks of the army are too high.

A subaltern upon half-batta may live not only without distress, but comfortably, in any part of India. It is not necessary that he should do more. It is even better that he should feel difficulty occasionally; but it is a bad training for an officer, to place him in a situation where he shall always be at his ease, and scarcely ever feel the necessity of practising economy.

The best remedy to all suits respecting boundaries, village accounts, and exactions, is a well-organized revenue system, which

checks in a great degree these disorders in their origin, and, when they do arise, furnishes at once a clear document for settling them. An independent spirit amongst the rayets themselves is, however, the most sure defence against exaction. This spirit can only exist when the rayets are, as in Canara, actual proprietors, not mere cultivators of the soil. Such a body of men will not submit to exaction from any authority less than that of the Government itself. They will resist it, and, by so doing, guard more effectually their own rights than can be done by all our judicial and revenue regulations united. It is evident, therefore, that the more widely landed property is diffused, the more numerous the class of small proprietors holding of no despot zemindars, of no superior but the Crown, the more will this spirit of independence spread among the people, and the greater will be the number whom it will protect from extortion and every kind of oppression. But landed property can never arise under a system which leaves no landlord's rent. If we wish to see landed property and all its good effects, we must reduce the assessment of the greater part of the provinces under the Madras Government.

Under the zillah judge there should be a certain proportion of Native judges, one to each teshildari, or two where the teshildari was large. The Native judge should hold his court in the same town with the amildar's catcherry, for the convenience of receiving the aid of that magistrate in assembling punchayets, &c.

The separation of power has certainly lowered the European character. It has already, perhaps, in some degree created, and will continue to spread gradually among the Natives, a spirit of independence, but springing less from confidence in themselves, than from an abated respect for the British Government. If we wish, in order to remove their prejudices, to communicate to them more of the European character in their habits and opinions; if we are desirous of raising in their minds that proper independence which results from living under a well-regulated Government, and of rendering them fit to take a share in it, and even at some future period to govern themselves, we have not, I fear, taken the steps most likely to conduct us to this object. The independence which our institutions create is more likely to lead to discontent and disturbances, than to a just estimate of the advantages which may be enjoyed under them, or to any anxiety for their preservation or improvement. While we are endeavour-

The usage of the country, or common law of the Hindoos, is very different from the written law, which is in a great measure obsolete among themselves. Before the introduction of a new code, we ought to have employed men properly qualified to collect all that could be found of usage or Hindoo common law. Many of the rules would have appeared trifling and absurd, and even contradictory; but from the whole a system might have been formed much better adapted to the genius and condition of the people, than our theoretical code.

Is the effect then of our boasted laws to be ultimately merely that of maintaining tranquillity, and keeping the inhabitants in such a state of abasement, that not one of them shall ever be fit to be intrusted with authority? If ever it was the object "of the most anxious solicitude of Government to dispense with their services, except in matters of detail," it is high time that a policy so degrading to our subjects, and so dangerous to ourselves, should be abandoned, and a more liberal one adopted. It is the policy of the British Government to improve the character of its subjects; and this cannot better be done than by raising them in their own estimation, by employing them in situations both of trust and authority.

There are many reasons why the civil government of India should have a greater control over the military power, than in other foreign dependencies of Great Britain. In all of these, the military force is too inconsiderable, and too closely connected with the Mother Country, to attempt any thing against her; and in most of them the civil government is strengthened by the weight and influence of the colonial assemblies. But in India, Government has nothing to support it but its own character, and the authority with which it is invested. It has no great civil societies to come forward to its aid in the time of difficulty. The chief strength of the army is composed of Natives; and even of the European soldiery, the greater part have no desire to leave the country. It is evident that the authority of Government over such an army ought to be maintained by every means not incompatible with the respect due to the Commander-in-chief, and that the supreme military power should be vested in the Governor in Council.

After the Commander-in-chief, there is no officer it is of so much importance to uphold as that of the regimental commanding officer of the Native corps; for on the respect which he can maintain, rests the subordination of the Native army, and the very existence of our dominion in India. The authority he once possessed has, with the view of checking abuses, been so much divided, that there is too little left any where to command respect. Part of his former power should be restored to him; and he should receive such allowances as will enable him to make an appearance suitable to his rank, in the eyes of the Natives and of the European officers.

Whatever plans may be adopted for accelerating promotion among the European officers, it ought to be accompanied by one for improving the condition of the Native officers; and no room should be left for them to feel that, in every arrangement for the improvement of the army, their interests are neglected.

1814-15. The people will often object to paying a tax expressly for the police of their own town, while they will make none to paying a much greater increase on houses, lands, or any established tax, though not intended for their protection. Government should adopt the tax most agreeable to the people, not that which appears most reasonable to us.

No modification can make the Mohammedan criminal law good for any thing: it ought to be abolished, and our own substituted. For whom is this law preserved? There is not one Mohammedan to twenty Hindoos; nor was the law ever administered worse than among that small portion.

The absolute power of dismissal at discretion is the only foundation of an efficient police: without it there can be no energy or zeal, and all regulations will be useless.

In 1812, a judge, or the judges, of a provincial court having, in a Report, said that the Mohammedan law, with all its modifications, was not suitable to the state of India, and that trial by jury might be introduced easily and with great benefit, Sir Thomas, then Colonel Munro, remarks, at the date of this fragment—"There can be no doubt that a Native jury would find the facts much better than any European judge."

other is given to understand, and another as far as he is able to learn.

The potails and curnums of every village, as political instruments holding together the internal frame, are of the highest use to Government. They are immortal; but the zemindar can command no respect. His property dividing and passing away, prevents his acquiring permanent influence. Government loses the services of the potail and curnum, and gets none from the zemindar.

1823.—The rise of the character of the natives is to be effected by means of the higher classes in the judicial and revenue department; by collectors and revenue board catcheries; by consultation on taxation with them, and with the principal rayets and merchants; by a system admitting a regular reduction of taxation in peace, and increase in time of war; by showing the reason of it, and gaining their confidence, so that they may pay willingly in war, from the certainty that reduction will follow in peace.

Let each Presidency pursue the course best calculated to promote improvement in its own territory. Do not suppose that one way will answer for all, and that Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay—places a thousand miles from each other—must be in every thing so much alike, as to require exactly the same rules of internal administration on every point. Let each Presidency act for itself. By this means, a spirit of emulation will be kept alive, and each may borrow from the other every improvement which may be suited to the circumstances of its own provinces. If there is only one system, and if one Presidency is to be the model of the rest, it will have no other standard to compare its own with; and when it falls into vices, it will, instead of correcting it by the example of others, communicate it to them.

Our Adawlut courts in the several provinces act like so many steam-engines, breaking the great estates into small ones, and the small ones into dust.

The introduction of regular troops into all the countries of India lately occupied by the numerous irregular armies of the Native princes, operates, like the first establishment of the steam-engine, in throwing a great body of men out of employment, because it performs with a few what before was the work of many. It occasions very severe and extreme distress, as well as disaffection, by depriving at once a large body of military men of the means of subsistence. The evil to the common sort may be

depend chiefly on our infantry, than to an enemy whose strength is in his irregular cavalry.

8. Upon the breaking up of an empire like the Peishwah's, it becomes a measure of necessity, as well as of humanity, to give employment to a portion of the irregular troops of the country, both with the view of preventing them from exciting disturbances, and of enabling them gradually to find some other means of subsistence. Where a choice is left, regulars only ought to be employed, for the sake both of economy and safety. If we compare the number of regulars and irregulars required for any particular service, and consider their respective efficiency for executing it, we shall find that the regulars are not one-half so expensive as the irregulars. The result will be the same whether we take the ordinary local militia, or the irregular corps, disciplined and commanded by an European officer. The expense of equipping corps so disciplined, increases in a greater degree than their efficiency, and they are at least twice as expensive as any regular troops. But there is another reason against the employment of irregulars as a matter of choice: it withdraws a great number of useful hands from the labour of the country. The place of one thousand regulars can hardly be supplied by less than five or six thousand irregulars. The loss of so many additional hands must proportionally diminish the produce of the country.

9. The events of the war have rendered the political settlement of the Southern States easier than it might otherwise have been. The whole of Goklah's jagheers have been resumed. Rastiah's jagheers have shared the same fate, with the exception of the village of Tullikattah, which has been left to him, as it is the residence of a part of his family. The districts of Manowlee and Chickori have been taken from Appah Deesye, and given up to the Rajah of Kolapore; but the Deessys has of course been allowed to keep Nepaund, and also Sirkopah, which he obtained from Purseram Bhow.

10. In transferring Chickori to the Rajah of Kolapore, the three enaum villages which formerly belonged to his vakeel's brother were restored, and four villages were given as a jagheer to the vakeel Bhow Mahavay himself. I meant at one time to have given him only two; but, on farther consideration, I thought it as well to satisfy the Bhow, by giving the whole, as the Rajah was as likely to be displeased with the grant in the one case as the other. It is said that the Rajah dislikes and fears

the Bhow. The report has, I suspect, some foundation; for, when I proposed to the Bhow that I should only recommend, and that the Rajah should make the grant, he objected to it.

11. On the arrival of the reserve before Nepauni, Appah Dessye surrendered without delay the whole of the districts of Chickori and Manowlee, excepting twenty-four villages, which having appropriated to the support of his household troops and principal servants, he gave up with great reluctance, after an interval of six weeks spent in evasion. He has now nothing to give up, but something to receive. He is not entitled, from his conduct, to any compensation for the territory transferred to the Kolapore Rajah; but he is entitled, from the assurances given to him, to retain all the remaining part of his jagheer which he held at the breaking out of the war; to recover the part of his jagheer resumed by Raj Row, unless when a promise, as in the case of Purrusghur, has been made to the inhabitants, that they will not again be placed under his authority; and to obtain from the Government of Hyderabad an equivalent for his rights in the Nizam's territories. I have told his vakeels that he must not expect to recover any of these lost rights, unless he previously execute all that has been required of him. He has, from the very beginning of his career, pursued a system of throwing into prison all the rich inhabitants, not only of his own districts, but of every district wherever he obtained a temporary authority, with the view of extorting money from them, and of seizing and keeping in confinement the women most remarkable for their beauty. Many of these unfortunate people had been in prison ten or twelve years, and many had died from cruel treatment every year. While I was in the neighbourhood of Nepauni, I heard of only a few prisoners, whom I ordered to be released. It was not until after I had marched from the place, that I learned that about three hundred still remained in confinement. I wrote to Appah Dessye to release them. He has set many at liberty, but many are still detained; and until the whole are set at liberty, I have directed some of his jagheer villages on the south bank of the Kistna, which were occupied during the war, not to be restored.

12. The peshcush, or rather the rent of the Dessye of Kittoor, never was regularly paid, and seldom without force. It is now converted into a fixed peshcush, and the zemindary erected into a sammastanun. The peshcush is fixed at its former amount of Shabpoore rupees 1,75,000, and the honorary dress (tushruf) to

be given yearly by the sirkar to the Dessye, according to custom, at rupees 3,955.

13. The Dessye has paid no peshcush for the last two years. The peshcush for the first of those years has been remitted, on account of some expenses incurred by him during the war, but more on account of his early defection from the Peishwah. The whole of the peshcush for the last year is to be paid by the end of October.

14. Raj Row had assigned to the Dessye and the Putwurdhans, seranjami lands in each other's districts, with the view apparently of causing dissension between them. But neither party obeyed his orders. Both retained what they had before; for this reason, and still more for that of their being ancient possessions of Kittoor, Bhagwaddi-Suptguon and Olkottah are continued to the Dessye.

15. By his sunnud, the Dessye was bound to maintain four hundred and seventy-three horse and one thousand foot. He is now absolved from the keeping up of any contingent, and the district of Khannapoor, and an annual allowance of 25,000 rupees from the sirkar, are resumed, because these constituted the whole of what he actually received for furnishing his contingent, as the gudwal peshcush, estimated at 25,000 rupees, and the lands of Chintamene Row estimated at 68,473 rupees, though calculated as forming a part of the allowance for his contingent, were never given up to him.

16. The Dessye is perfectly satisfied with the present arrangement, and he has cause to be so; for, although his peshcush is not lowered, he is exempted from many private demands by the Peishwah's officers, with which he found it necessary to comply. His country is now freed from the incursions frequently made into it lately by the neighbouring jagheerdars and the Peishwah's troops, and will yield him a greater revenue; and he is secure in the possession of what he has. I have therefore no doubt that he feels the advantages of being under the protection of the British Government, and will endeavour to preserve them.

17. The Putwurdhans are the only great jagheerdars with whom an arrangement has not yet been made; but as they are to receive, and not to give, no difficulty is likely to be met with beyond what may arise from their discussions among themselves respecting their several shares of the additional allowances in money and land which may be granted by Government. I have not stated to their vakeels the amount proposed to be given; but

tolerably accurate estimate can be formed of the state of the revenue during the last eight or ten years. We know, however, that it has declined greatly since the succession of Raj Row, from the system of renting and sub-renting, and the frequent disturbances arising from the weakness of the government. The most flourishing period of the revenue during the last fifty years was when the country was under the Mysore dominion. The sum entered in the partition treaty schedules of 1792 is supposed to have been almost one-fourth more than the real amount. The revenue may undoubtedly be again brought to that standard; but it will be necessary to proceed with great caution, and to keep the assessment very moderate for some years.

24. The soil is in general extremely fertile; but as the cultivators are few and poor, the country cannot possibly be improved, unless their rents are low. The settlements should be annual. Every rayet should be at liberty to cultivate as much or as little as he pleases, and should pay only for what he cultivates. The rents of the rayets should be collected by the heads of villages, and be paid by them to the tishildars of the collectors. An agricultural survey of the country should be made, in order to ascertain the better its resources, and to establish a fixed and moderate assessment. But as such a survey, if precipitately undertaken, would cause an alarm that an increase of rent was intended, and thereby diminish cultivation, it would be proper not to begin it for three or four years, when the inhabitants will have acquired more confidence in our forbearance.

25. The coining of money, and the levying of customs on goods passing through the country, by the jagheerdars, are prejudicial to trade, and ought to be abolished whenever the jagheerdars can be prevailed upon to accept a fair compensation for the sacrifice of these rights.

26. The dessyces, potails, and curnums have, in general, considerable enaums. It is better that it should be so, as it establishes a respectable class of landholders and gradations in society between the cultivators and Government; and, as by giving to the heads of villages more influence, it renders them more useful as instruments of internal administration. Some confusion has arisen from revenue officers of one class having, by purchase or violence, obtained the offices and enaums of those of another. The dessyc or despundi of a small district is sometimes both potail and curnum of several villages. His right cannot

now be set aside; but the evil may be corrected by insisting on his employing fit persons to execute the duties, and making them a sufficient allowance.

27. All *enams* have already been guaranteed to the owners by proclamation, but many *enams* will be found, on examination, to have been given clandestinely by revenue officers without authority. Every one, from the *curnum* of a village to the *sirsoobah* of the Carnatic, grants both lands and pensions. The *sirsoobah*, or his deputy, when he is about to quit his office, fabricates a number of *enam sannads*; he gives away some, and sells the rest; the new *sirsoobah* resumes some, but continues a part of them. Where such *enams* have not, by long possession, become in some degree the fair property of the possessors, they ought to be resumed. I would consider all grants of this kind, since the cession of the Carnatic by Tippeo Sultan in 1792, as resumable; but the Mysore conquests did not extend beyond the Gulpurbah; and the year 1792 can therefore have no particular applicability to the rest of the Carnatic and the districts south of the Kistna. In those countries, I would therefore substitute the year of Nana Farnavee's removal from power, or of Raj Row's accession, because there has since been no regular control over the disposal of the *sirkar's* property.

28. It would be advisable that no *zillah* court should be introduced for some years. The collector ought, in the mean time, to act as judge and magistrate, and the *tishilders* of districts, and heads of villages under his superintendence, to manage the police, and exercise judicial authority in petty suits within their respective circuits.

29. The collector should have under him two subordinate collectors, one at Bijapoor, or Shulapoor, and the other at Haveri or Ranie Bednoor. The collector should, as usual in such cases, be called the principal collector, as it serves to give him more weight in the eyes of the natives.

30. I am convinced, from long experience, that the system of management by principal and subordinate collectors is the best calculated for an extensive collectorate, particularly where the territory is a recent acquisition, and requires much investigation; and that it is also the best adapted for producing a succession of efficient collectors. A subordinate collectorship is the best of all schools for acquiring revenue knowledge. The subordinate collector has all the practice of his principal in revenue details; and

being exempted from all public correspondence and duties of a general nature, he has more time to examine and understand them thoroughly.

31. With the exception of the small tract south of the Wurdah, the other districts fell into my hands during the progress of the war. The enemy in all had collected more or less of the revenue of the year, and in some which were last occupied, the whole, so that in such districts a considerable expense was incurred for an establishment of revenue officers and irregular troops, without any returns. The tishildars and their irregulars were sometimes driven out of a district, after having obtained possession of it, and every district was too much disturbed to admit of any jum-mabundi, or regular settlement of the revenue, being made. The collections, or rather contributions, were carrying on both by the enemy and us at the same time, and in the same districts. I looked to the collections merely as the means of facilitating our military operations, by lessening the resources of the enemy, and increasing our own. Whatever was got in the struggle was so much gained from the enemy, and might be regarded rather as captured property than as revenue. Under all these disadvantages, enough was realized to defray the charges of all the civil establishments of a body of three hundred horse, and of a body of peons amounting at one time to nearly ten thousand, and to leave a balance in the treasury on the 8th instant, of star pagodas 52, 65, 32, 444; so that the campaign in the Carnatic may be said to have been carried on without any expense to Government.

32. The preparation of the English revenue accounts has been hitherto delayed by the death of the English writer brought from Madras; but they are now nearly finished, and will be forwarded to you in a few days by Mr. Chaplin.

I have, &c.

attempt them without, is only to create confusion and useless expense.

A public man should have no motive but the good of his Government and his own reputation, which are inseparably connected.

What India wants most is a free export of her produce to England, as is permitted from England to India. Admission to all our silks and coloured goods, &c. on moderate duties.

If you want discipline, you must support the respectability of commandants of corps ; this, more than any thing, is wanting.

All armies, but more particularly mercenary armies, such as we have in India, require something like service to keep up their attention when, for any length of time, we have no war. The best thing is distant marches to and from a foreign territory.

A Governor should always be a man who will maintain the system prescribed by the Court of Directors.

You do great injustice to a Governor if you give him counsellors adverse to the system he is enjoined to follow, as well as great injustice to the Company and their subjects.

In recommending new systems, people are too apt to think that mankind are mere pieces of machinery, on which it is perfectly harmless to make experiments every day.

When we are actually at war, it is not the business of a subordinate government to ask questions about the origin or justice of it ; but to use every exertion to enable the superior government to get out of the war as well as possible.

Of our troops, one to five, or even ten, of the enemy is enough.

Government loses all its dignity when a bankrupt is employed to rule over his creditors.

Nothing is more unphilosophical, and, what is of more consequence, more imprudent, than to show a slight to any person

We are not however to conclude, from the conduct of the sepoys, that they were less inclined to the cause of the rioters than the police. Sepoys are often led, by the habit of military discipline, to act in opposition to their prejudices; but nothing can be more dangerous than to expose their fidelity to such a trial, and it ought never to be done unless in cases of the utmost necessity.

It would be desirable that the customs of the castes connected with their public ceremonies should be the same every where, and that differences respecting them should be settled by decisions of the courts; but as this is impossible while their prejudices remain, we ought, in the mean time, to follow the course most likely to prevent disorder and outrage.

The conflicts of the castes are usually most serious and most frequent when one party or the other expects the support of the officers of Government. They are usually occasioned by supporting some innovation respecting ceremonies, but rarely by preventing it. The magistrate ought therefore to give no aid whatever to any persons desirous of celebrating marriages, or other festivals or public ceremonies, in any way not usual in the place, but rather to discountenance innovation. He ought, in all disputes between the castes, to take no part beyond what may be necessary in order to preserve the peace; and he ought to punish the rioters on both sides, in cases of affray, for breach of the peace; and, on the whole, to conduct himself in such a manner as to make it evident to the people that he favours the pretensions of neither side, but looks only to the maintenance of the peace.

I recommend that instructions in conformity to these suggestions be sent to the magistrates for their guidance.

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

3rd July, 1820.

written in the September preceding his death ; but he left the bulk of his fortune to his eldest son, Kullum Oolla Khan, whom he constituted guardian to his younger children. He said nothing of the jagheer in his will, because he was too well acquainted with the usage of India to believe that he had any permanent proprietary right in it ; because he was aware that these grants were revocable. Although, therefore, he knew that he could not claim the jagheer as a right, he wrote a letter to Government, stating that he had held it by the favour of the Nabobs Walajah and Amdut, and trusting that it would be continued by the favour of the Company. Lord Clive answered his letter, and assured him that attention would be paid to his high character ; and in his minute of the 28th of May 1802, recommended that, in conformity with the resolutions of Government in 1700, all the country jagheers then current should be restored ; and as the jagheer of Asim Khan was one of them, it was restored to his eldest son, Kullum Oolla Khan ; but the grant was not for ever ; and the revenues arising from salt, saltpetre, and the customs, were expressly excepted ; and as it was submitted to the Court of Directors, and sanctioned by them, it might have been expected that it would not be shaken by any authority in this country. This expectation, however, has been disappointed by the proceedings in the Supreme Court. The brothers of Kullum Oolla Khan, instigated by certain Europeans, endeavoured to set aside their father's will, on the ground of insanity ; but the will was established in Court, in 1813. They succeeded afterwards in establishing their claim to the personal property, according to the shares prescribed by the Mohammedan law ; but the Court twice gave a decision against their claim to a share of the jagheer. They soon after filed a new bill, in which the Company were made defendants, as well as Kullum Oolla Khan, and in which they prayed that he might be compelled to account for the revenues of the jagheer, and the Company to issue a new grant to all the brothers and sisters jointly. The Company told their law officer that they had no interest in the suit, and that it ought to be prosecuted between the parties interested. But the objection was overruled by the Court, on the ground that the Company had an interest in the matter ; and the cause was tried ; but before judgment was passed, the Advocate-General, conceiving that the case was not well understood, proposed that fresh evidence should be taken on two points : first, as to the nature of the interest conveyed by jagheer grants ; and, second, as to the usage of

ginally amenable, and having submitted to the jurisdiction, the Court had a right, by its process, to act upon the property any where within the Company's territories :"—and the second, "because the Government having assigned to the defendant the jagheer, it could no longer be regarded as public revenue, but was subject to the same process as any other property of the defendant :"—and an order was made for the receiver. But on the Advocate-General urging the inconvenience which would result from an order so unprecedented, and intimating that there would be an appeal from the decree ; it was agreed by the parties, on the recommendation of the Court, that, in place of the aforesaid receiver, the collector of the district should be substituted, and should, under the orders of Government, collect the profits of the jagheer lands, pay them into "the public treasury, with the privity of the Accountant-General of this Court, to the credit of this cause, and subject to the farther order of this Court." This course was acceded to by Government, for no other reason but that of its being the only one by which discussion with the Supreme Court could be obviated ; and the Advocate-General was directed to take immediate measures for appealing the suit to England. Though Government has therefore already done all that it can do, I ought not, I think, to let so extraordinary a decision pass, without stating, individually, my own sentiments upon it.

The case, on the side of the Company, has been so ably argued by the Advocate-General, and the long and able minute of Mr. Thackeray has so fully explained the grounds on which the right of the Company rests in this case, that no room is left for me to add any thing material to what has been already adduced ; and I must therefore content myself with noticing the main arguments on which the Chief Justice founded his decision, and with stating those ancient usages of the country of which long experience has given me some knowledge, and by which I am led to regard his opinion as erroneous.

The Supreme Court are, by their charter, expressly prohibited from taking cognizance of any matters relating to the public revenue ; but, in the present instance, they get over this difficulty by saying, that the revenue of the jagheer having been assigned to Asim Khan, was no longer revenue, but private property, subject to the same laws which regulate private inheritance. If this doctrine were admitted, it would lead to the most dangerous consequences ; for it would enable the Court to entertain suits

against the Company in all cases of jagheer, enaum, or other grants of public revenue, wherever situated, on the plea that, having been granted, it is no longer public revenue. As all the Native religious establishments, and municipal servants throughout the country, are maintained by grants of land, the Supreme Court might gradually extend their jurisdiction over them, destroy their respect for the authority of Government, and throw the affairs of the country into confusion. Were the Court once to begin to receive suits respecting lands assigned for the maintenance of public servants, it would be impossible for Government to realize the revenue, or to maintain good order in the country. It may be said, that the Court is not likely to interfere in such matters, but of this we can have no assurance at present; for, but a few years ago, its interference in the jagheer of Kullum Oolla Khan, above a hundred miles from the limits of its jurisdiction, was regarded as at least equally improbable. There will never be wanting men whose interest it will be to bring into Court, at all hazards, the jagheers and enaums allotted to the civil and religious establishments of the country; and as the Court will judge for itself in determining whether these lands do or do not come under the description of what is meant as revenue by the charter, I own that I see no hope, after what has passed, of their being regarded as any thing else than mere private property. The only effectual way in which the Government would be secured from the mischievous effects of the Court's extending their interference to public revenue, assigned, in the form of services and charity, for the maintenance of various establishments, would be by restraining the Court from taking cognizance of any suit, respecting any land whatever, situated beyond the limits of its jurisdiction.

It is manifest, from the observations made by the Chief Justice in the course of the trial, that the notions of the Court regarding public and private lands in India, are very vague, and that it must therefore be continually liable to exceed the bounds prescribed to its authority in the charter, by mistaking public revenue for private landed property. The Chief Justice says, "That it does not appear that it was not part of the private possessions of the Crown:" he thinks that the grant to Kullum Oolla Khan is not revenue, because Lord Clive "excepts the sayer, salt, and saltpetre, which are revenue." He supposes that a private property in the land is granted, from the expressions used by the Chief Secretary, "deliver over these lands;" and in

Walajah's grant, "put him in possession of the pergunnah." It is well known that the usual meaning of these terms is nothing more than that the deshmooks, deshspeendies, and other public officers, shall make over the management of the village, or pergunnah, to the jagheerदार, and pay him the public revenue. The sunnud says nothing of private revenue; it states clearly, that what is granted is public revenue, estimated according to the kamil jumma, or perfect, or standard assessment, at sixty-four thousand six hundred and three chuchrums and eleven annas. Grants of land usually contain a clause saving all private rights; and when it is not inserted, it is always understood that no private, but only public rights are transferred by the grant. It seems strange that the Chief Justice, after reading the sunnud, should have had any doubt as to what was granted being revenue.

He seems to have been uncertain throughout, and sometimes to have thought that it was public revenue, and sometimes that it was not; and to have given his decision, in a cause of the highest importance, both from the magnitude of the property and the political consequences which it involved, without having any very distinct idea of the nature of the property on which he was deciding. But it is not surprising that an English judge should have believed that grants of land by the sovereign must be grants of crown-lands. It is easy however to show that they are not so in India; and it would have been better perhaps if the Advocate-General had more fully explained in what the difference consists. It might have been shown in a very few words; and by defining the nature of the thing granted, the question of right will be more easily understood. If we suppose the gross produce of the lands of any village of a pergunnah to be one hundred—

That of this amount the expense of cultivation is	40
The landlord's rent or share	20
The Government revenue or share	40
	<hr/>
	100

If this village, or pergunnah, be granted as a jagheer, it is the forty only, composing the Government revenue or share, which is granted. The twenty, forming the landlord's rent, is not granted, but remains, as before, in the hands of the owner, as also the forty, making the expense of cultivation, as he must defray it. If the jagheer be resumed, the property of the landlord is not affected by the change: it is the forty only, composing

the Government revenue or share, which is affected by the resumption. It is paid to the Government instead of the jagheer-dar, in the same manner as it was before the grant. The jagheer-dar ceases to have any interest in the village or pergunnah, because he never had any property in the land, but merely in the revenue, which is now resumed. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that wherever private proprietary right in land exists, whatever is granted by Government must be public revenue only; and that as the grants to Kullum Oolla are of lands in the Carnatic, where all lands are the hereditary private property of the inhabitants, the thing granted is public revenue only in the share which the proprietors paid to Government; and that there is not the smallest foundation for the supposition of the Chief Justice, that a proprietary right in the land itself, or any private property of the sovereign, was conveyed by the grant.

In stating the landlord's share at 20 per cent. of the gross produce, I have done so merely for the sake of illustration. It is in some provinces higher, and in others much lower, and in some so low as not to be distinguishable from the charges of cultivation.

The jagheer sunnud conveys the rights of Government, whatever they are, and no more. These rights vary in different parts of the country. Wherever the lands are held, as in the Carnatic, by rayets having an hereditary proprietary right in the whole lands of the village, they are limited to the public revenue, or Government share of the produce, and do not give a foot of land. In some provinces of India, where the lands are held by rayets having an hereditary right to the lands in cultivation, but not to the waste, the jagheer sunnud gives the government revenue, or share of the produce only, in the cultivated lands; but in the waste it gives the proprietary right in the land, whatever it may be, by the custom of the country. When such a jagheer is resumed, no private rent is affected by the resumption. The ancient hereditary rayets pay the public revenue of their lands to Government, in place of the jagheer-dar, and the jagheer-dar himself pays the public revenue of the waste-lands which he may have brought into cultivation; and if he agree to this condition, he retains possession of them with the same proprietary right as the other landowners, or rayets of the district. It is obvious, therefore, that though in rare cases of unclaimed, or waste-lands, Government may confer a private proprietary right, it never resumes it, and that there is no foundation for the opinion, that resumption is an unjust violation of private property, since the thing resumed is always public revenue, never the landlord's rent.

little attention to some of the articles of the treaty of 1801 will show, that the regulating not only of Kullum Oolla's jagheer, but of all the other jagheers, was a measure of state independent of the jurisdiction of every municipal court.

By the first article, "The Nabob Asim ul Doulah Behader is formally established in the state and rank, with the dignities dependent thereon, of his ancestors."

By the third article, the Company "charges itself with the maintenance and support of the military force necessary for the defence of the Carnatic, and for the protection of the rights, person, and property of the said Nabob; and the said Nabob stipulates that he will not enter upon any negotiation or correspondence with any European or Native power," &c.

By this, the Nabob does not relinquish his sovereignty: he merely renews the article of former treaties, by which he engaged not to correspond with foreign states without the consent of the Company.

By the fifth article, one-fifth part of the net revenue of the Carnatic is allowed for "the maintenance and support of the said Nabob."

The fifth part is his claim as sovereign of the whole Carnatic. It is the revenue which remains, after providing for the civil and military charges, and is probably as large a clear revenue as was received by any of his ancestors.

By the sixth article, the one-fifth is to be calculated after deducting, first, "all charges of collection;" second, "the amount of the jagheer lands stated in the ninth article of the treaty of 1787, at pagodas 2,13,421, and the same sum of pagodas 6,21,105, appropriable to the liquidation of the debts of the late Mahomed Ally."

By the ninth article, the Company engages "to take into consideration the actual situation of the principal officers of his late Highness's Government." It charges itself with the expense of a suitable provision for their maintenance, to be distributed with the knowledge of the said Nabob, in such manner as shall be judged proper.

By this article, it appears that the Company, in conjunction with the Nabob, may regulate the provision for the officers as it thinks proper. And by the second separate article it is stipulated, "that it shall not be incumbent on the Honourable Company to appropriate lands yielding a revenue to the said amount of pagodas 2,13,421; but that the said Company shall be at

liberty to exercise its discretion on the mode, and in the extent, of the provision to be made."

By the tenth article, the rank of the Nabob as a Prince, and as an ally of the British Government, is declared. No change in the political situation of the Nabob has taken place since 1801. He is still Prince of the Carnatic, and he is a party to the treaty by which one-fifth of the net revenue is secured to him. Without a breach of the treaty, we cannot, except with his consent, alter any of the articles. By one of these articles we are bound to provide for the dependents of the Nabob, and among them, for Kullum Oolla Khan. The Nabob concurred in the provision made for him. If we take it away without the Nabob's consent, it is a breach of the treaty, which is cognizable by the Government at home, but not by the Supreme Court here. The question is not one of private right between two brothers, as maintained by the Chief Justice, but one of state policy, whether a public grant, confirmed by treaty, shall or shall not be set aside by a municipal court. If the Court has jurisdiction in any jagheer included in an article of a treaty, it must have it equally with regard to all the other jagheers; and if it can alter any provisions of an article, it may, on the same principle, set aside the whole treaty.

I doubt whether the Supreme Court can legally exercise jurisdiction in the Carnatic, even in cases of private property. Had the Nabob retained the civil administration, it certainly could not have done so, neither could it have done so under a temporary assumption similar to what has occurred at former periods. The present assumption of the country is more permanent; but the relative situations of the Company and the Nabob are the same as in former cases of assumption. The Nabob is still Prince of the Carnatic,—receives in that capacity one-fifth of the net revenue, and has a right to object to any measure which, by the increase of grants or otherwise, may tend to a diminution of his dues. But if the Company, with the concurrence of the Nabob, were to resume a grant of land or money, and if the Court were to consider the grant as private property, and secure against the resumption, it is obvious that the revenue of the Nabob would be injured thereby. There are many other cases in which the decrees of the Court might be at variance with the rights of the Nabob; and whatever therefore may be thought of the expediency of the Supreme Court's having jurisdiction in the Carnatic, in matters of private property, where the claim is against the

India is what the excise and customs are in England,—the main source of revenue, and cannot be permanently alienated with safety to the state. The Kings of England never could alienate the public revenue in perpetuity, nor could any government do so. No government can debar its successors from the use of the public revenue. The existing government must always have the power of calling it forth, for the preservation and defence of the state. In India there is no assembly or public body between the prince and the people, to regulate the rate or the amount of the taxation or revenue. The sovereign himself is the only authority by which revenue is levied and disbursed, and by which it is granted or resumed. The power to resume as well as to grant must be lodged somewhere; and in India, where there is no other authority, it is obvious that it must be vested in the Prince. But this is denied, because opinions are drawn from European institutions, and strained analogies are found, where none exist, between the usages of India and Europe. And hence the Chief Justice observes, that “he cannot see how any argument can be derived from the particular situation of the Nabob of the Carnatic, which shall, on general reasoning, deprive him of the same right to alienate the revenues of the state, as was actually enjoyed by the Kings and Queens of England.” This is not a correct view of the case. The Kings of England could not alienate the great sources of public revenue in perpetuity. They could alienate their crown-lands, but not the public revenue upon them. But the alienation by the Nabob is that of the whole of the public revenue of extensive districts. The alienation in England was merely a transfer of the crown-lands to private individuals, to be liable to all the public taxes. The alienation by the Indian Prince was a transfer from the state, of all public taxes on land, to individuals as private property. The Chief Justice does not appear to have perceived the distinction in the nature of English and Indian grants; for, in speaking of the grant to Asim Khan, he says, “It ought to appear that it was properly belonging to the public, or, at least, that it was not part of the private possessions of the Crown.” It has already been shown, that all grants of jagheers in India, are grants of public revenue. They cannot indeed be otherwise, because there are no crown-lands. The Chief Justice is evidently acting all along under the influence of English analogies, and endeavouring to find a resemblance in things which have not the remotest connection. He thinks, that because the sovereigns of Europe, under the feudal system, pos-

essed extensive crown-lands, the sovereigns of India must, from their being more despotic, have had still more extensive private dominions; but nothing can be more unfounded than such an opinion. Crown-lands, according to the English acceptation of the term, are unknown in India. The most powerful monarchs had none; neither Akhbar nor Aurungzebe had any; and the despotism of the sovereign was itself the very cause of their being none, because, by giving him unlimited control over all land throughout the empire, it rendered the aid of any private domain altogether unnecessary. A small part of the public revenue arose from customs; the rest, about nine-tenths of the whole, from the land revenue or tax. All land was assessed to the public revenue; a part of the land was allotted to religious and charitable purposes, and to municipal institutions, and the public revenue of such lands was enjoyed by the incumbents. But the public revenue of all other land came to the royal treasury, unless when assignments of particular villages or districts were made to civil and military officers for their personal allowances, and the pay of their respective establishments; all which assignments, however varied, ceased at the will of the sovereign. As there was no public body, no class of nobles or clergy, which had any right to interfere in the settlement of the land-tax; as this power was vested in the Sovereign alone, and as he could raise or lower the tax as he saw proper; and as the whole produce was at his disposal, it is manifest that he could derive no advantage, and therefore have no motive for holding, as "private possessions of the Crown," any lands apart from the general mass of the sirkar or Government lands of the empire; and it is also obvious, that whenever he granted land rent-free, he granted the public revenue.

The Chief Justice says, that if we are to argue from the reason of the thing, we may have recourse to the history of our own country, where he shows, that it was declared by the twelve judges, as late as the time of King William, that "it was the ancient and undoubted right of the Crown to alienate its hereditary estates;" and he hence infers, that the Nabob of the Carnatic must have the same right. This argument would be very just if the estates alienated in England and the Carnatic were of the same nature; but as they are totally different, it is not at all applicable. The King of England might, without injury to the nation, alienate his hereditary estates. The owners were changed, but the estates themselves were still liable, like the other lands of

the kingdom, to all the public burdens of the time ; to military service, aids, &c. By the transfer, the Crown became poorer, but the nation richer. But an Indian grant is the reverse of all this: it gives away the public revenue of the lands, it exempts them from military service, from every kind of tax or public burden, and renders them entirely useless as a resource to the state. In England, the alienation of the crown-lands does not lessen the resources of the state ; in India, it annihilates them. In England, the effect of such alienation could only have been partial, as the crown-lands bore but a small proportion to the lands of the kingdom. In India, it might have extinguished all revenue, as the Sovereign, though he has no crown-lands, has the power of granting all lands.

The Chief Justice observes, that it was not in the contemplation of the great men who investigated the subject of the crown-grants, when Queen Anne first succeeded to the throne, to remedy the evil of the resumption. He thinks that their moderation furnishes a contrast with the conduct of the Company's Government. But this Government has never claimed a right to make a resumption at all similar to what a resumption of the crown-lands in England would be. It does not claim to resume any private property conveyed by the grants ; it claims the public revenue only, and leaves the rent of the landlord with the proprietor.

If all Indian Princes could grant *altamgha jagheers*, and if none could resume them, a great portion of the country might, in time, be released from affording any aid to the state, either in revenue, or in military service. Some idea may be formed of the probable effect of such a system, by looking at what happened in a few years under the Nabob Walsajah and his son Amdut ul Onra. Family jagheers were granted to the amount of above six lacs of pagodas, and containing a population of above six hundred thousand persons. Of these jagheers, only about one-fourth was *altamgha* ; but the whole might have been so, and the state would have been deprived of every kind of aid from more than half a million of its subjects. Many of the jagheers, too, might have been held, as was actually the case, by persons who, though attached to the donor, were inimical to his successor ; but, when once granted, they could not, according to the opinion of the Court, have been resumed. If, therefore, the increase of *altamghas* during successive reigns, might, if not checked, have materially impaired, if not altogether exhausted, the resources of

the state, and as the evil could only be remedied by resumption, it seems to follow, from the reason of the thing, that the sovereign must have had the right to resume as well as to grant.

The next ground on which the Company's right to resume the grant to Asim Khan has been denied by the Court, is that of the usage and custom of the country. The usage of the country is undoubtedly the rule by which the question ought to be decided; and, in a case of this kind, the common practice of the Native princes must be admitted to be the usage. It can easily be shown that princes resumed altamghas at pleasure. It cannot be shown, that when they were disposed to resume, the act of resumption ever was or could be prevented. It may be said that they were despots, and acted unjustly. Had they seized private property, they would have been regarded as unjust by the country; but no injustice was attached to the seizure of an altamgha, as the people knew that it was a grant of public revenue. The princes were, it is true, despotic; but they were liberal, and even profuse in their grants, and the grants themselves grew out of their very despotism; for it was because they found no difficulty in resuming, that they made none in granting. Altamghas were not, in fact, more respected than money pensions, which, though every day liable to resumption, are frequently continued for generations. The resumption and renewal by the Amdut of the grant to Asim Khan, the favourite minister of his father and himself, is a strong proof of the practice of the country, and of the opinion of the public. If altamghas were not resumable, it may be asked what has become of them. Their very scarcity is a proof of the usage to the contrary. There is not one in the Carnatic older than Walajah. Where are all those of his predecessors, which, according to the Chief Justice, ought to have been protected by usage, and by the Mohammedan law? The right of resumption never was doubted in the Carnatic until called in question by the Supreme Court. The Company's Government could have had no doubt of it, when, in 1801, they resumed all jagheers, though they afterwards continued most of the old ones, but none of the altamghas to the Nabob's family. The usage is shown by Walajah himself, who certainly best knew what it was in his own dominions; but his opinion is in direct opposition to that of the Court. In his letter to Government, of the 18th October 1790, he says, "I am Prince of the Carnatic, and for these forty years I have granted, resumed, and altered jagheers, from time to time, in such manner as I have thought proper." The right of resum-

superior for a new one, shows that he considered them as liable to be resumed at pleasure. He knew that this must either be the case, or that they must be maintained by force. The usage, in this respect, has probably arisen from necessity; for, as altamghas are chiefly given to members of the reigning family, and to the higher officers of state, and as they are usually for extensive districts, it is obvious that, in every case of a new dynasty, and in every instance of disputed succession in an old one, which is so common in India, the new Prince could not be secure, unless he had the power of resuming the altamghas of all who he supposed were not well affected, and of rewarding his adherents by new grants. This has been the usage with regard to all large grants; the small ones of a few hundred rupees are, from their insignificance, sometimes neglected, and allowed, like charity lands, to pass through several generations.

There is nothing either in existing records, or in the state of the country, to support the opinion that altamghas were not resumable at pleasure. The altamgha was so far different from a common grant, that it was not for any specific period; and that it frequently, but not always, contained the words, "from generation to generation." It was therefore a grant that the donor was anxious should be durable; and his son might on this account continue it, if he had no cause of being dissatisfied with the jagheerdar; but the next prince could hardly show the same forbearance, as he would probably have new favourites to provide for, by the resumption of old grants. If we examine Mr. Falconer's report on the jagheers of the Carnatic, we find no old altamghas on the list. The whole of the altamghas, sixteen in number, are by Walajah and his son. The old grants which have passed through several generations, are not altamghas, as might have been expected from the principle of their not being resumable, but common jagheer grants, neither hereditary, nor for life, but temporary. Many of these common jagheerdars were killedars of strong forts, and, from this circumstance, held their jagheers longer than they would probably have done under the dynasty by which they were granted; because, in the convulsions attending the decline of the Mogul power, their forts enabled them to secure terms for themselves. But even after the new Government became strong, and could easily have removed them, they frequently permitted these to remain, either on account of family alliances, out of respect for their high birth, or some other cause. The greater part of the jagheers of Asim Khan were held

under a royal firman, not *altamgha*, by Mulk Mohammed Ali Khan, with the fort of Mustaphaghur. Though the grant was merely temporary, yet it continued in the family, and descended lineally from father to son, for three generations, till 1780, when the jagheerदार having died during Hyder Ally's invasion of the Carnatic, his family was sent into captivity in Mysore by that prince. The jagheerदार of Awelwandah and several others, held by the common tenure, have in the same way descended through several generations. It appears from these facts, that in the Carnatic, *altamgha* grants, so far from being irresumable, have not been so much respected as many of the ordinary jagheers. It would not weaken the argument, even if it could be shown that, in other parts of India, the practice was different, because the question before us regards the usage in the Carnatic only; but I believe that it was nearly the same throughout India: we know, at least, that it was so in the Peishwah's dominions; for the commissioner at Poonah, in answer to a reference made to him on the subject, has stated that he has not been able to find a single *altamgha* in the Deccan, and has transmitted a list of five hundred and fifty-nine jagheers, resumed by the Peishwah's Government within the last fifty years, none of which are *altamgha*. Of these, he observes, three hundred and sixty-four were resumed for reason assigned, usually offences against the state; and one hundred and ninety-five without any reason assigned. In the Nizam's dominions, too, the resumption of jagheers appears from the note of his minister, Chundoo Lal, transmitted by the resident, to have been regulated, as in the Carnatic, by the will of the Prince. It is stated, that "*altamgha* jagheers which are granted to children generally, without any specification of names, are continued to the descendants of the deceased person; but if any great fault has been committed, or there are no descendants, the jagheer is resumed." It is also stated, that the sons sometimes share equally; "but if one is found fit, and another unfit, the sovereign exercises a discretion, and continues the jagheer as he may think proper, in consideration of the merits of the persons;" and it is added, "there are no persons to whom jagheers have been continued, without some change or modification." What is here said corresponds very nearly with the practice of the Company, and the Nabob in the Carnatic, with regard to the jagheers of Kullam Oolla Khan and others. When any great fault is committed, the jagheer is resumed. The sovereign exercises his discretion, in renewing or continuing the jagheer to all

jagheers at discretion. Lord Clive was the best judge of his own intentions; and, if we are to judge of them from his own acts, he leaves us no ground to join in the doubts of the Chief Justice. He certainly did intend to resume the grant, for he resumed the customs, salt and saltpetre belonging to the jagheer, and continued the land-rent only; and the new grant which he issued for the land-rent was not a renewal of the old *altamgha*, but a common jagheer grant. Kullum Oolla Khan is the heir of Asim Khan. It was not in the name of the other sons and heirs, because Lord Clive knew that Asim Khan was desirous that the jagheer should be conferred on his eldest son. His Lordship also knew that it was only on account of the high character and long services of Asim Khan, that the jagheer had been originally granted; that the respectability of the family could only be maintained by giving the undivided jagheer to the eldest son, and that the Nabob approved of the measure. The original grants both of Walajah and the Amdut left the division of the jagheer to Asim Khan to be made as he chose, and he never expressed a wish to make any. The *sunnud* of Lord Clive states expressly, that it is on account of "the respectable character and commendable conduct of the said Beharder (Asim Khan), and a well-founded expostulation that his son Kullum Oolla Khan will pursue the same laudable line of conduct, that the jagheer is renewed."

I expect that the answers to the queries respecting *altamghas*, transmitted to various public officers, will contain different opinions as to their being renewable or not. They will vary according as they are founded in the usage of one province or another, or on the opinions of Native lawyers, or on extensive or limited observation. We are too apt to be carried away by supposed analogies, and to build up systems of uniform practice, where none ever existed, or ever were thought of; and much of the argument on the present occasion seems to have arisen from this cause. The conflicting opinions may be easily accounted for, by considering what really took place. The small *altamghas* were frequently neglected on account of their insignificance, and allowed, like common charity or *enam*-lands, to continue for two or three generations, and to be regulated by the laws of private property. But the greater *altamghas* were, from their nature, objects of state jealousy, and were resumed or transferred at the discretion of the sovereign, to punish one person, or to reward another: they could not be left as private property, without danger to the State.

wealthy families of Madras have already been impoverished by their litigations in the Court. The attorneys and law dubashes now look to the provinces; and if the doctrine maintained by the Court continues to be acted upon, its jurisdiction will in time reach to every zemindar, jagheerdar, and official landholder under this Presidency; because, Madras being the capital, many of the great proprietors and principal inhabitants will occasionally visit this place and reside in it for a time, and thus become amenable; and every person also holding an official or charitable grant, which it may be deemed expedient to assess or resume, will be able to bring his case before the Court, as a complaint against European oppression.

The powers of the Supreme Court and of the Government should never be suffered to come into collision; and both the Court and the Government will thus be enabled the more efficiently to discharge their respective duties, and to command the respect of the natives. But, in order to attain these objects, it will be necessary—

1st, To exclude from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court all civil suits between native and native, except where both parties agree to submit to their decision.

2nd, To alter the present boundaries of the local jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, so as to include the fort and town of Madraspatnam, but to exclude Chepauk and Triplicane.

3rd, To exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court all lands situated beyond the limits of the Court.

4th, To exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court all acts done by the Government as a Government, and making such acts cognizable only by the superior authorities in England.

5th, To vest in Government the powers now exercised by the justices, of assessing the inhabitants of Madras for paving, lighting, and cleansing the streets, or at least to vest in it the power of exempting from the tax all such Bramins, priests, and other privileged persons as, from the usage of the country, are exempted from such taxes.

If suits between native and native are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it will check litigation, and lessen greatly the expense where it actually occurs, and save thousands from ruin. The local boundaries of the Supreme Court are far too extensive; they seem to have been fixed at first without much consideration; they reach to a distance of five miles from Madras, and include several populous villages which ought never to have

been within them. They contain a population of above five hundred thousand persons. The line proposed by Mr. Stratton ought to be the new boundary. It runs along the river at the Government-house to Cochrane's canal, and would place about two hundred thousand natives under the jurisdiction of the Company's Court. It would also enable us to accomplish a most important object, in withdrawing the Nabob, with all his relations and adherents, from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. That jurisdiction has, for many years, been a source of constant complaint from his Highness. While it exists, it cannot be otherwise; for, whatever may be the forbearance of the judges, and their attention to native prejudices, circumstances must occur almost every day, offensive to the Nabob, and to every Mussulman of rank. The authority of the Nabob over his family and dependents has been impaired by political events, and still more by the interference of the officers of the Court. Daughters of Walajah have turned prostitutes, and been released from the custody of their husbands and the Nabob, by *habeas corpus*. Other women of rank have been encouraged, by their example and their impunity, to follow the same courses. The disgrace of these women is felt, not only by their own families, but by every Mussulman here, as a degradation of their caste. The Mussulman population of Triplicane, always distressed and dissatisfied since the assumption of the Carnatic, has had its discontent increased by these transactions; and it is therefore desirable that the cause of them should be removed, by placing the Nabob without the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It is also chiefly for the purpose of removing the causes of discontent, that I have proposed that Government, rather than the justices, should possess the authority of taxing the inhabitants of Madras, for paving, cleansing, and lighting the streets. The majority of the justices is composed of men either not in the Company's service, or who, having always resided at Madras, know little of the native usages. Bramins, priests, and other privileged persons, have in consequence been subjected to this house-tax, from which they are every where else exempted by the custom of the country; and the Hindoo population has been rendered discontented as well as the Mohammedan. The discontent has shown itself only in complaint and clamour; but for this we are indebted to the presence of a military force. Had the same measures been attempted to be carried into execution when there was none, they would have been resisted by insurrection. The Advocate-General has given

a small quit-rent at first, and then raising it to a greater, next to a half, and so on to the full rate of assessment. In India, revenue always follows the population and the produce, wherever they go. This is the usage, and it cannot be relinquished without endangering the future resources of the country; because, as the Government waste-lands, together with the jagheer and enaum lands, are equal to from one-fourth to one-half of the whole of the lands in cultivation, if they were permanently exempted from the payment of revenue, they would gradually, instead of lying half waste and poorly cultivated, as at present, become completely cultivated, by drawing off the cultivators and stock from the lands now paying revenue, which would be proportionably diminished. If an effect of this kind has not already been experienced, in provinces containing a large proportion of jagheer and enaum, it is because it is prevented by the usage of transferring the assessment from the deserted to the newly cultivated lands. Whenever it is found that the revenue of a district has been considerably diminished by the abandonment of assessed, and the occupation of waste lands belonging to jagheerdars or enaumdars, an assessment, proportionate in some degree to the loss, is imposed on the jagheer or enaum. It is this which guards the public revenue from loss, by former profuse grants; and if this power were relinquished, we should have no means of saving it from very considerable defalcation. The smaller enaums, though they separately contain only a few acres each, are very extensive collectively. They have, for the most part, been granted without authority, by heads of villages and revenue servants; and when they have escaped notice for a few years, and have afterwards been discovered, they have been allowed to continue, from charitable or interested motives, and they have, from various causes, a constant tendency to increase.

The investigation of enaums was therefore, among the Native Governments, like an inquiry into the state of the nation; and it is advisable that we should occasionally investigate and resume, in order to prevent the abuses and increase to which enaums are liable from neglect.

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

College committee, and receive from it a certificate of their competency.

With regard to the furnishing of college-books to the officers engaged in the study of Hindoostanee, as proposed by his Excellency, I am of opinion that a reference should be made to the College to ascertain the names of the books, the number of copies of each that can be furnished, and the prices, and we can then determine whether the books should be lent or issued to the officers on their paying for them.

The measure recommended by the Commander-in-chief, in his minute, would undoubtedly greatly promote the important object of encouraging the study of the Hindoostanee language among the junior officers of the army; but there is an objection to it which Government cannot remove; namely, that its expense would exceed that of the former system of granting rewards for proficiency, which was abolished by order of the Honourable the

Court of Directors, first in 1814, and finally in 1818. It is observed, that though two moonshies to each corps may now be necessary, in consequence of the great number of young officers, one may hereafter be found sufficient.

This reduced number would, however, occasion an annual expense of 24,360 rupees, which would still exceed the probable charge under the former system: it would be nearly equal to fourteen donations, which is perhaps a greater number than would be given one year with another; we ought not therefore to revive a charge which has already been discontinued by the Honourable Court, without their previous sanction; but the object in view is so essentially useful to the army, that it may be advisable to bring it again to the notice of the Honourable Court.

It is not necessary to specify all the difficulties which a young officer on this establishment has to overcome in learning the Hindoostanee language; but among them may be mentioned, that of his seldom hearing the language spoken, as his Native servants speak English, and the language of the Carnatic is Tamul; and in none of the provinces under the Madras Government is Hindoostanee the language of the people.

The chance of obtaining the appointment of interpreter is not of itself a sufficient inducement for a young officer to incur the expense and the labour of studying a language which he finds he can do without; but the inducement might be rendered more effectual by carrying into execution the instructions of the Ho-

Court of Directors, 4th Feb. 1815, para. 231. Honourable Court,—that a competent knowledge of Hindoostanee shall be an indispensable qualification in every candidate for a staff-appointment.

I would therefore recommend that the paragraph in question should be adopted as a rule, and published to the army.

It is not necessary that the same proficiency should be required from every staff-officer as from the interpreter; but he should have that knowledge of Hindoostanee which may enable him to discharge his duty efficiently.

Some officers have a talent for acquiring languages, who are in all other respects unfit for a staff employment, and cannot therefore be reckoned in the number of those who are eligible to it. There are other officers who, though they study Hindoostanee, with the hope of obtaining a staff-appointment, would study it without any such object, and would think the expense well compensated by the satisfaction of being able to communicate with the natives, and by the superior advantage it gives them in the discharge of their public duties. But it is notwithstanding certain, that the number of officers who acquire a moderate knowledge even of Hindoostanee is very inadequate to the demand of the service, and that stronger motives than now exist are requisite, in order to procure a sufficient supply. There are two ways of effecting this: one is by providing moonshees and books for the students; the other is by reviving the donation of five hundred pagodas: the donation has this advantage, that while it is the cheapest of the two, it is paid only for proficiency; in the other case, the expense is the same, whether there be proficiency or not.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Minute, November 1823.

I CONCUR entirely with His Excellency the Commander-in-chief in the observations in the minute regarding the importance to the public service of young officers acquiring a knowledge of the Native language, and that the expense which might be incurred in promoting this object would be a judicious sacrifice; but, as the Honourable the Court of Directors have repeatedly ordered the allowance formerly granted to be discontinued, and have said that the quarter-mastership and other staff-offices ought to form a sufficient incitement to the study of the Hindoostanee language, I do not think that the necessity of the case is so urgent as to

justify our acting contrary to their orders. We have not, in the present instance, the same causes as in that of the Judge-Advocate, to expect that the Honourable Court would view with indulgence our acting without waiting for their sanction. There was no encouragement whatever for men to qualify themselves for the office of Judge-Advocate, and this most serious inconvenience had been felt from irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings of courts-martial. We cannot say that there is no encouragement to the study of Hindoostance, when we know that it opens the road to almost every staff-appointment. Some immediate or certain pecuniary aid would no doubt increase the encouragement, and produce a greater number of students; but still we find that, without this aid, it has a very great effect, and of this there can be no better proof than the list brought forward by the Commander-in-chief of fifteen officers examined in the current year, since the beginning of May. I am persuaded that we shall have as great, or even a greater proportion every succeeding year, because, besides the incitement held out by the new office of regimental quartermaster, there is the additional one of knowing that an acquaintance with the Hindoostanee language will now form an essential part of the qualifications for many other staff-employments.

If the Honourable Court authorize any expense on account of the students, it might be done either by restoring the former donation, or by granting such a sum as may be equivalent to the charges incurred by the officers on account of moonshees and books. I cannot recommend the plan of fixed moonshees to corps; it would lead to much inconvenience, and probably to disputes and references. An officer will not do much good with a public moonshee, whom he can have only at a particular hour: if his wish is to make rapid progress, he must have a moonshee of his own, whose service he can command at all hours.

The Commander-in-chief is undoubtedly the proper authority, by which officers are to be selected for the situation of quartermasters; but Government does not fulfil the instructions of the Honourable Court, if it does not see that these officers have a competent knowledge of the language; and the only way in which it can satisfy itself in this respect, is by the report of men qualified to judge. The officers at this Presidency who conducted the examinations are perfectly qualified, and we may safely trust to their opinion; but this is an accidental circumstance, and their successors may not be equally qualified; but Government should

competent to command a corps as they ever can be at any future period. In the infantry and cavalry, as well as in the artillery, a corps is frequently commanded by a major or a captain, and without any injury to the service; and no reasonable augmentation that could be made could secure to us the actual presence of a lieutenant-colonel with every corps.

4. Another of the inconveniencies stated to result from the want of officers is, that twenty-one companies are commanded by subalterns. We cannot say that there is a want of officers, merely because there is not always a captain to each company. The command of a company is not so important or difficult, that it may not with safety be entrusted to a subaltern of from ten to fifteen years' standing. An officer must have served to very little purpose, who is not in that time qualified for a higher command than that of a company.

5. The number of officers employed as commissaries of ordnance, is urged in support of the propriety of an augmentation; but the establishment of officers, when full, is so ample, that it may, without impairing the efficiency of the corps, furnish these commissaries. Besides, in cases of emergency, these ordnance officers are always available for service with the artillery, as they may be ordered to deliver over charge of the stores to an assistant-commissary or conductor, and join their corps.

6. In support of the expediency of the proposed augmentation of European officers with the Golundaus corps, it is observed, "that such a corps, being composed of natives, is as much, if not considerably more dependant upon its European officers than any other." This is a principle which has never yet been admitted with regard to our other Native troops, and to the justness of which I cannot assent. I am so far from thinking that the efficiency of Native troops is increased in proportion to the increased number of European officers, that I think that the number of officers may be too great, and that, when this is the case, it injures the discipline of the corps, and lessens the respect of the Natives for their European officers. Native troops are quiet, orderly, and easily managed. The Native officers are well acquainted with all their duties, and expert in their execution. They conduct almost all the inferior details, and leave but little for the European officer to do. They are, however, apt to grow indolent and careless when left to themselves, and European officers are therefore absolutely necessary to direct them, but not many; one to a company is quite enough for every useful purpose.

7. The only increase of European officers which is really wanted, is to the Golundauz corps, and it should consist of two captains, two first and two second-lieutenants; this, added to the present establishment, would give two European officers to each company, and, allowing for absentees on staff and other duties, would probably always secure the presence of one with each company. Were the corps of Golundauz to remain together in a body, I should consider the present establishment of European officers as quite sufficient. It is only because it is broken into detachments that I recommend an augmentation.

8. There seems to be no sufficient cause for increasing the European officers of the foot-artillery. The present establishment is, one captain, two first, and two second-lieutenants to each company, which, if kept complete, would be an adequate allowance both for ordnance and artillery duties, even if the commissaries of ordnance were exempted from acting as regimental officers. But I am satisfied that they ought to act both as ordnance and regimental officers. There is no commissary where there is not a detachment of artillery; and there can be no necessity for employing any other officer than him to command it. I see nothing serious in the objections stated to this measure. I cannot admit that each of the "two situations require the full and undivided attention of one officer;"—any commissary has ample time for them both. There is no difficulty in his leaving "the charge of his stores, and marching with the artillery, if called upon for service. He has an assistant-commissary, or conductor, competent to the charge, and his making it over to him happens frequently. The check required by the Regulations to be exercised by the commanding-officer of artillery over the commissary is not a material objection, as the issues to the detachment of artillery are very trifling, and their expenditure may, if necessary, be ascertained from his orderly-book, as the issues to all the other troops must be verified by their commanding-officers respectively, and as the commissary is under the check both of the commandant of the station and of the Military Board. The union of the ordnance and artillery has grown out of the experience of its convenience. It is the system best adapted to the nature of the service in this country; and I am convinced that their separation would be attended not only by great expense, but with great detriment to the service.

9. We have, no doubt, too few artillery officers at present;

X.

MINUTE ON THE IMPOLICY OF MIXING EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS, THROUGH DISTRUST OF THE FIDELITY OF THE LATTER.

Dated 18th February 1823.

1. His Excellency the Commander-in-chief has dissented from my proposal of relieving the European corps at Quilon, by a battalion of sepoys instead of his Majesty's 41st regiment now in Fort St. George, on the following grounds:—1st, The danger from the disturbed state and actual rebellion in which the country has been within these few years. 2ndly, The treacherous character of the inhabitants rendering it unsafe to place any confidence in the present apparent tranquillity. 3rdly, That it was in Travancore that the most recent attempt was made to alienate the minds of our Native troops, and that, by withdrawing the Europeans, they would again be exposed to similar temptation. 4thly, The expediency of having European corps with all large bodies of Native troops, not only in order to check incipient discontent, but, in a military point of view, to assimilate discipline, and accustom them to place confidence in each other.

2. These arguments are all entitled to the highest respect; and were I not satisfied that some of them have not the same force which they would have had some years ago, I would not have recommended the present measure. There has been no rebellion, or rather insurrection, in Travancore for above twelve years; and it ought certainly to create no anxiety now. Such disturbances have occurred in many other districts as well as Travancore, without creating any apprehension *now* for their tranquillity.

They are the consequences which, in almost all countries, usually follow, for a time, the establishment of a foreign dominion. Malabar was agitated by rebellion, and is now perfectly quiet; and though one regiment of Europeans is stationed there, it is not entirely for the purpose of keeping the country in subjection, but also for that of more general service, as it can, in case of emergency, be readily moved either to Mysore, or by sea to Bombay and Canara, which, in the early part of our Government, though disturbed by insurrections, and occupied by a large

check incipient discontent, I have great doubt of the policy of the measure, because I think that it would show suspicion, without being efficacious in preventing the danger apprehended; for it is remarkable, that in the only instance in which a conspiracy against the lives of the European officers was carried into execution, a European regiment was present, with only two battalions of sepoy; and yet that regiment was so far from being able to protect the European sepoy officers, that it lost a great part of its own officers and men, and was saved from destruction only by the timely arrival of troops from Arcot. I do not, from this, mean to infer, that European troops may not be useful on such occasions, but that they do not furnish such security as can be entirely depended upon, or as ought to be purchased by any great sacrifice of convenience or economy. I think that the best way of ensuring the fidelity of our Native troops is to show no distrust, but confidence at all times; to treat them well; to keep them occupied; to relieve the different stations regularly; to bring all the corps at certain fixed periods, back to their respective Native districts; and to take care that none of them be permitted to remain too long in any place where they are likely to be tampered with by any Native chief.

6. It appears to me, that in all our cantonments our European corps are so situated as to be exposed to great danger, and to be incapable of acting efficiently in the event of any general conspiracy among the Native troops. The European barracks are so near those of the sepoy, as to be always liable to surprise. In order to be secure, they ought to be at some distance from them: this would enable the European corps to guard against surprise, and more effectually to overawe any combinations of Native troops.

7. It will be obvious, from what has been said, that I do not consider it to be necessary that an European regiment should continue in Travancore. Were it necessary, I should not object to the expense which it would involve; but as it is not, I am unwilling that Government should incur an expense for barracks of not less than rupees 12,100,15,4, more especially when we have barracks for a complete regiment at Wallajahabad, Arnee, and Vel-

confined to the jemadar and men already executed; to the late Dewan of Travancore, and the pretended nephew of the Cottah Rajah, with a few sepoy and peons of very bad characters; and that the saker accused the Native officers either from private motives, or in hopes of saving himself."

too high at present. The coming out of European women to this country should be restricted as much as possible ; for the climate and the way of living are unfavourable to every decent woman who is the wife of a soldier.

15. I have already stated my sentiments on the allowance to half-caste women and children. The measure would in time lead to so much expense, and produce so much distress, and is altogether so extravagant and impolitic, that I should consider myself as wanting in my duty, if I did not recommend to the Honourable Court not to sanction it in any shape, or in any degree, but to reject it entirely. In speaking of the half-caste population, I have chiefly spoken of them as depending on us, not as what they would be if left to themselves, but as what they are made by our injudicious interference. If we limit our care of them to the support of schools, and leave them in every thing else to their own exertions, they will become a numerous, industrious, and useful race of men ; but they must expect, like every other great population, to have among them every gradation of condition, from independence and affluence to poverty and hard labour. They are at present, as far as regards the means of living, in better circumstances than the people of England. Comparing them with an equal number of the people of England, there are among them a smaller proportion subjected to extreme poverty, and a greater who live comfortably. This may last while their number is small, and employment easily found ; but it must gradually cease as they become numerous ; and they must then, like every other great community, have their full proportion of poor. There is no cause why they should not by their own exertions become a thriving people ; they are not at present so well qualified as the Hindoos for hard labour, but they will gradually acquire the habit of labour from necessity ; and they have the advantage of having fewer prejudices, and a better education, and this advantage of education will always continue. The influence of the superior schools at the Presidency will extend to those at a distance, and the acquisition of knowledge will no doubt be encouraged, both by the aid and example of the most respectable part of their own community.

16. It is rather from the desire of concurring, in some degree, in the sentiments of the Commander-in-chief, than from any conviction of the expediency of the proposed increase, that I now agree to adopt some part of it, instead of previously referring the whole subject for the orders of the Honourable Court, as suggested in my former minute.

is probably some error in this number; and though the number privately taught in the provinces does certainly not approach this rate, it is no doubt considerable; because the practice of boys being taught at home by their relations or private teachers, is not unfrequent in any part of the country. The proportion educated is very different of different classes: in some it is nearly the whole; in others it is hardly one-tenth.

3. The state of education here exhibited, low as it is, compared with that of our own country, is higher than it was in most European countries at no very distant period. It has, no doubt, been better in earlier times; but, for the last century, it does not appear to have undergone any other change than what arose from the number of schools diminishing in one place and increasing in another, in consequence of the shifting of the population from war and other causes. The great number of schools has been supposed to contribute to the keeping education in a low state, because it does not give a sufficient number of scholars to secure the service of able teachers. The monthly rate paid by each scholar is from four to six or eight annas. Teachers, in general, do not earn more than six or seven rupees monthly, which is not an allowance sufficient to induce men properly qualified to follow the profession. It may also be said, that the general ignorance of the teachers themselves is one cause why none of them draw together a large body of scholars. But the main causes of the low state of education are the little encouragement which it receives from there being but little demand for it, and the poverty of the people.

4. These difficulties may be gradually surmounted. The hindrance which is given to education by the poverty of the people may, in a great degree, be removed by the endowment of schools throughout the country by Government; and the want of encouragement will be remedied by good education being rendered more easy and general, and by the preference which will naturally be given to well-educated men in all public offices. No progress, however, can be made without a body of better instructed teachers than we have at present. But such a body cannot be had without an income sufficient to afford a comfortable livelihood to each individual belonging to it; a moderate allowance should, therefore, be secured to them by Government, sufficient to place them above want; the rest should be derived from their own industry. If they are superior both in knowledge and diligence to the common village schoolmasters, scholars will flock to them, and augment their income.

This expense will be incurred only by degrees, because it will be long before a sufficient number of qualified teachers can be obtained. The charges for the Madras School Book Society and the collectorate schools are all that will probably be wanted before the sanction of the Honourable Court can be received. The sum for which we ought to request their sanction, ought not to be less than half a lac of rupees. None of the endowments in the collector's Report are applicable to the present object. They do not exceed twenty thousand rupees in all; and only a small portion of them are public grants, and this small portion belongs chiefly to teachers of theology, law, and astronomy. Whatever expense Government may incur in the education of the people, will be amply repaid by the improvement of the country; for the general diffusion of knowledge is inseparably followed by more orderly habits, by increasing industry, by a taste for the comforts of life, by exertions to acquire them, and by the growing prosperity of the people.

8. It will be advisable to appoint a Committee of Public Instruction, in order to superintend the establishing of the public schools, to fix on the plans most proper for them, and the books to be used in them; to ascertain in what manner the instruction of the natives may be best promoted, and to report to Government the result of their inquiries on this important subject.

9. We must not be too sanguine in expecting any sudden benefit from the labours of the School Book Society. Their disposition to promote the instruction of the people, by educating teachers, will not extend it to more individuals than now attend the schools. It can be extended only by means of an increased demand for it, and this must arise chiefly from its being found to facilitate the acquisition of wealth or rank, and from the improvement in the condition of the people rendering a larger portion of them more able to pay for it. But though they cannot educate those who do not seek, or cannot pay for education, they can, by an improved system, give a better education to those who do receive it; and by creating and encouraging a taste for knowledge, they will indirectly contribute to extend it. If we resolve to educate the people, if we persevere in our design, and if we do not limit the schools to tahsildaries, but increase their number so as to allow them for smaller districts, I am confident that success will ultimately attend our endeavours. But, at the same time, I entirely concur in the opinion expressed in the Fifth Report of the Calcutta School-Book Society, when speaking of the system,

office; and if the purchase be of land sold for arrears of revenue, the sale should be null. It may be thought that there could be no harm in allowing him to purchase land when sold by private sale. But it appears to me to be objectionable on two grounds: first, on that of his becoming a landholder in his own district; and secondly, on that of its leaving an opening for converting into a private, what would otherwise have been a public sale. In all unsettled districts, but especially in Tanjore, where the settlements fluctuate annually according to prices; and in many villages, both according to prices and to produce, the principal revenue servants have many means of causing the sale of lands and villages, without appearing to be concerned in it. They may overrate the produce and the prices. They may prevent remission where it is necessary, by underrating the loss of crop from want of water or other causes; and they may insist on punctual payment of the kist when the delay of a month or two would have saved the land-owner from great loss; and he may, in this manner, often be obliged to sell his land, in order to avoid a distress by attempting to retain it. I believe that it is generally understood by the revenue servants, that they are not to purchase land in the districts in which they serve, and that this circumstance restrains them; but were this check removed by such purchases being openly authorized by Government, they would soon be carried to an extent which would be extremely injurious both to the landholders and to the public revenue.

4. The question of revenue officers being proprietors of land in their own districts, is, however, of much less consequence than that of they and their relations being the purchasers of land sold by public auction for arrears of revenue. Wherever such a practice is suffered to exist, it must tend to facilitate the oppression of the land-owners, to spread corruption among the revenue servants, and to destroy the confidence of the people in the protection of the Government. The statement given by the Board of Revenue sufficiently proves how rapidly such a mischievous practice increases when it meets with any encouragement, as in Tanjore. It appears that land belonging to nine hundred and fifteen individuals, bearing an assessment of rupees 1,00,523, has been sold on account of arrears amounting to rupees 3,09,544, and produced at sale, rupees 120,384: that these arrears have been accumulating from so old a date as 1801-2, the first year of the Company's undivided administration of the province: that of this land thirty-two lots

Board of Revenue,
August 8, 1836,
para. 13, 14, &c.

in their own hands. The arrears which occurred under sequestration ought to have been borne exclusively by Government. The cultivators who received tuckavi, were no doubt answerable for it; but accidents often happen, which render them unable to pay it; and when this accrues, it should be remitted. A measure so harsh as the seizure of their whole share of the produce for its liquidation, ought never to be resorted to.

Govt. to Board of Revenue 9th August 1821. 9. The balances of fualies 1211 and 1212 are included in their arrears, though they were ordered by Government to be struck off; and no cause is assigned for their having been retained. The Board

Board of Revenue, 8th August 1810. Distd, 8th August 1825, para. 52. of Revenue recommended that after remitting star pagodas 62,467,29,37 on account of fualies 1218 and 1219 in the province of Tanjore, leaving a balance of star pagodas 10,947,15,15,

the collector should exercise his discretion in collecting it. The balance on this account, however, notwithstanding the sale of so much land, is still rupees 19,413, which I think ought at once to be remitted. The principle

Para. 35. stated by the Board of Revenue, in recommending a remission of star pagodas 59,108 out of a balance of star pagodas 86,597,35,51 on account of the lease from fusly 1220 to 1224, due from villages originally rented, but afterwards assumed and managed by the sirkar servants, namely, "that the deficiency which then occurred could not in fact be regarded in the light of a balance so much as an unavoidable reduction in the settlement," is perfectly correct.

10. The custom of keeping the accumulating balances of a great number of years standing, against districts, is productive of many serious evils, and is scarcely ever attended with any real advantage. We see how small a portion of them has been recovered in Tanjore after the lapse of so many years, and the adoption of such rigorous measures; and if we could trace all the effects of this recovery, we should probably find that it had been obtained partly out of the current year's revenue, and partly by disabling the proprietor from carrying on his cultivation to the usual extent, and that Government had, in fact, gained little or nothing by the recovery. We see that these old balances are good for little else than furnishing the means of corrupting the revenue servants, and of oppressing the inhabitants; and I am therefore of opinion that a period ought to be limited beyond which no balance of land revenue should be demanded. It ought perhaps

office, to spend the surplus in charity and maintaining poor relations, than in saving. They do not admit that public servants ought to be assimilated to private, in being left to depend upon parsimony and their relations, and think that they have a claim to a certain extent upon the State. I never saw any objection to this claim to a certain extent; but I saw very serious objection to its being, by means of a Pension Fund, artificially augmented to an unmanageable extent, which it has been for some years. Long before the establishment of the Pension Fund, claims of real distress were heard, and, I believe, better satisfied than at present, because they were not overwhelmed with a mass of those of another description; and the claims of long and meritorious services were not less attended to than now. The Pension Fund will not provide better for either of these classes than was done without it. But it will certainly do what was not done before,—it will provide for the families of the thoughtless and improvident, at the expense of the careful and frugal; and I agree with the Committee of 1817 in thinking, that it will, among the great body of the Native Servants, have a bad effect in lessening their provident habits. I cannot concur in the opinion of the Honourable Court, that saving is very rare among our Native servants. I believe that it is very general, even among those whose pay is small; and that there are few who, when old, have not, either from their own savings or the aid of children or relatives, the means of subsistence, or whose families, after their death, have not, from some helps, the means of maintaining themselves. If we suppose with the Honourable Court, that few servants can save, there would then be few whose families would not require pensions, and pensions could only be given to a few, by withholding them from many who required them as much as themselves. This is, I believe, what does happen, and what must always in a great degree happen, in the distribution of pensions, founded on our imperfect estimate of the circumstances of our Native servants.

The stoppage for the Pension Fund is said by the Honourable Court to be only the enforcement of a moral obligation. It is a nice point to determine where Government ought to interfere in the enforcement of moral obligations. In many cases, it is best to leave the observances of them to the discretion of the party; and the present appears to me to be one of those cases. Were it certain that Government could discover the objects really entitled to the pension, and grant it accordingly, there might be some

balance the stoppage. At the Presidency, where the duties are of a more fixed and uniform nature, this is not so easy; but in the provinces the case is different, and the fluctuation in the rates of pay must long continue there, because it will be very long before such an uniform system of order can be introduced as will enable us to fix the rates of pay for any considerable time. Our knowledge of every district is more or less imperfect. Investigations must be carried on to enable us to bring them into better order; and the pay of the Natives employed must be regulated by their qualifications, and not by any invariable scale.

I have hitherto been speaking of the Family Pension Fund. I shall now make a few short remarks on the proposed Superannuation Fund, which was disapproved of by the Committee of 1817. I have strong objections to both funds; but of the two, I have the least to the superannuation, because it is much simpler, much easier in its management, and much less liable to abuse, than the other; as we can always ascertain when a servant is superannuated, though we cannot whether a family be in distress or not. But, notwithstanding these advantages, I am averse to the introduction of this fund; because I am averse to every new establishment whose utility is not obvious. Superannuated servants, having claims upon the State, know that they will always be attended to; and it would be better that they should be defrayed from the treasury, than from a subscription fund. The pension in this way would be more honourable, and more acceptable to the pensioner. If it be given from a fund, however moderately and cautiously given at first, it will soon be given with profusion, and exhaust the fund. The heads of departments and officers who recommend, would be partial to their own servants. The very circumstance of there being a fund for the purpose would make them more liberal in proposing the reward, would make them gradually become less severe in their estimate of public merit, and, in time, think it hard to exclude almost any man of a tolerably fair character. It may be said, that Government can prevent any unnecessary expenditure in this respect. It certainly can, if it give sufficient time to the subject; but if we are to judge from experience in all similar matters, it certainly will not, because it could not possibly find time for the requisite inquiry. Were superannuation to be determined solely by length of service, the difficulty would be lessened. But as decay of sight and other infirmities must have a place, the difficulty will continue. There is in the system itself a principle of profusion,

in the encouragement which it gives to constant claims. Government cannot be always on its guard, or at leisure to examine them in detail, and they will undoubtedly soon swallow up the fund.

The Family Pension Fund was never thought of until August 1807, when it was first suggested by the Committee of Finance. No inconvenience had ever been felt from the want of it, during the long previous existence of our Native establishments. No recommendation of it, no call for it, had ever come from any quarter. The opinions of every Committee employed upon the fund have been against it. The Committee of 1813 pointed out the great difficulty of deciding upon claims, and how little aid could be derived from the recommendations of heads of offices. The Committee of 1817 expressed great doubts of the utility of the institution. They showed that it occasioned great and continually increasing labour, and that from the lapses annually accruing in a body of thirty-six thousand subscribers, it would in time become a business of immense detail, and that it tended to corrupt the moral feelings of the natives; and they requested that some other permanent arrangement might be made for the management of the fund, as it occupied too much of the time required for their other duties. When I hear such opinions from a committee composed of men remarkable for their application to public business, I am satisfied that, by establishing a Pension Fund, we are needlessly involving ourselves in a mass of useless and interminable labour, which will waste the time of many public servants, which will lead to expenses which we do not foresee, and which Government will not be able to prevent, or even check, in any degree, without neglecting its more important duties.

As I disapprove entirely both of the Family and Superannuation Pension Funds, I have thought it right to state the grounds of my opinion; but as the Honourable Court have directed their continuance or reinstitution, it only remains for the Board to carry their orders into effect in the way most likely to produce the benefit contemplated, with the least injury to the service, and the least waste of public labour. I am not aware that any better plan can be devised for this purpose than that which has been already suggested, of excluding the lower classes of servants from the Family Pension Fund, and not admitting any claim to superannuation until after thirty years' service. It will not be sufficient to exclude peons and servants whose pay is under three

pagodas. The exclusion ought to extend to all servants whose pay is less than pagodas eight, or rupees twenty-eight, and to all who do not belong to establishments of a permanent nature, whatever the amount of their pay may be.

XVI.

ON THE ABOLITION OF ZILLAH COURTS.

30th January 1827.

1. I HAVE considered with attention the letter from the Honourable the Court of Directors in the judicial department, dated the 11th April 1826. Some of the measures recommended in this letter may be immediately adopted with advantage; but there are some which it would not be advisable to adopt, and others which it may be found useful to introduce hereafter, when the system is more consolidated and better understood, but which it would be inconvenient to carry into effect at present.

2. The Honourable Court, after noticing the abolition of the zillah courts, between February 1821 and March 1823, observes, that the local and superior judicial officers should have been required to report their opinion, before measures of such extreme importance were decided on. The abolition was not hastily adopted; it had been frequently discussed among the members of Government, who were unanimous in their opinion regarding its expediency. Had the members of Government been men of little experience, and unacquainted with the operation of the judicial system, I should undoubtedly have thought it necessary to make a reference to the judicial officers; but Messrs. Stratton and Thackeray, the two civil members, were, from their general knowledge of the service, and experience in the judicial line, at least as competent as any of the local officers to form a just opinion on the subject under consideration; and to have waited, under such circumstances, to collect opinions from every quarter, would have been a mere waste of labour. There are some cases in which it is useful to have the opinion of every local officer; there are others in which that of only one or two of the most intelligent can be of the smallest use; and there are some in which none is necessary. I considered the present to be a case

in which Government could have derived no aid from other opinions in forming its own; for it possessed in itself as extensive a knowledge of the localities of every district under this Presidency, and of the character and customs of the inhabitants, as could have been obtained anywhere else; and as it had before it the periodical returns of the business done in the several courts, it was enabled, by observing what was done in some of the larger and more populous zillahs, to determine how far some of the smaller ones might be united, without detriment to the due administration of justice.

3. It is obvious too, that on such a question as that of the reduction of the number of zillahs, an impartial opinion could hardly have been expected from the judicial officers. They must be supposed to be, like other men, favourable to the branch of service to which they belong; and, however conscientious, they may be liable to be influenced, without being sensible of it, by their wishes and their interests. Had the number of zillah courts been double or even treble of what it actually was, I am satisfied that not a single reduction would have been recommended.

4. Petitions against the abolition of the courts are in general of little weight. They prove nothing against the measure—they arise out of partial local interests. In whatever town or village a zillah court is established, it is beneficial to the inhabitants, not only for the sake of justice, but because it adds to the value of their houses and other property—gives them additional employment, and a better market for their produce. The removal of the court will of course be a loss to the inhabitants of that place and its neighbourhood, and produce petitions; but the same thing would happen if the court were not reduced, but removed within the same zillah, from a small town to a larger one, more conveniently situated for the population of the zillah. Or even if, on removing the court, two courts instead of one were established in the same zillah, the inhabitants of the place from which the court had been removed would still complain. Had the courts been originally three times as numerous as they were, the reduction of any one of them would have produced petitions. Government cannot act upon such petitions, but must look to the wants of the whole country, and be guided by them in distributing the courts.

5. On the introduction of the judicial system, the courts were established at once, without any previous knowledge of the num-

ber that would be requisite. It was soon discovered that there were too many, and several were reduced. Longer experience showed that the business of some courts was much less than that of others; that the business of all had considerably diminished by the operation of the Regulations of 1816 and subsequent enactments; and that a farther reduction could be made without inconvenience, and without imposing upon the courts more labour than they formerly had. It was upon this ground that the reductions from 1821 to 1823 were made; and it is to be regretted that any expression in the minute proposing them should have led the Honourable Court to think that they were connected with the establishment of sub-collectors. There was no connection between the two measures; the sub-collectors would have been appointed had there been no courts to reduce, and the courts would have been reduced even if there had been no intention of appointing sub-collectors. But it was regarded as a satisfactory circumstance, that while we were increasing the expense of one branch of the service, we could lessen that of another, without impairing its efficiency. If we compare Bengal and Madras with respect to their relative extent of territory and amount of revenue, property, and population, and if we take into the account the relief which the Madras zillah courts have derived from the regulations of 1816, I believe it will appear that Madras has as large a proportion of zillah courts as Bengal.

6. The Honourable Court have quoted some reports of judicial
 Para. 11, 12, officers, regarding the great distance which wit-
 13, 14. nesses have sometimes to travel. A case is stated in Canara, in which some of the witnesses resided at the distance of two hundred, and others of two hundred and sixty miles from the zillah courts. Mangalore, the Court station, is about fifty miles from the southern extremity, and one hundred and sixty from the northern extremity of Canara, and about two hundred and ten from the most distant part of Soondah. There was a zillah court at Honawur, which was abolished many years ago by a former Government; and had the remaining court been then transferred from Mangalore to Cundapoor or Barroor, where the collector's cutcherry was for some years, though it would have been equally distant from the northern and southern points of Canara, it would have obviated, as far as regards distance, every material inconvenience which has been since experienced. Canara is a long narrow tract of country, not more than twenty or thirty miles in its average width; and Soondah, which is

the motives which may have led to this preference. In some instances it may have been the belief that the case would have been better examined in the zillah court,—in others, it may have been the contrary. The character of the court, and the case being a plain or intricate one, would often influence the suitor in his choice of a court. In many cases, recourse was no doubt had to the zillah judge, because the suitors resided in the town which was the station of the zillah court: but one thing is clear, that, as all causes coming before the district moonsiffs might have gone to the judge, and as so small a proportion of them did go, the moonsiff's court is much more popular than the zillah court. It cannot be denied, that the abolition of the zillah courts was attended with inconvenience from the loss of the services of the sudder ameenas. But it was soon remedied by the appointment of additional moonsiffs.

9. It is apprehended by the Honourable Court, *Para. 20.* that when, in consequence of the late reduction of the zillah courts, "access to justice becomes very difficult, crimes are winked at or compromised, prosecutions are prevented, information is suppressed, and acts of fraud and violence, scarcely less terrible to the community in their commission than in their discovery and its consequences, must necessarily increase, although the Government may not be aware of the sufferings of the people." There is no cause, I think, for the apprehension here expressed. When, at an earlier period, several zillah courts were reduced, and Cuddspah and Bellari, each more extensive than any of the enlarged zillahs, were left with one zillah court each, no such apprehension was entertained, and no such consequences followed; and there is no reason to believe that they are more likely to follow in the recently enlarged zillahs. Crimes have not increased, they are gradually diminishing, and will continue to diminish. If the Honourable Court suppose that crimes can be prevalent without the knowledge of Government, or that the sufferings of the people can be concealed from it, they have formed an opinion of the state of things under this Presidency which is far from being correct; there can hardly be any crime, and there can be no suffering of the people, concealed from Government. There may be a very few exceptions in some of the hill zemindaries, where the authority of Government scarcely reaches, but in all other districts the detailed nature of our internal administration, and the innumerable body of rayets who hold their lands immediately of Government, bring us into such

universal and direct intercourse with the people, as to preclude the possibility of their sufferings being concealed from us.

Para. 22. 10. It is remarked by the Honourable Court, that the village moonsiffs, estimated to amount to fifty thousand, are vested with much uncontrolled power, and are subject to great temptations, which too many of them are unable to resist; that the fear of prosecution in the zillah courts was an useful check upon them, and that the late reduction of courts will remove this check. This opinion is not supported by any experience we have yet had. The village moonsiffs are so far from abusing their power, that very few of them act at all; their dread of being summoned on some false complaint or other to the zillah court is so great, that most of them avoid exercising the authority intrusted to them. This unwillingness was foreseen at the time the regulation was passed, but not to the extent it has since been found to exist. Had they been left, according to ancient usage, responsible, in the first instance only, to their tishildar, they would, in general, have discharged the duties of the petty jurisdiction assigned to them; but the fear of the court is so great, that only a small portion of the more intelligent venture to act at all; the abolition of the courts has not made them more confident; and it will yet be a very long time before they acquire confidence sufficient to enable them to become so useful in their subordinate station as they ought to be.

Para. 22. 11. It is stated very justly by the Honourable Court, that in order to form a just estimate of the merit due to the district moonsiffs, from the small proportion of appeals made from their decision, we ought not to compare the number of appeals with the number of decisions, but with the number of suits appealable; and that, if this were done, the result would be less favourable to the moonsiffs. It is also remarked, that many appeals are prevented by expense and other obstacles; but this surely is not peculiar to the moonsiffs, more than to the zillah and provincial courts. Even if we take only the appealable suits, the proportion of appeals will still be so small as to be very creditable to the moonsiffs. The records of the Government-offices do not supply the information required, as they do not distinguish between the suits above and below twenty rupees; and as it would take a considerable time to get it from the provinces, it will suffice, for the present purpose, to exhibit the returns which I have obtained from two of the nearest zillahs, Combaconum and Cuddapah.

to Masulipatam on the sea-shore; but the hill inhabitants of the other, it is said, can only, with safety to their lives, be sent to Rajahmundry. The real hill inhabitants, those who actually reside upon the hills, are very few, and they would probably suffer from confinement in any gaol; but the people who fill our gaols are those of the plains, and of the valleys among the hills, and they are so much the same race, that no line could possibly be drawn so as to distinguish which of them should, for the sake of health, be sent to one gaol, and which to another.

13. The Honourable Court have adverted at Para. 26, 29. considerable length, and with just severity, upon the conduct of the native police officers in extorting confessions from prisoners, and they specify some very atrocious cases, among which are the murder of a man by a peon, in endeavouring to extort a confession, and the maiming a prisoner by a potail, in torturing him for the same object. In both these cases, however, it is satisfactory to know that the offenders were convicted and punished, one capitally, and the other with two years' imprisonment and hard labour. The judge who reports, fears that cases of forced confession are too common, even among the officers of Government; but observes, that the proof is difficult. When violence really takes place, the proof cannot be difficult; but I believe that, in a great proportion of the cases where it is charged, none has been used. It is much more general in Malabar and Canara than in other zillahs, and the difference is probably owing to the people of Malabar and Canara still retaining much of the turbulent and vindictive character which they acquired while divided into petty states, and little restrained by any regular authority from exercising acts of outrage on each other.

14. It is, no doubt, too certain that many irregularities are used in obtaining confessions, and that in some instances atrocious acts are committed; but when we consider the great number of prisoners apprehended, and the habits of the people themselves, always accustomed to compulsion where there is suspicion, how difficult it is to eradicate such habits, and how small the proportion of cases in which violence has been used is to the whole mass, the number of these acts is hardly greater than was to be expected, and is every day diminishing. The prohibition against forced confessions is known to all native police officers; and it seems extraordinary that they should ever employ force, for they know that they have much to lose and nothing to gain by such conduct; but some of them, in spite of every injunction to the

present most requires help, is Cuddapah; but I imagine that the pressure there is only temporary; that it has arisen in a great degree out of the disorders caused by the famine in 1823-4, and that it will soon cease. Salem, both from its great extent and population, ought to have an assistant judge, either at Coimbatore or any other convenient station. Masulipatam, for the same reasons, should have an assistant judge; but I am not sure that it may be advisable to transfer the zillah judge to Rajahmundry, and station the assistant at Masulipatam. The towns both of Rajahmundry and Masulipatam are situated on the extremity of their respective districts, but Rajahmundry is central to both.

18. I concur also with the Honourable Court, in thinking that the native judicial officers of the assistant judges should, in the first instance, be taken from the officers of the reduced zillah courts, as far as they may be properly qualified, and that the vacancies which may occur afterwards should be filled from the list of district moonsiffs, in order that we may have a gradation of Native as well as European officers: Such gradation is desirable in every department: It encourages good conduct, and secures to the public the services of zealous and experienced servants. It should however be understood, that merit alone can entitle any individual to promotion.

19. Some advantages might result from carrying into effect the suggestions of the Honourable Court, regarding the zillah judges holding alternate sessions at different places within the zillah; but I imagine that they would be at least counterbalanced by the inconveniences which would attend the measure. The visiting and inspecting of the district moonsiffs by the zillah judge might be useful; but, on the other hand, the general progress of business would probably be retarded by his absence from the court station, by the time spent in travelling, and by the partial hindrance of the moonsiffs' proceedings while engaged with him. The same object might perhaps be attained by sending occasionally for such of the moonsiffs as most appeared to require instruction, and employing them for a time under his own eyes at the court station. His travelling for the purpose of learning the state of the police, and hearing complaints against it, and communicating his information to the magistrate and the provincial court, would do no good, and might often lead to inconvenient interference, by diverting his attention from the duties more properly his own to those which did not belong to him. It will be much safer to leave the supervision of the

police to the magistrate and the court of circuit. Before coming, however, to any final resolution on the question of the zillah judge visiting the stations of the district moonsiffs, it may be advisable to refer it for the opinion of the judicial department.

Para. 43.

20. The Honourable Court are apprehensive that the allowing fees to the district moonsiffs "may have conduced rather to the quick dispatch, than to the satisfactory adjustment of the business before their courts;" and they observe, that the number of suits appealed should be contrasted with the number appealable, before it can be proved that their proceedings are of a satisfactory character. We have not, as already stated, before us the documents required for making this comparison; but it is sufficiently evident, from the continued resort of the people to the courts of the district moonsiffs, that their decisions are in general satisfactory.

21. As the Honourable Court disapprove of the abolition of fees on suits under ten rupees, which was done with the view of leaving no inducements to the district moonsiffs to use any undue means for drawing such petty suits into their own courts, and as the abolition of the fees does not appear to have had any material effect in any way, it seems proper that they should be restored.

Para. 43 to 60.

22. In order to encourage the district moonsiffs not only to dispose of their business without delay, but also to weigh maturely the merits of each particular case, the Honourable Court recommend that their payment by fees should be abolished, and that they should receive a salary somewhat higher than the average amount of their present salary and fees together; and that "no suit instituted in a district moonsiff's court should be subjected to a higher fee than two and a half per cent.," which reduction, they expect, will bring a large addition in the district moonsiff's court. I do not think that the reduction of fee to two and a half per cent. would increase the business in the district moonsiff's court, because I am convinced that all which now goes there would go even if there were no fees. The business in these courts is more likely to diminish than to increase: some of the moonsiffs already complain of having too little business. It does not appear therefore to be necessary to give them a salary in place of fees, to enable them to weigh cases more maturely. Such a plan may be proper at a future period, but not for many years: it is not suited to the present habits and opinions of the people. The moonsiff system is both popular and

efficient far beyond every expectation that was formed of it, and is becoming more so every day. It is better not to disturb it, but to let it go on as at present until it shall have acquired more firmness by time, by the improved judicial knowledge of the moonsiffs, and the increased respect of the people. If the fee should have a tendency, in some cases, to stimulate the moonsiff to too hasty decisions, it is to be recollected that it is checked by the fear of suitors not coming to his court. If his decisions were wrong, either from haste or any other cause, the people would soon discover it, and carry their suits to the zillah court, if they could not be settled in the village. If the business were in any case actually too great for him to get through properly, the inconvenience could always be easily remedied, by appointing an additional moonsiff. But though I would not think it safe to shake the public confidence in the moonsiff system by so great an innovation as the substitution of salary for fees, I highly approve of the recommendation, that the fee in the district moonsiff's court should not exceed two and a half per cent. I think, however, that it would be more convenient to make the fee half an anna per rupee. The difference is trifling, and the calculation would be more easily understood by the poorer classes of the people. The charge of half an anna is so slight, that it may be adopted for every sum cognizable by the district moonsiff. The decrease of receipt which will be occasioned by the lowering of the fee, should be borne by Government, and it should in no way affect the income of the moonsiff, who should continue to receive, as at present, one anna per rupee.

23. I am doubtful of the propriety of leaving to the district moonsiffs a discretion of admitting pauper cases into their courts; but the subject may be referred for the opinion of the judicial department.

Para. 51. 24. The granting rewards to meritorious moonsiffs

and to head police officers for exemplary discharge of their duty, as recommended by the Honourable Court, will no doubt be productive of considerable public benefit, and ought therefore to be carried into effect. It does not appear to be necessary to attach higher allowances to certain districts, in order to reward extraordinary merit in moonsiffs, by appointing them to them. In almost every zillah, there are at present one or two moonsiffs' districts, in which the allowances from fees are considerably higher than in the rest, and to which the more meritorious moonsiffs may be nominated as vacancies occur. It is not

by law, instead of being, as they were when incorporated with other zillahs, from the effects of the moonsiff system, of the magistrates' increased jurisdiction, and of other causes, as much protected by the zillah court, and as completely under its control, as they were in their separate state when first established. It is unquestionably the duty of Government to establish all the judicial courts that may be necessary for the due distribution of justice; but it has also another duty,—not to waste the resources of the country in useless and expensive establishments. The judicial establishments of this Presidency were at one time on a scale of extravagance far beyond that of any other country, or what the resources of any country could maintain. They have since been reduced at different times, and are now at a standard more proportionate to the wants of the people; and any temporary pressure which may arise will be easily relieved by the appointment of an assistant judge, without the necessity of any additional zillah courts. In every country some districts must be far from the principal courts, because no country can afford to maintain expensive judicial courts, merely because some individuals of such remote districts may otherwise have to travel an inconvenient distance once or twice in the course of their lives. Expensive establishments, when once sanctioned, are not easily put down. There is never any difficulty in finding plausible reasons to keep up a lucrative office; and if the office be judicial, the protection of the people can always be brought forward in defence of it; but the people would be much more solidly protected by abolishing the expensive establishment, and remitting the amount in their assessment.

30. I shall now recapitulate the several points which I have in this minute recommended for the approval of the Board.

1st, That assistant judges be appointed to certain districts, and that a regulation be framed defining their duties and relation to the zillah judge.

2nd, That the suggestion in the letter of the Honourable Court, regarding the zillah judges holding sessions with their district moonsiffs, be referred for the opinion of the Sudder Adawlut and subordinate courts.

* 3rd, That the district moonsiffs be authorised to levy fees on suits under ten rupees.

4th, That all suits in the district moonsiffs' courts shall pay a fee of half an anna per rupee, and no more; and that one

anna per rapee shall be paid to the district moonsiff by Government.

5th, That the discretion proposed by the Honourable Court to be allowed to district moonsiffs in admitting pauper suits, be referred to the Sudder Adawlut.

6th, That honorary rewards be granted to meritorious district moonsiffs and native heads of police, at the close of each year.

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

CANIATCHY, or by mistake **CALLATCHY**. A term used in Malabar, signifying landed inheritance or property, having nearly the same signification as the Persian word *Meerussacc*.

CANONGEE. An officer of the government, whose duty was to keep a register of all circumstances relating to the land revenue, and, when called upon, to declare the customs of each district, the nature of the tenures, the quantity of land in cultivation, the nature of the produce, the amount of rent paid, &c.

CAURY, or **CARI**. Mohammedan judge or justice, who occasionally officiates also as a public notary, in attesting deeds, by affixing his seal thereto.

CHOKMEDAR. A watchman.

CHOKY, or **CHOKER**. A chair, sent. Guard, watch.

CHOULTRY. A covered public building, generally of hewn stone, often richly carved and ornamented, for the accommodation of travellers.

CHOUT. A fourth; a fourth part of sums litigated.

CROWDRY. A permanent superintendent and receiver of the land revenue under the Hindoo system, whose office seems to have been partly superseded, by the appointment, first, of the *Crore*, and, afterwards of the *Zemindar*, by the Mohammedan government.

CHUDDAR. Staff-bearer.

CHUCKERS. Extra assessments in Canara under the former governments.

CHUCKER. A wheel, a circle. Extra assessment in Canara of 1720.

CHUCKLA. A division of a country consisting of several *pergunnahs*, sometimes equal to a moderate-sized English county, and of which a certain number constituted a *cincar*, or *chiefship*.

CINCAR. Head of affairs. The state or government. A grand division of a province. A head man.

COOLIES, *sing.* **COOLY**. Labourers, porters.

COOLWAR, or **CULWAR**. A statement of the *Ryots* holding lands; or a settlement made with the *Ryots* individually.

COSE. A corrupt term used by Europeans to denote a road measure of about two miles; but varying in different parts of India.

COWL. Word, saying; promise, agreement, contract, engagement.

COWRY. A small shell which passes as money.

CRORE. Ten millions.

ENAMUDAN. Holder of any thing as a favour. A person in the possession of rent-free, or favourably rented lands; or in the enjoyment, under assignment thereof, of the government dues from a particular portion of land, granted from charity, &c.

FAQUEER. A poor man, mendicant, or wandering beggar of the sect of Mohammed.

FASI, or FAZAL. Season, crop, harvest.

FIRMAUN. Order, mandate. An imperial decree, a royal grant or charter.

FOUJDAR. Under the Mogul government, a magistrate of the police over a large district, who took cognizance of all criminal matters within his jurisdiction, and sometimes was employed as receiver-general of the revenues.

FOUJDARRY. Any thing appertaining to a Foujdar, as his office, jurisdiction, court, and the like. Also the produce of fines, confiscations, and chout, in the Foujdarry courts.

FOUJDARRY ABWAB. Foujdarry assessments. Assessments made by the Foujdars.

FOUJDARRY COURT. A court for administering the criminal law.

FUSLY. What relates to the seasons: the harvest year.

FUSLY KHERREF. The autumnal season or harvest, for rice, millet, &c.

FUSLY RUBEY. The spring season or harvest, for peas, wheat, &c.

FOTWAB. A judicial decree, sentence, or judgment; particularly when delivered by a Mufti or doctor of Mohammedan law.

GAM. A village.

GANGANAH. By villages, a settlement by villages. A term equivalent to Mouswar, used to designate a village settlement.

GATWALL. Who has charge of a pass in the mountains, or a landing-place on a river.

GENTOO. Indian. One of the aborigines of India. At Madras our countrymen use this term to designate the language and people of Tellingana.

GHEE. Clarified butter, in which state they preserve that article for culinary purposes.

GIRDAWAR, or GIRDWAR. An overseer of police, under whom the Gozandes or informers act, and who has the power to apprehend those whom the latter point out.

GOMASTAH. A commissioner, factor, agent.

GOOROO. Graves, a grave man; the spiritual guide of a Hindoo.

GOZENDA. An informer; a spy to discover public offenders.

GRAM, or GRAMA. A village.

GRANA KUTICH. Village charges or expenditure.

HAKIM. Commander, ruler, governor, master. The governing authority in a province.

HASTABOOD. Literally what is and was. A comparative account; an examination by measurement of the assets or resources of the country, made immediately previous to the harvest; also, in a more general sense, a detailed inquiry into the value of lands financially considered.

HAVELLY. House, habitation, domain. In Bengal the term is applied to such lands as are held by a Zemindar for his own benefit; but at Madras it designates such as are under the immediate management of government, without the intervention of Zemindars or Jaghiredars, the revenues of which are either farmed out on short leases, or collected by its own officers, without any other agency.

HINDOO, or HINDU. One of the aborigines of India, by the Persians called Hind.

HOBLY. A district.

HUZZOOR. The presence. The seat of government, or of the European authority in a collectorship.

JAGHIRE or JAGHEER. Literally the place of taking. An assignment of the Government share of the produce of a portion of land to an individual.

JAGHIRE BECKSHER. A jaghire for the support of a General or Commander-in-chief.

JAGHIRE CIRCAR. The jaghire of the Government; the Company's jaghire under the Presidency of Fort St. George.

JAGHIRE DEWANNY. The jaghire of the Dewanny; i. e. of the office of Dewan held by the Company.

JAGHIRE TANAHAT. Jaghires for the support of Tanahs, or small garrisons of Sebundy troops.

JAMMA. The whole, total, sum, amount, sum total, assembly, collection. The total of a territorial assessment.

JANNABUNDY. A settlement of the total of an assessment, or a written statement of the same.

position. An occasional impost or tax sometimes included in the Abwab.

MEERASS. Heritage, patrimony.

MEERASSADAR. The holder or possessor of a heritage. **Meerass.** The proprietor of land.

MEERASSER. Hereditary, hereditary property.

MOOUDDINS. Placed before, antecedent, prior, foremost. Head ryot, or principal man in a village, who superintends the affairs of it, and, among other duties, collects the rents of government within his jurisdiction. The same officer is in Bengal called also Mundul, and in the Peninsula Good and Potail.

MOOUDDER. Fixed, established, permanent.

MOOUDDERY. As applied to lands, means lands let on a fixed lease.

MOUSSIL. Separated, particularized, distinguished, divided into distinct parts, detailed. The subordinate divisions of a district, in contradistinction to the term Sudder, which implies the chief seat of government; also the country, as opposed to town; the interior of the country. As applied to accounts, the term signifies detailed, or those accounts which are made up in the villages and pergunnahs, or larger divisions of country, by the Putwarries, Canongoes, or Serishtadars. As applied to charges, it signifies the expense of village and pergunnah officers, employed in the business of receiving, collecting, settling, and registering the rents, such as Moouddins, Putwarries, Peons, Pykes, Canon-goes, Serishtadars, Aumeens, &c.

MOUSSIL. Provincial court of civil justice.

MOUSSER or MOUTH. A writer, or clerk in an office.

MOLUNGRO. Manufacturer of salt.

MONIGAR. A surveyor, a supervisor, or manager.

MOOFTY. The Mohammedan law officer who declares the sentence.

MOOFTY. A learned and religious man. An Interpreter of the Mohammedan law.

MOONSHER. Letter-writer, secretary.—Europeans give this title to the native who instructs them in the Persian language.

MOOTAH. In the Northern Circars, a small district or subdivision of a country, consisting of a certain number of villages, more or less. A farm of several villages.

MOOTAHARRY. What relates to a Mootahdar.

MOOTADAR. A person on whom the Zemindarry rights of a mootah are conferred by the government, under the conditions of a perpetual settlement.

MORAH. In Canara, rent in kind. A field, let to a tenant at will, is reckoned and called a field of so many morahs.

MUNGOORY. Applied to lands, means fresh, in contradistinction to Nemucky, or salt lands.

MUGGS. Pirates from the coast of Arracan, who formerly committed great depredations in the river Ganges.

MULLA. A learned man, a schoolmaster.

MUNDUL. A circle, a division of country so called. The head man of a village; the same as Mocuddim.

MUNSIFF. A just and equitable man; native justice, or judge, whose powers do not extend farther than to suits for personal property not exceeding fifty rupees.

MUSNUH. The place of sitting; a seat, a throne, or chair of state.

MUTSEDDY. Intent upon. Writer, accountant, clerk in a public office.

NAIB. A deputy.

NAIB NAZIM. Deputy of the Nazim or governor.

NAIK. Lender, conductor, chief; petty military officer.

NAIR. Chief, head man. The Nairs are a peculiar description of Hindoos, principally of the military class, who hold lands in Malabar.

NAUNCAR, or NANCAR. Allowance or assignment for bread or subsistence. An assignment of land, or the Government dues from a particular portion of land, calculated to yield five per cent. on the net receipts into the treasury, held by a Zemindar. The term is also applied to the official lands of the Canongoes and other revenue servants.

NAWAB. Very great deputy, vicegerent, viceroy. The governor of a province under the Mogul government, whom we call Nabab.—The title of a Nawab, by courtesy, is often given to persons of high rank or station.

NAZIR. A supervisor or inspector.

NAZIM. Composer, arranger, adjuster. The first officer or governor of a province, and minister of the department of criminal justice: styled also Nawab and Soubahdar.

NEEM TUCKY, or NEM TAUKA. A perquisite of half a

the Peninsula similar to hill Zemindars in the Northern Circars ; the chief of a Pollum.

POTAL. Head man of a village who collects rents from the other Ryots therein, and has the general superintendence of its concerns. The same person who in Bengal is called Mocuddim and Mundul.

POTTAHS TANAJAT. Pottahs or leases given to the cultivators individually.

POLLAH. A lease granted to the cultivators on the part of Government, either written on paper, or engraved with a style on the leaf of the fan palmyra tree ; by Europeans called Cadgan.

POTTAHS TUCKA. Pottahs granted to small farmers.

PUNCHAYET. Five assembled. An assembly or jury of five persons to whom a cause is referred for investigation and decision ; an ancient Hindoo establishment.

PUNDIT. A learned Brahmin.

POTWARRY. Village accountant ; the same as the Carnum of the Peninsula.

PYKE. A foot messenger. A person employed as a night-watch in a village, and as a runner or messenger on the business of the revenue.

RAJAH. King, prince, chieftain, nobleman. A title in ancient times given to chiefs of the second or military Hindoo tribe only.

RAJE. The title, office, or jurisdiction of a Rajah.

RANNY. Queen, Princess ; wife of a Rajah.

RAZENANAH. A written testimonial given by a plaintiff, upon a cause being finally settled, that he is satisfied.

ROY ROWAN, or ROY ROYAN. A Hindoo title given to the principal officers of the Khalsa, or chief treasurer of the exchequer.

ROZINAH. Daily, daily allowance. Daily allowance to the Brahmins, &c. An item of the Muscorat.

RUSSOOM. Customs, customary commissions, gratuities, fees, or perquisites. Sharers of the crops and ready money payments received by public officers as perquisites attached to their situation.

RYOT. Peasant, subject ; tenant of house or land.

RYOTWAR. According to or with Ryots. A Ryotwar or Kulwar settlement is a settlement made by Government immediately with the Ryots individually, under which the Govern-

ment receives its dues in the form of a money rent fixed on the land itself in cultivation, and not being a pecuniary commutation for its share of the produce, varying as the extent of the produce may vary in each year; but under an Aumanee settlement the Government receives its dues in kind from each cultivator.

SALAM. Salutation, or the form of saluting, generally by touching the forehead with the right hand.

SAWARY. Lord, master, owner, proprietor. A title given also by the Hindoos of the Peninsula to their gods.

SAWARY BOGUN. The lord's enjoyment or possession. The lord's right as proprietor. Quit-rent or acknowledgment of proprietary right in the Peninsula.

SAYER. What moves. Variable imposts, distinct from land-rent or revenue, consisting of customs, tolls, licences, duties on merchandize and other articles of personal moveable property, as well as mixed duties, and taxes on houses, shops, bazars.

SHAIKDHAR. Title of an Aumildar, in the Northern Circars, in his capacity of Dewanny or financial delegate.

SHASTER. The instrument of Government, or instruction. Any book of instruction, particularly containing Divine ordinances.

SHIKISTAN. A public record.

SHIKISTADAR. Keeper of the records; or one who keeps a record of accounts or particular transactions. The recorder in a court of justice under the Company's government. A revenue accountant of a district, who checks the accounts of the regular village Curnum or accountant.

SHROF. A banker or money changer.

SIRDAR FOJJE. Captain of the military. Title of an Aumildar in his military capacity.

SIRDAR. Chieftain, captain, head man.

SOUBAHDARRY. The office or jurisdiction of a Subahdar.

SOUCAR. A merchant or banker. A money lender.

SUBAH. A province, such as Bengal. A grand division of a country, which is again divided into circars, chucklaha, pergunnahs, and villages.

SUBAHAR. The viceroy or governor of a province.

SUDDER. The breast; the fore court of a house. The chief seat of government contradistinguished from Mofussil, or interior of the country.

SUDDER DEWANNY ADAWLUT. The chief civil court of justice under the Company's government held at the Presidency.

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